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RUSH TO CLOSURE: LESSONS OF THE 
TADIC JUDGMENT 
Jose E. Alvarez* 
"Courts try cases, but cases also try courts." 
- Justice Robert Jackson1 
In 1993 and 1994, following allegations of mass atrocities, in­
cluding systematic killings, rapes, and other horrific forms of vio­
lence in Rwanda and the territories of the former Yugoslavia, two 
ad hoc international war crimes tribunals were established to prose­
cute individuals for grave violations of international humanitarian 
law, including genocide.2 As might be expected, advocates for the 
creation of these entities - the first international courts to prose­
cute individuals under international law since the trials at 
Nuremberg and Tokyo after World War II - aspired to grand goals 
inspired by, but extending far beyond, the pedestrian aims of ordi­
nary criminal prosecutions. Those who pushed for the creation of 
these tribunals argued that, as with earlier trials of major Nazi and 
Japanese wartime leaders, properly conducted international crimi­
nal trials, brought by and on behalf of the international community, 
would: threaten those in positions of power to deter further vio­
lence; make possible atonement for the perpetrators and honor the 
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. B.A. 1977, Harvard; B.A. 
(M.A.) 1979, Oxford; J.D. 1981, Harvard. - Ed. The author gratefully acknowledges com­
ments received on portions and prior drafts of this article from Susan Damplo, Catharine 
MacKinnon, Theodor Meron, Mark Osiel, Gerry Simpson, Eric Stein, and James Boyd 
White. While some of these individuals would take issue with much of what is said here, their 
challenging criticism proved invaluable. The author is also grateful for the continued finan­
cial support provided by the University of Michigan Law School's Cook research fund. 
1. Quoted in TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PER­
SONAL MEMOIR 45 (1992). 
2. The war crimes tribunals for both the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were established 
by the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council under its Chapter VII powers. See S.C. Res. 
827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/827 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY 
Statute]; Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolu­
tion 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993) [hereinafter Report of the Secre­
tary-General] (establishing the tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and containing that 
tribunal's statute); 3 S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 
(1994) [hereinafter !CTR Statute] (establishing the tribunal for Rwanda and containing that 
tribunal's statute). The tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was established in The Hague, the 
Netherlands, and the tribunal for Rwanda in Arusha, Tanzania. 
This author uses "war crimes" to describe the offenses involved in the Rwandan and 
Balkan prosecutions even though, as is clear from the statutes of these tribunals, the jurisdic­
tion of each extends beyond violations of the laws and customs of war. 
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dead; provide a mechanism to enable victims and their families to 
receive needed psychological relief, identify remains, restore lost 
property, and otherwise help heal wounds; channel victims' thirst 
for revenge toward peaceful dispute settlement; affirm the 
Nuremberg Principles at the international level while restoring faith 
in the rule of law generally; tell the truth of what occurred, thereby 
preserving an accurate historical account of barbarism that would 
help prevent its recurrence; and, perhaps most important, restore 
the lost civility of tom societies to achieve national reconciliation,3 
This article reexamines these goals in light of the judgment is­
sued after the first full trial at the Yugoslav tribunal, the case 
against the Serb former cafe owner, Dusan "Dusko" Tadic.4 In my 
view, the form, structure and content of this historic judgment sug­
gest adherence to what Mark Osiel has characterized, in other con­
texts, as a model of closure.5 Under this model, inspired by the 
Nuremberg trials and subsequent criminal prosecutions for "admin-
3. This is a distillation of the goals most frequently articulated by the diplomats who 
established these tribunals and the relevant epistemic co=unity of international lawyers. 
For various views, see, for example, Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand 1lvo 
Hundred and Seventeenth Meeting, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 12-14, U.N. Doc. SI 
PV.3217 (1993) (statement of Mrs. Albright, United States); Provisional Verbatim Record of 
the Three Thousand One Hundred and Seventy-Fifth Meeting, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th 
mtg. at 8, 27, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3175 {1993) (statement of Mr. Merimee, France) STEVEN R. 
RA'INER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN 
lNTBRNATIONAL LAW 135-36 {1997); MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE 214-28 {1997); 
Payam Akhavan, Justice and Reconciliation in the Great Lakes Region of Africa: The 
Contribution of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 7 DuKE J. COMP. & INTL. L. 
325, 336-43 {1997); Payam Akhavan, Punishing War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia: A 
Critical Juncture for the New World Order, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 262 {1993); Richard J. 
Goldstone, Conference Luncheon Address, Address Before the Minnesota Advocates for 
Human Rights {Mar. 23, 1996), in 7 TRANSNATL. L. & CoNTBMP. PRoas. 1 {1997); Theodor 
Meron, Answering for War Crimes, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 2, 6-7 [hereinafter 
Meron, Answering for War Crimes] ; Theodor Meron, The Case for War Crimes Trials in Yit­
goslavia, FOREIGN AFF., Su=er 1993, at 122 [hereinafter Meron, The Case for War Crimes 
Trials]; Prosecuting and Defending Violations of Genocide and Humanitarian Law: The Inter­
national Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 88 ASIL PRoc. 239 {1994) [hereinafter Prosecut­
ing and Defending Violations]; Naomi Robt-Arriaza, Punishment, Redress, and Pardon: 
Theoretical and Psychological Approaches, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTBRNA· 
TIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 13, 13-21 (Naomi Robt-Arriaza ed., 1995) [hereinafter IMPUNITY 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS]; Minna Schrag, The Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal: An Interim As­
sessment, 7 TRANSNATL. L. & CoNTBMP. PROBS. 16, 19-20 (1997); Daphna Shraga & Ralph 
Zacklin, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 7 EUR. J. INTL. L. 501, 502-04 
{1996); see also W. Michael Reisman, Institutions and Practices for Restoring and Maintaining 
Public Order, 6 DUKE J. CoMP. & INTL. L. 175 (1995) {discussing seven fundamental goals of 
legal systems designed to restore and maintain public order). 
I 
4. Opinion and Judgment, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T (Trial Chamber, Intl. 
Trib. for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Intl. Humanitarian 
Law Committed in  the T erritory of F ormer Yugo. since 1991, May 7, 1997) 
<http://www.un.org/icty/970507jt.htm> [hereinafter Tadic Judgment]. 
5. Mark Osiel, Ever Again: Legal Remembrance of Administrative Massacre, 144 U. PA. 
L. REv. 463, 486-88 (1995). 
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istrative massacre[ s ]" in national courts, it is assumed that such pro­
ceedings will draw upon "an already-existing consensus" regarding 
"first principles" and evoke in participants and observers a sense of 
social solidarity premised on the "common values" of Emile 
Durkheim's "collective conscience."6 
With respect to the Balkans and Rwanda, advocates of these 
prosecutions start from the premise that such trials "assign guilt for 
war crimes to the individual perpetrators . . . rather than allowing 
blame to fall on entire groups and nations."7 Tribunal advocates, 
commonly members of the "invisible college" of international law­
yers,8 generally assume that only individual, not collective, attribu­
tion of responsibility can terminate historical cycles of inter-group 
bloodletting; that only by bringing individuals to the dock will vic­
tims and survivors cease to "cry out for justice against the group" 
and find closure.9 In the words of a former prosecutor at the 
Yugoslav tribunal, Minna Schrag, by finding identifiable individuals 
accountable, the rest of the community is not "associated with col­
lective guilt ... ," and generations do not grow up saying "it's the 
Serbs or the Croats or any other group that did this to my father 
• • • •  "10 It is also assumed that, by punishing the guilty- and only 
the guilty - all of the other Nuremberg-inspired goals enumerated 
above will thereby be advanced. 
The recipe for emotionally cathartic closure as the mechanism 
by which all these diverse goals are achieved is commonly grounded 
in a victim-centered approach that blurs the lines between criminal 
6. MARK OsrnL, MAss ATROCITY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND nm LAW 22, 24 (1997) 
(citing EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SocIETY (George Simpson trans., 
1964)). This is an extended version of Osiel's article, Ever Again. See Osiel, supra note 5. 
Osiel defines "administrative massacre[ s ]" as "large-scale violation[ s] of basic human rights 
to life and liberty by the central state in a systematic and organized fashion, often against its 
own citizens, generally in a climate of war - civil or international, real or imagined." OsIEL, 
supra, at 9. In both book and article, Osiel limits his discussion of closure to the role of 
judges in evoking collective memory in such cases. Osiel does not address the significance of 
closure with respect to the other goals of such trials, and he does not apply his insights to the 
ongoing international prosecutions involving the Balkans and Rwanda. 
7. Meron, Ans111ering for War Crimes, supra note 3, at 2-3; accord Kenneth Roth, Why 
Justice Needs NATO, THE NATION, Sept. 22, 1997, at 21. 
8. Oscar Schachter, The Invisible College of International La111yers, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 217 
(1977). 
9. Mary Ann Tetreault, Justice for All: Wartime Rape and Women's Human Rights, 3 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 197 (1997) (quoting former Chief Prosecutor in the Balkan Tribunal 
Richard Goldstone); see also Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., International Obligations to Search for 
and Arrest War Criminals: Government Failure in the Former Yugoslavia?, 7 DuKE J. CoMP. 
& INTI.. L. 411, 454 (1997) (quoting John Shattuck, then the top human rights officer at the 
U.S. Department of State). 
10. James Vescovi, The Search for Justice in the Former Yugoslavia and Beyond: An 
Intervie111 111ith Minna Schrag '75, CoLUM. L. SCH. REP., Autumn 1996, at 27. 
2034 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 96:2031 
punishment and civil redress and between utilitarian and retribu­
tivist rationales for punishment.11 It is argued that international in­
vestigations and criminal prosecutions will permit victims' families 
and survivors to put the past to rest; that victims will channel their 
anger and vent their frustrations through their testimony at trial be­
cause, through participation as witnesses, they will be able to "reas­
sert their sense of control and autonomy," enhance their dignity, 
"lessen their isolation, and increase their feeling of belonging to a 
community," and even "find some meaning in their victimiza­
tion."12 The goal of using such trials to preserve an accurate collec­
tive memory is also based on the model of closure. It is said that 
war crimes trials permit entire societies to "draw[ ] a clear line be­
tween past and future, allowing the beginning of a healing 
process. "13 
In this article, I argue that the trial of Dusko Tadic was con­
ducted on the premise that Nuremberg-inspired goals would be fur­
thered through the invocation of shared values in four distinct 
areas: (1) preservation of "common history judged by common 
standards";14 (2) application of "objective," "apolitical" rules of 
law; (3) adherence to a "level playing field" for the defendant; and 
( 4) respect for the needs of victims. I show that TadiC's judges 
sought, first, to render a verdict containing a definitive and endur­
ing historical account that would be accepted as accurate, balanced, 
complete and fair by all sides, including Serbs, thereby helping to 
produce closure with respect to collective memory. Second, the 
judges sought to remain above politics, in the mold of judges in 
liberal states who purportedly act as mere interpreters of politically 
neutral rules of law evenhandedly and objectively applied, regard­
less of the political aspirations or the ethno-religious status of the 
parties involved, thereby eliciting a satisfactory consensus based on 
the application of the rule of law. Third, they attempted scrupu­
lously to adhere to fair approaches to the admission of evidence 
11. See Robt-Arriaza, supra note 3, at 16-21. 
12. See id. at 19-21 (noting also how the mere verbalization of victimization serves cathar-
tic psychological and therapeutic ends). · 
13. Naomi Robt-Arriaza, Introduction to IMPUNITY AND HUMAN R1mrrs, supra note 3, at 
3, 7. Professor Robt-Arriaza thus argues, for example, that investigations and trials, because 
they reveal the extent of repression, restore the reputation of innocent victims, constitute an 
official condemnation of state-sanctioned abuses, make repetition of past mistakes less likely, 
and permit societies to redefine themselves in light of real and not falsified history. See id. at 
7-8 (noting how war crimes frequently demonstrate a "struggle for the control of history" and 
arguing that criminal investigations "play[] a central role in a society's redefinition of itself' 
and do not allow a former dictatorship's version of history "to be perpetuated in the military 
academies or in textbooks"). 
14. See 0SIEL, supra note 6, at 22. 
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and its careful weighing under the presumption of innocence in or­
der to elicit universal confidence in the procedural fairness ac­
corded the defendant. Finally, they sought to provide closure to 
TadiC's victims by according them a prominent role in the 
proceedings. 
Thereafter, I examine whether the judges' efforts succeeded in 
these respects, using the conclusion of the first international war 
crimes trial in fifty years as an occasion to reexamine the didactic 
functions of such trials. I contend that the model of closure, and 
certainly the version suggested by the Tadic judgment, is flawed and 
may even undermine the grand aims articulated for the Yugoslav 
and Rwanda tribunals. Yet I do not conclude that international war 
crimes trials ought not be attempted generally or that the establish­
ment of these two ad hoc tribunals was necessarily a mistake. 
Rather, this article advances a different set of justifications for these 
prosecutions, or at least a different set of criteria by which to judge 
their "success." I propose here that these prosecutions not be 
judged on the unattainable premises of closure, but on Mark Os1el's 
alternative concept of "civil dissensus" wherein trials stimulate fur­
ther dialogue regarding the issues on which they focus.15 
Part I identifies how the model of closure has influenced the 
establishment, structure, and operation of these tribunals. Part II 
indicates how the Tadic judgment reflects that model. Part III 
shows how TadiC's trial and conviction fall short of meeting clo­
sure's demands in four vital respects, and concludes with more gen­
eral reasons for skepticism about the likelihood of reaching closure 
through ad hoc international tribunals for Rwanda and the former 
Yugoslavia. Part IV argues for a discursive justification for these 
tribunals and indicates, preliminarily, some of the implications of 
this alternative approach.16 
I. CLosuRE AND THE NEw An Hoc TRIBUNALS 
International lawyers have advanced many reasons why the in­
ternational polity, or at least its most reputable representative, the 
United Nations, should punish basic affronts to human dignity.17 
They claim that the legal, political, and even moral choices have 
been, to a considerable degree, settled by international law as 
15. See OsIEL, supra note 6, at 41-48. 
16. Readers who have little interest in the Tadic judgment as such or who have, from the 
outset, grave doubts about the viability of "closure" may wish to proceed directly to Part IV. 
17. These are further considered infra notes 238-45 and accompanying text. 
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"shaped by the requirements of the international community."18 
They argue that such a result is anticipated by the U.N. Charter and 
its provisions for handling threats to and breaches of the interna­
tional peace, and that the U.N., or at least its post-cold war Security 
Council, now seems politically willing to establish such judicial fora 
when the failure to prosecute presents a sufficient threat to the in­
ternational order.19 These arguments have been premised on the 
goal of generating "closure" for victims, defendants, and observers 
both inside and outside the regions affected. The model of closure, 
considered as a kind of Weberian "ideal type,"20 has provided the 
single, coherent rubric to justify ad hoc international tribunals. 
The policy justifications offered for international war crimes 
tribunals build from the premise, discussed above, that public crimi­
nal trials absolve those who are not in the dock. Given the imprac-
18. Robt-Arriaza, supra note 13, at 5 (arguing that 50 years after Nuremberg, treaty and 
case law developments in humanitarian law have shaped the minimum requirements for com­
pliance and have helped to settle questions regarding investigation, prosecution, and com­
pensation); see also KARINE LESCURE & FLORENCE TRINTIGNAC, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: THE WORKING OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNAL OF THE HAGUE 17-31 (1996); Leila Sadat Wexler, The Proposed Permanent Inter­
national Criminal Court: An Appraisal, 29 CORNELL INTL. L.J. 665, 707-10 (1996). There is, 
however, an unresolved tension between the arguments for primacy of international fora -
when these are available - and other arguments that national authorities have a duty to 
prosecute some international crimes under international law. See, e.g., Diane F. Orentlicher, 
Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 
YALE L.J. 2537 (1991) (arguing that an international legal duty to prosecute ought to con­
strain governments' resort to immunity); Naomi Robt-Arriaza, Sources in International 
Treaties of an Obligation to Investigate, Prosecute and Provide Redress, in IMPUNITY AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 24, 24-38 (discussing sources of international law that sug­
gest an obligation to investigate, prosecute, or provide redress). It seems that a national 
authority's ostensible duty to prosecute does not result in any ostensible right to retain exclu­
sive or primary jurisdiction over such prosecutions, at least not in the case of the former 
Yugoslavia or Rwanda. 
19. After all, if Iraq's unwillingness to permit weapons inspections, Libya's failure to 
transfer alleged terrorists to national courts, or the Haitian coup leaders' failure to abide by 
the results of a U.N.-supervised election each justified a forceful Security Council response, 
why not the continued impunity of alleged war criminals in the Balkans or Rwanda which 
has, at a minimum, prompted destabilizing waves of refugees across international borders? 
For the Yugoslav tribunal's response to a challenge to its establishment, see Decision on the 
Defence Motion on Jurisdiction, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T (Trial Chamber, 
Intl. Trib. for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Intl. Humani­
tarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugo. since 1991, Aug. 10, 1995) <http:// 
www.un.org/icty/970507jt.htm> [hereinafter Decision on Defence Motion on Jurisdiction] ; 
Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Prosecutor v. 
Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72 (App. Chamber, Intl. Trib. for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of Intl. Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of 
Former Yugo. since 1991, Oct. 2, 1995) <http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeaUdecision-e/ 
acel.htm> [hereinafter Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal]. 
20. See generally MAx WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 
(A.M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans., Free Press 1964) (1�47). As Talcott Parsons 
notes in his famous introduction to this work, Weber's concept of an "ideal type" consists of 
an "abstract" and "generalized rubric within which an indefinite number of particular cases 
may be classified." Talcott Parsons, Introduction to id. at 13. 
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ticality of national venues for such trials as well as the comparative 
merits of U.N. fora, advocates for these tribunals conclude that in­
ternational criminal proceedings are best able to unite spectators -
whether or not involved in the conflict - in collective revulsion 
against the barbarism of a few and in support of the civilized nature 
of the trials themselves. International convictions, in short, are 
viewed as best able to provide the cathartic group therapy necessary 
to reestablish lost national and international consensus and, there­
fore, peace.21 It is assumed that everyone will find the judgments 
and verdicts of an international bench legitimate and that such uni­
versal forums, issuing verdicts with universal legitimacy, will restore 
lost civility - at least for the war-tom countries directly at issue 
and, over the longer term, for the entire international community. 
Yet to be successful, the model of closure requires fulfilling the 
promise of the Nuremberg Principles while avoiding those charac­
teristics of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials that have been the tar­
get of fifty years of criticism. These critiques, adequately surveyed 
elsewhere,22 require only short summary here. 
Prominent critics complain that the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
processes were tainted by "victor's justice,"23 including procedures 
and verdicts that were unfair to the defendants.24 Critics also ques-
21. For a characteristic attempt to link justice and peace, see, for example, Richard J. 
Goldstone, Justice as a Tool for Peace-Making: Troth Commissions and International 
Criminal Tribunals, 28 N.Y.U. J. !Nn.. L. & PoL. 485, 486-90 (1996). Tue presumed link 
between war crimes prosecutions and securing international peace goes back, of course, to 
the Nuremberg trials themselves. See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL MODERNISM 336 (1994) 
(discussing how Nuremberg was seen as "the trial to end all wars"). 
22. See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, supra note 21, at 335-91; SCHARF, supra note 3, at 3-17; 
TAYLOR, supra note 1; Kevin R. Chaney, Pitfalls and Imperatives: Applying the Lessons of 
Nuremberg to the Yugoslav War Crimes Trials, 14 DrcK. J. !Nn.. L. 57 (1995); Symposium, 
1945-1995: Critical Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trials and State Accountability, 12 N.Y.L. 
SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 453, 453-544 (1996). 
23. These include complaints that these tribunals' rules and bench and prosecution teams 
were dominated by lawyers from the United States and arrogant notions of "American ex­
ceptionalism;" that trials were marred by the application of double standards since no 
charges were brought against the allies despite evidence that they also had violated interna­
tional humanitarian law; and that the Allies' noble goals were compromised from the outset 
since the very day that they signed the London Charter to establish the Nuremberg tribunal 
the United States dropped its second nuclear bomb on Nagasaki. See, e.g., Gerry J. Simpson, 
War Crimes: A Critical Introduction, in THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES 1, 4 (Tunothy L.H. 
McCormack & Gerry J. Simpson eds., 1997). 
24. These include accusations that defendants were convicted in absentia, while others 
encountered trial by ambush - i.e., an expedited criminal process using unfamiliar rules and 
based on documentary evidence primarily within the control of the prosecution with defense 
lawyers accorded minimal time for preparation. Others have questioned the imposition of ex 
post facto criminal liability, arguing that defendants were charged with newly minted interna­
tional crimes, including "aggression" - premised dubiously on violations of the Kellogg­
Briand Pact - "crimes against humanity," and other novel offenses having little basis in 
many domestic legal systems, such as conspiracy. See, e.g., id. at 11-16; LUBAN, supra note 21, 
at 349-52, 360-62. 
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tion the premise that World War II trials did much to preserve col­
lective memory in the service of history. To at least some, the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo trial records make for a fundamentally 
flawed, even false, historical account that is grossly unfair to the 
victims of the Holocaust and to the actual conduct of World War II. 
With respect to Nuremberg's treatment of the Holocaust, some at­
tribute the problem to the Allies' decision to make the waging of 
"aggressive" war the linchpin of all the major trials at Nuremberg, 
an approach that made the Holocaust incidental to the war instead 
of making its horrors at least the equal focus of attention. By, for 
example, arguing that Nazi concentration camps were effectively 
tools of the German war effort and by failing to bring charges or 
present evidence of Nazi crimes committed before the official onset 
of interstate aggression, such as under German pre-1939 racial pu­
rity laws, the trials of the major Nuremberg defendants obscured 
the real scope and depth of the Holocaust while providing a funda­
mentally misconceived account of German military strategy.25 By 
encouraging the �heory that Nazi war criminals were merely an es­
pecially �vii collection of gangsters bent solely on aggressive con­
quest, the major Nuremberg trials glossed over the ethnic, religious, 
and racial underpinnings of the Holocaust. In part because the tes­
timonies of victims were deemed unnecessary, these proceedings 
obscured the discriminatory animus that motivated the Nazis, ren­
dering their anti-Semitism and homophobia, for example, less 
prominent.26 By contrast, the Tokyo proceedings, along with the 
more notorious proceeding against General Tomoyuki Yamashita 
that reached the U.S. Supreme Court, have been criticized for 
Even graver charges of overly hasty, and perhaps even racist, judgments have been lev­
eled against the Tokyo trials. See, e.g., Dissentiilg Opinion of J. Pal, in 21 THB ToKYO WAR 
CruMss TRIAL 1 -21 (R. Pritchard & S. Zaide eds., 1981); Ann Marie Prevost, Race and War 
Crimes: The 1945 War Crimes Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, 14 HuM. RTS. Q. 303 
(199 2) (arguing that Yamashita's trial, conducted in the immediate wake of Japanese aggres­
sion, was thoroughly riddled with violations of fair process and tainted by racism); see also 
Elizabeth S. Kopelman, Ideology and International Law: The Dissent of the Indian Justice at 
the Tokyo War Crimes Trial, 23 N.Y.U. J. INrL. L. & PoL. 373 (1991) . 
25. See, e.g., Osiel, supra note 5, at 533 -36. But later trials by the Allies under the more 
expansive terms of Law No. 10 of the Control Council for Germany went further. See 
RA'INBR & ABRAMS, supra note 3, at 47, 50. 
26 . For an argument that it also rendered less evident how the Nazis were able to 
bureaucratize their final solution, see, for example, LUBAN, supra note 21, at 365-74. A more 
balanced portrayal of the Holocaust, it is said, has only emerged thanks to the work of later 
historians and the trial records of proceedings more sensitive to the needs of victims, such as 
Israel's prosecution of Eichmann. Attorney General v. Eichmann, 36 I.L .R . 5 (Isr. D.C. 
(Jm.) 1961) , 36 I.L.R. 277 (Isr. S. Ct. 1962) . These later accounts, in tum, have altered 
modem-day recollections of the Nuremberg trials such that today those proceedings are 
often cited as an affirmation of the horrors of crimes against humanity and not aggressive 
war. 
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presenting a racially charged, unnuanced account of atrocities com­
mitted by Japanese troops in the Pacific theater.21 
For the creators of the new ad hoc international tribunals, the 
flaws suggested by these criticisms needed to be avoided if the 
grand goals along the model of closure were to be achieved.28 To 
avoid the accusation of "victor's justice," they took a number of 
steps. They created denationalized entities established by the world 
community, namely the U.N. Security Council, its General Assem­
bly, and Secretary-General.29 To deflect charges of .double stan­
dards, they attempted to ensure that all those who committed 
crimes in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda, regardless of na­
tional origin, ethnicity, or religion, would be subject to prosecution 
- and by an international bench and prosecution teams that would 
not include persons from the region - presumptively tainted by 
national bias - but would reflect, as does the International Court 
of Justice, the full diversity of tJ:ie world's legal systems. 
To avoid related accusations of unfairness, they incorporated 
modern international human rights standards on behalf of criminal 
defendants into the tribunals' respective statutes and rules of proce­
dure and evidence.30 To level the playing field between prosecution 
and defense, the tribunals borrowed considerably from the adver­
sarial, oral nature of common law courtroom proceedings - includ­
ing its procedures for cross examination - incorporated the 
possibility ·of appeals, and even anticipated the need to train law­
yers in this novel synthesis of common law and continental proce­
dures. 31 In response to the perceived illegitimacy of ex post facto 
27. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946); Prevost, supra note 24, at 305; see also M. 
Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to Establish a 
Permanent International Criminal Court, 10 liARv. HUM. Rrs. J. 11, 36-37 (1997). For a 
defense of the Yamashita case, see Major William H. Parks, Command Responsibility for War 
Crimes, 62 Mn .. L. REv. 1, 22-38 (1973). 
28. See generally SCHARF, supra note 3, at 69-73; Meron, The Case for War Crimes Trials, 
supra note 3. 
29. See Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 19, 'll 44. As 
noted by the judges in the Tadic case, by securing the cooperation of the U.N. Secretariat as 
well as the General Assembly, the tribunals' creators drew from the legitimacy of the in­
dependent international civil service as well as the representativeness of the world's foremost 
deliberative body. 
30. See, e.g., !CTR Statute, supra note 2, art. 20 (providing for "rights of the accused" 
comparable to those in article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights); 
ICTY Statute, supra note 2, art. 21 (same). 
31. But note that the tribunals also borrowed from the civil law's tradition and permitted 
appeals by the prosecution, a concept that has drawn criticism from those within the co=on 
law tradition. See Michael P. Scharf, A Critique of the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal, 25 
DENY. J. INTI.. L. & PoLY. 305, 307 (1997) (suggesting that this "infringe[s] the accused's 
interest in finality which underlies the double jeopardy principle"). The drafters of the rules 
also departed significantly from common law traditions by permitting the use of hearsay evi-
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imposition of criminal liability, the creators of the Yugoslav tribunal 
restricted that body's jurisdiction to crimes based on "rules of inter­
national humanitarian law which are beyond any doubt part of cus­
tomary law,"32 thereby limiting the tribunal's reach to international 
crimes that, while arguably novel at the time of Nuremberg or 
Tokyo, now have a fifty-year-old pedigree. 
Gone from both tribunals were the aspects of the World War II 
prosecutions most criticized from a modern human rights perspec­
tive: the death penalty, liability for membership in a criminal or­
ganization, and the possibility of trials in absentia.33 On the other 
hand, measures for the counseling of victims, the protection of wit­
nesses and court-ordered restoration of stolen property responded 
to modern sensitivities favoring the rights of victims.34 Presumably 
this new sensitivity to victims also responded to the criticism that 
Nuremberg had dishonored the memory of victims of the 
Holocaust.35 
But closure demands not merely a demonstrable commitment to 
impartiality and procedural and substantive fairness: it requires 
certainty of results, such that the tribunals' orders are enforced no 
less than those of any court, and all perpetrators face a realistic 
dence, by granting the tribunal the power to order the production of evidence, and by ban· 
ning plea bargaining and prosecutorial grants of immunity. See SCHARF, supra note 3, at 67. 
32. ICTY Statute, supra note 2, 'l[ 34. For the approach taken by the Rwanda tribunal, see 
infra notes 171-75 and accompanying text. 
33. But see Intl. Trib. for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of 
Intl. Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugo. since 1991, RULES 
OF PROCEDURE AND EvmENCE, rule 61, U.N. Doc. IT/32 (1994), amended by U.N. Doc. IT/ 
32/Rev. 1 (1994), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 2 (1994), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 3 (1995), U.N. Doc. 
IT/32/Rev. 4 (1995), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 5 (1995), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 6 (1995), U.N. 
Doc. IT/32/Rev. 7 (1996), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 8 (1996), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 9 (1996), 
U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 10 (1996), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 11 (1997), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 12 
(1997) (providing for public indictments in cases where arrest warrants are not executed) 
<http://www.un.org/icty/basic/rpe/revl3e.htm> [hereinafter ICTY Rules]. This article is 
based on the 1995 revision, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 3. 
34. For rules requiring the restitution of property and compensation to victims within the 
Rwanda Tribunal, see !CTR Statute, supra note 2, art. 23; and Intl. Crim. Trib. for the Prose­
cution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of Intl. Humani­
tarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda, RuLES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE, 
rules 88(B), 105-06, U.N. Doc. ITR/3/Rev. 1 (1995). 
35. Perhaps with the critique of Nuremberg's flawed history in mind, the prosecutors in 
the first trial at the Yugoslav tribunal spent what seemed to some courtroom observers an 
inordinate amount of time at the outset of the proceedings placing their case against Tadic 
within the broader context of the recent history of the former Yugoslavia through testimony 
on nationalist attitudes and their consequences, presented through an academic historian and 
fourteen policy witnesses, none of whom had been eyewitnesses to any of the crimes alleged 
in the indictment. See SCHARF, supra note 3, at 120-37. As Scharf notes, for the first five 
weeks of the Tadic trial, the prosecutors focused on proving the systematic and widespread 
nature of ethnic cleansing without presenting any testimony as to the alleged crimes commit· 
ted by the defendant. See id. at 137. 
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prospect of becoming defendants. Accordingly, those who estab­
lished the new ad hoc tribunals tried to replicate, despite the 
absence of victor's justice, conditions prevailing among national 
criminal courts in liberal states.36 While, ideally, closure demands 
an Austinian sovereign authority capable of enforcing the law 
against all,37 a precondition that is of course impossible to duplicate 
within the present international system, tribunal creators achieved 
the next best thing: tribunals backed by the power and resources of 
the Security Council, with jurisdictional primacy over national 
courts. 
Consistent with the needs of closure, it is also argued - with 
some success - that multilateral forces need to use force as neces­
sary to arrest those whom local authorities refuse to give up,38 that 
prosecutors courageously must indict at least the highest leaders re­
sponsible regardless of the political repercussions, since the convic­
tion of only inconsequential small fry will delegitimize the entire 
process, and that tribunal orders need to be enforced directly on 
recalcitrant government officials through renewed Security Council 
sanctions if necessary.39 Proponents of closure argue further that 
international criminal prosecutions need to reach deeply into all re­
gions of Rwanda and the Balkans to identify and punish all those 
who have been complicit with evil - even if such a thoroughgoing 
search for the truth requires expensive trials far into the future, po-
36. Indeed, some hope that international criminal proceedings will help promote demo­
cratic transitions. See CARLOS SANTIAGO NINo, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL 127-34 (1996); 
OsraL, supra note 6, at 1. 
The achievement of closure for victims, for defendants, and for society as a whole is, of 
course, commonly associated with ordinary criminal trials in the United States. Cf. Frank 
Rich, Rush to Closure, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1997, at A21 (ridiculing the notion that the trial of 
Tunothy McVeigh, convicted of bombing the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 
1995, brings closure to concerns with respect to "right-wing fringe groups"). The headline for 
Mr. Rich's column inspired the title of this article. 
37. See Simpson, supra note 23, at 16-17. 
38. In July 1997, in a change from its preexisting policy, NATO forces in Bosnia actively 
began to seek out for arrest indicted war crimes suspects. This change in policy yielded some 
arrests but also retaliatory attacks and threats by angered Bosnian Serb authorities. See 
Mike O'Connor, Arrests by NATO Worry Bosnian Serb Leaders, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1997, at 
A4; Mike O'Connor, Serbs Threaten Retaliation for War Crime Arrests, U.N. Says, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 17, 1997, at A6; see also Payam-Roman Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, Peace in 
the Former Yugoslavia?, 20 HUM. Rrs. Q. (forthcoming Nov. 1998) (manuscript at 82-87, on 
file with author). For a description of NATO's earlier "monitor, but don't touch" policy, see 
SCHARF, supra note 3, at 89. 
39. See, e.g., CENrER FOR INTL. PROGRAMS, UNIV. OF DAYTON, BRINGING WAR 
CRIMINALS TO JUSTICE (1997) [hereinafter BRINGING WAR CRIMINALS TO JusucE]; Meron, 
The Case for War Crimes Trials, supra note 3, at 134; Roth, supra note 7. 
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litically treacherous manhunts by international forces, and innova­
tive adaptations to established extradition practices.40 
Today, many international lawyers argue that the two ad hoc 
international war crimes tribunals now in place "have genuinely ad­
dressed many of the problems associated with their Nuremberg and 
Tokyo predecessors."41 
II. CLOSURE APPLIED: THE TADIC JUDGMENT 
After a trial that lasted nearly seven months, on May 7, 1997, a 
trial chamber of the Yugoslav tribunal found Dusko Tactic guilty on 
eleven of thirty-one counts charged in the original indictment.42 
40. See Akhavan, supra note 38 (manuscript at 94). Thus, an ad, placed in The New York 
Times by the "Coalition for International Justice" shortly after NATO troops arrested one of 
those indicted by the Balkan tribunal, urged that U.S.-led NATO forces meet their "moral 
obligations" to bring the rest of those indicted to justice. 
[S]o long as war criminals are at large and justice is not done, the wounds of war cannot 
heal, refugees cannot return to their homes, and reconciliation, lasting peace, and a civil 
society cannot be achieved in Bosnia. A successful exit for U.S. troops will not be possi­
ble, and their many good works will have been wasted, if they leave behind a country in 
which persons indicted for war crimes continue to wield significant power and make a 
mockery of the rule of law. 
Coalition for Intl. Justice, Advertisement, Mr. President: Order the Arrest of War Criminals 
in Bosnia Now!, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1997, at AS. The ad concludes: 
Mr. President, at the dedication of the Holocaust Museum you reiterated the pledge 
"never again" to permit genocide. If the War Crimes Tribunal and the quest for peace in 
Bosnia should fail because U.S.-led NATO troops are unwilling to apprehend indicted 
perpetrators of crimes against humanity, the civilized world will have lost the opportu­
nity to restore some credence to this tarnished pledge. We appeal to you not to allow 
this to happen. 
Id. Among the groups in this coalition were Amnesty International, USA, and Human 
Rights Watch. See also Roth, supra note 7 (arguing for the use of NATO troops to arrest 
indicted war criminals). Indeed, some international lawyers contend that U.S. troops are 
legally obligated to arrest war criminals in the Balkans. See, e.g., John F. Hector, Why US 
Troops Must Arrest War Criminals, A.B.A. NATL. SEc. L. REP., Summer 1997, at 7 .  But see 
David P. Forsythe, Politics and the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. 
L.F. 401 (1994) ; Robert M. Hayden, Schindler's Fate: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, and 
Population Transfers, 55 SLAVIC REv. 727, 742-43 (1996) [hereinafter Hayden, Schindler's 
Fate] ; Robert M. Hayden, Hayden's Reply, 55 SLAVIC REv. 767, 771 -72 (1996) ; [hereinafter 
Hayden, Reply] ; Alfred P. Rubin, Dayton, Bosnia, and the Limits of Law, NATL. INTEREST, 
Wmter 1996 -97, at 41. 
For a survey of the necessary adaptations to extradition, see, for example, Kenneth S. 
Gallant, Securing the Presence of Defendants before the International Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia: Breaking with Extradition, 5 CRIM. L.F. 557 (1994). 
41. RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 3, at 185. 
42. Although Tadic was acquitted of 20 counts, including all nine charges of murder, 11 of 
these acquittals stemmed from the decision by two of the three judges that "grave breaches" 
under Article 2 of the Fourth Geneva Convention had not been shown because the prosecu­
tion had failed to prove to the tribunal's satisfaction that the conflict in Bosnia was, after May 
19, 1992, when all of TadiC's alleged offenses had occurred, an "international conflict." Tadic 
Judgment, supra note 4, 'Jl'l( 607 -08. The majority found that the withdrawal of the Yugoslav 
National Army at that time put the onus on the prosecution to prove Serbian "effective 
control" over any offenses committed thereafter by forces of the Republic of Srpska (VRS). 
Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'Jl'll 584 -608. They concluded that the VRS needed to be shown 
to be essentially agents of the Serbian army in order for their victims to be "protected per-
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Tactic, who had not been charged with genocide, was convicted of 
"persecution" and fourteen beatings, designated as six crimes 
against humanity and five violations of the laws or customs of war.43 
On July 14, 1997, Tadic was sentenced to twenty years in prison.44 
Observers predict that Tadic will probably serve at most ten years.45 
As the following sections demonstrate, in judging and sentenc­
ing Tadic, the judges attempt to provide an account of the history of 
the region, the facts in the case, and the application of the law to 
these facts in a way that closely adheres to the model of closure's 
sons" under the Fourth Geneva Convention and that the prosecution had not met this evi­
dentiary burden. Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'l['l[ 607-08. Judge McDonald, from the 
United States, dissented, indicating that she doubted whether "effective control" needed to 
be shown and finding that even if that needed to be shown, the prosecution had met this 
burden. Opinion and Judgment, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge McDonald Re­
garding the Applicability of Art. 2 of the Statute, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T,  'l[ 
4 (Trial Chamber, Intl. Trib. for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Viola­
tions of Intl. Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugo. since 1991, May 
7, 1997) <http:l/www.unorglicty/970507jt.htm> [hereinafter McDonald Dissent]. 
As this suggests, the relatively large number of acquittals on the formal charges filed 
against Tadic is deceptive. In most instances the original indictment had assigned three 
counts to each separate act or series of acts by the accused: "grave breaches" of the Geneva 
Conventions, "crimes against humanity" (namely persecution), and violations of the laws and 
customs of war. Thus, most of the acquittals were based on rulings of law, not fact. Although 
Tadic was acquitted by the majority of all charges of "grave breaches," many of the same 
alleged actions led to successful convictions as violations of the laws of war and crimes 
against humanity. Further, even though Tadic was cleared of all murder charges, the counts 
under which he was convicted include involvement in the deaths of two Muslim policemen. 
43. A charge involving forcible sexual intercourse against a female prisoner, designated 
as a grave breach of the Geneva Convention, a violation of the laws or customs of war, and a 
crime against humanity, was withdrawn before trial because the victim was unwilling to 
testify. 
44. Tadic was sentenced to a total of 97 years for the 11 separate convictions, but each of 
these sentences was to be served concurrently, and the longest is for 20 years. See Sentencing 
Judgment, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T (Intl. Trib. for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of Intl. Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of 
Former Yugo. since 1991, July 14, 1997) <http://www.un.org/icty/su=ary/tadic.htm>. 
Although in theory Tadic had faced the possibility of life imprisonment under the tribunal's 
rules, see ICTY Rules, supra note 33, rule 101, this probably was not a realistic outcome given 
the requirements in the tribunal's Statute that it "have recourse" to the "general practice" 
regarding prison sentences in the courts of the former Yugoslavia, see ICTY Statute, supra 
note 2, art. 24(1). While the issue of what "general practice" is in the former Yugoslavia is 
not free from doubt, generally the maximum allowable sentence in the region is 20 years 
imprisonment. See Dylan Cors & Siobhan K. Fisher, National Law in International Criminal 
Punishment: Yugoslavia's Maximum Prison Sentences and the United Nations War Crimes 
Tribunal, 3 PARKER SCH. J.E. EuR. L. 637, 660-62 & n.110 {1996). 
45. Both the defendant and the prosecutor have filed appeals to the judgment. See 
Notice of Appeal of Judgment of May 7, 1997 by the Defence, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. 
IT-94-1-T {App. Chamber, Intl. Trib. for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations on Intl. Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugo. since 
1991, June 3, 1997) <http:l/www.un.org/icty/p210-e.htm> [hereinafter Defence Notice of Ap­
peal]; Notice of Appeal of Judgment of May 7, 1997 by the Prosecutor, Prosecutor v. Tadic, 
Case No. IT-94-1-T {App. Chamber, Intl. Trib. for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible 
for Serious Violations on Intl. Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former 
Yugo. since 1991, June 6, 1997) <http:l/www.un.org/icty/p210-e.htm>. 
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demands in four critical respects. First, they try to fulfill the de­
mand for a definitive historical account that preserves the history of 
barbarism. Second, they resort to the law's apolitical neutrality and 
rely on its objectivity to make both factual and legal determina­
tions, the better to highlight the contrast between the court's politi­
cally neutral treatment of the defendant as compared to the 
defendant's actions of persecution. Third, they repeatedly rely on 
concepts like the presumption of innocence to illustrate how closely 
and scrupulously they respect the defendant's rights to a "level 
playing field." Finally, the judges acknowledge the innocence of 
victims in both their historical accounts as well as in their applica­
tion of the rules of humanitarian law. 
A. Preserving Collective Memory 
The judgment's initial background and preliminary findings 
chronicle the historical and geographic background of Bosnia's 
multi-ethnic milieu, the disintegration of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, political developments in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the rise of a propaganda campaign in favor of eth­
nic cleansing for the good of "Greater Serbia," the formation of 
Serb autonomous regions, the transformation of the Yugoslav 
National Army (JNA) into the instrument of Serbia and 
Montenegro, the rise of the army of the Republika Srpska (VRS) in 
the face of the JNA's withdrawal from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and the effects within Bosnia, along ethnic lines, of the JNA's incur­
sion into Croatia.46 These sections present an equally detailed ac­
count of the immediate history of the region in which Tactic's 
actions occurred, Opstina Prijedor, including the breakdown in eth­
nic relations there in the face of the "polarizing effect" of "propa­
ganda and political manoeuvres" intended "to shift the balance of 
power in the former Yugoslavia to Serbia."47 The judgment also 
provides an account of the Serbian takeover of the town of Prijedor 
and its grim consequences.48 
This historical account, common to judgments involving admini­
strative massacres, aspires to be the common history judged by 
common standards that the model of closure demands with respect 
to the preservation of "collective memory."49 It is a painstaking 
46. See Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll'll 53-126. 
47. Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll'll 130-92. 
48. Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll'll 137-41. 
49. Osiel defines the term as collections of historical stories that permit societies to draw 
co=on lessons for the future, namely, tales that "a society tells [itself] about momentous 
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attempt to provide a definitive, historically accurate account not 
merely of TadiC's actions but of the immediate context in which 
these occurred. This historical section of the judgment appears to 
be intended to stand on its own, as a testament to how hate was 
permitted to consume a particular region. While it does not directly 
relate to the crimes charged, it seems intended to be a chronicle of 
the past that seeks to put the past to rest. The judges assume that 
their unflinching account of Serbian aggression against non-Serbs, 
replete with graphic descriptions of the severe torture, executions, 
sexual assaults, and beatings endemic to camps holding mostly 
Muslim and Croat civilians, along with the nearly ceaseless ethnic 
and religious epithets that encouraged and accompanied these hor­
rific conditions, will repel ordinary readers. so 
The judges' historical chronicle is also intended to lend credibil­
ity to their subsequent findings with respect to the defendant. After 
all, if Serbs in this region were being encouraged to treat non-Serbs 
as sub-human and were in fact doing so, would it be particularly 
surprising if Tadic, a vitriolic supporter of "Greater Serbia," en­
gaged in the same? At the same time, these preliminary findings 
imply that Serbian actions in 1991-92 and, by inference, TadiC's as 
well, were extreme in both cruelty and motivation, especially within 
the context of the formerly harmonious interethnic relations in the 
former Yugoslavia. The judges contrast the state of affairs in 
1991-92 in Prijedor before the Serbian takeover - portrayed as a 
town where various ethnic groups lived in apparent harmony 
amidst significant intermarriages and friendships across ethnic lines 
with limited signs of division51 - with its post-invasion state in 
stark terms, drawing sharp black-and-white distinctions between 
good and evil, aggressor and victim. Readers are discouraged from 
seeing the underlying events as in any sense a continuation or exac­
erbation of older conflicts, but, at the same time, no one except the 
defendant is assigned specific blame. 
The judges' findings, only nominally preliminary, are presented 
in a matter-of-fact tone that acknowledges little self-doubt or possi-
events in its history, the events that most profoundly affect the lives of its members and most 
arouse their passions for long periods.'' OsIEL, supra note 6, at 18-19. 
50. Thus, the judgment includes the statement of an elected Serb official who indicated in 
the media that he would no longer allow non-Serb women to give birth at the local hospital, 
that all mixed marriage couples should be divorced or face annulment, and that children of 
such marriages "were good only for making soap." Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'JI 147. 
51. See Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'lI 129. The judgment also quotes one witness who 
describes Prijedor as the symbol of the "brotherhood unity of the former Yugoslavia at 
large.'' Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'lI 129. 
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bility of partiality. The judges tell a simple, linear story, presented 
as if it were an objective press account that would presumably be 
found credible by anyone, regardless of ethnicity or political sympa­
thies. Their account relies on only those adverse inferences about 
Serbian motivations that, in the Chamber's view, any reasonable 
observer would draw. The judges do not render any outwardly 
valuative judgments with respect to Serbian nationalist goals, and 
they are careful to avoid any suggestion that all Serbs, even in 
Prijedor, are complicit in the mass atrocities they describe. This is 
strongly confirmed by the rest of the judgment which is devoted to 
showing, in elaborate detail, why Tadic, as an individual, is guilty of 
certain specific offenses. 
B. The Factual Case Against the Defendant 
From broad historical context, the judgment proceeds to a de­
tailed enumeration of the accusations against Tadic, the evidence 
bearing on these, and the judges' findings with respect to all thirty­
one counts charged in the indictment.52 The judges describe Tadic's 
ever more prominent nationalistic sentiments, use of ethnic epi­
thets, and political activities, both as a reserve police officer and, 
most crucially, at the Omarska, Keraterm, and Tmopolje prison 
camps.53 They find that Tadic: (1) participated in the attack on 
Kozarac;54 (2) beat non-Serb civilians there, at the Prijedor military 
barracks, and in the Omarska and Keraterm prison camps;ss and (3) 
assisted in the seizure, selection, and transportation of individuals 
for detention.56 As in the historical section of the judgment, this 
section does not flinch from describing, in graphic detail, what 
Tadic is alleged to have done. All trial observers, Serb and non­
Serb alike, are invited to join in the judges' horror, the better to 
join the societal consensus in favor of the ultimate verdict. 
In one respect, however, this portion of the judgment differs 
sharply from the judges' preliminary findings. Although that 
historical overview adopts an authoritative tone, with little refer­
ence to the evidence that led its authors to their conclusions, in this 
section the judges enumerate in detail each witness and document 
introduced, connecting these to each of the charges against the de-
52. See Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll'll 193-556. Fo r  the tribunal's disposition of each 
count charged, see Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll'll 203-04. 
53. See, e.g., Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll'll 207-28. 
54. See Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'Jl'll 396-97. 
55. See Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll'll 397, 426-35, 444-48. 
56. See, e.g., Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll'll 453-59. 
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fendant. They indicate, through detailed findings, precisely why 
they find one version of the facts more credible than another. The 
testimonies of individual prosecution and defense witnesses are 
canvassed, and the judges identify which witness put the defendant 
on the scene - despite the defense's denial that, for example, Tadic 
was ever present in the Omarska prison camp - as well as which 
witness claims to have seen Tactic commit the alleged acts. Repeat­
edly, the judges indicate that the presumption of innocence means 
that evidence that Tactic was present at the scene of particular as­
saults or other crimes is, by itself, insufficient to convict.57 
The differences between the historical and defendant-centered 
sections of the judgment are readily understandable. The historical 
portions of the judgment are largely drawn from the prosecution's 
academic/policy witnesses, whom the defense, for its own reasons, 
decided not to rebut and barely to cross-examine.58 Under a system 
that largely relies on the parties and not the judges to contest evi­
dence, uncontested evidence is much more likely to emerge un­
scathed in the subsequent judgment.59 On the other hand, once the 
judges reach what both prosecution and defense consider to be the 
heart of the case - the specific charges against Tadic - on which 
there is conflicting evidence, they clearly believe that a careful ac­
counting of the evidence is necessary to legitimize their conclusions. 
With respect to every charge, Tactic relied on what his defense 
team characterized - misleadingly - as an alibi defense. Defense 
witnesses testified that Tactic was living in Banja Luka, some forty­
five kilometers from Kozarac and further from Prijedor, from May 
23 through June 15, 1992; that he made only four trips from Banja 
Luka; and that, thereafter, he lived in Prijedor while working as a 
reserve traffic policeman. 60 According to the defense, Tadic was 
57. See, e.g., Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll 237 (finding insufficient evidence that Tadic 
took an active part in the assault and mutilation' of Flkret Harambasic); Tadic Judgment, 
supra note 4, 'll 241 (finding insufficient evidence that prisoners died of the injuries alleged). 
The Chamber rejected, however, the defense claim that, as a matter of law, a finding of guilt 
cannot rest on the testimony of a single witness. See Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll'll 256, 
535-39. 
58. Defense cross-examination of these witnesses was largely restricted to contesting the 
description of the underlying conflict as international. See SCHARF, supra note 3, at 120-37. 
59. The Tadic defense team's relatively nonconfrontational approach to the prosecution's 
presentation of relevant history, was, for example, very different from the approach taken by 
lawyers for Klaus Barbie who attempted to put modem French history itself on trial. See, 
e.g., OsIEL, supra note 6, at 52-53. 
60. See Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll 481. For an overview of the defense's case, see 
ScHARF, supra note 3, at 175-206. 
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simply not present at Kozarac or in the relevant prison camps at the 
time of each of the alleged offenses. 61 
To the extent the judges reject this defense with respect to spe­
cific charges, they do not indicate that they find defense witnesses 
untruthful. Instead, the judges respectfully and cautiously conclude 
that defense witnesses merely failed to provide a conclusive alibi, 
since even if what they said was true, their testimony did not pre­
clude TadiC's presence elsewhere.62 Even with respect to the weigh­
ing of competing testimony, the judges strive to cast their findings 
as the inevitable result of the application of coolly unemotional, ra­
tional, and objective logical iµference and not subjective - and 
presumably more challengeable - credibility determinations. 63 
The search for societal consensus with respect to their verdict also 
leads the judges to tiptoe gingerly around the question of the poten­
tial ethnic or religious bias of all witnesses, an issue that emerged 
repeatedly during cross-examination of the Serbian defense wit­
nesses and the non-Serb prosecution witnesses - most of whom 
were Muslim victims.64 
The Chamber's sensitive handling of evidence seeks to elicit 
confidence that the judges are being apolitical and are not being 
61. See, e.g., Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'lI 443 (relating to Tadic's claim that he was not 
present at the Keraterm camp). 
62. Even with respect to events at the Omarska camp on June 18, 1992, the Chamber 
simply states that "no other Defence witness could assign 18 June as a date when the accused 
was in his or her company." Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'JI 230; see also Tadic Judgment, 
supra note 4, ']['][ 312-13. Of course, as the judgment readily acknowledges, an alibi defense in 
this case became nearly impossible given the need to account for TadiC's whereabouts over 
an extended period. See Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'JI 533. Pointing to the many prosecu­
tion witnesses who put Tadic on the scene in Omarska on June 18, the Chamber appealed to 
logical inference, indicating that "it is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the 
accused." Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, '][ 234. With respect to other charges, the chamber 
counters the "general" testimony of defense alibi witnesses, who testify of the accused's 
"constant" presence elsewhere, with the "very specific and precise evidence" of certain 
prosecution witnesses who testify to TadiC's actions on particular occasions. Tadic Judgment, 
supra note 4, 'lI 278 (relating to events of July 10, 1992); see also Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 
']['][ 434-35 (relating to TadiC's presence at the Omarska camp). 
63. Presumably not to offend Serbian sensibilities and to find common ground in support 
of the judgment, the judges avoid saying that many defense witnesses, including the accused's 
wife, Mira Tadic, are not credible. Indeed, at various points, the judges go out of their way to 
rely on Mira TadiC's testimony, thereby suggesting that they find at least portions of it credi­
ble. See, e.g., Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'lI 428. Thus, the judges do not accuse the de­
fense's four alibi witnesses, all of whom testify that Tadic was present in Kozarac in May 
1992, of lying; the judges simply state that their testimony "does not afford an alibi to the 
accused except to indicate that they did not happen to see the accused in Kozarac on that day 
while they were there." Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, '][ 337. 
64. The judges deemphasize the possible significance of ethnic or religious bias by any 
witness. They dismiss defense contentions that Muslim victims are inherently biased and 
avoid similar contentions with respect to the veracity of defense witnesses. See Tadic Judg­
ment, supra note 4, ']['][ 540-41. 
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drawn into local ethnic or religious tensions. At the same time, the 
judges emphasize that, under the applicable law, they are obliged to 
find evidence that Tadic was personally motivated by and acted 
upon the systematic nationalist ethno-religious hatreds canvassed in 
the judges' preliminary findings. The tribunal links Tadic's intent to 
those of the Serbian society at large in three steps. First, the judges 
cite their preliminary findings, along with other evidence, to con­
clude that TadiC's acts were taken within a "general context of dis­
crimination." 65 Second, they rely on specific examples of 
victimization of non-Serbs to conclude that "[a] policy to terrorize 
the non-Serb civilian population of opstina Prijedor on discrimina­
tory grounds is evident[,] . . . that its implementation was wide­
spread and systematic throughout," and that this was apparent "at 
the minimum" in Opstina Prijedor.66 Finally, the Chamber links 
these general policies to TadiC's own actions to conclude that Tadic 
was "aware of the policy of . . .  discrimination against non-Serbs, 
and acted on the basis of religious and political grounds."67 
C. The Legal Case Against the Defendant 
In the final section of the judgment, the Chamber applies the 
applicable humanitarian law to its factual findings. The judges con­
firm that, as a matter of law, a showing of discriminatory animus on 
the part of Tadic individually and by advocates of "Greater Serbia" 
generally is needed to convict Tadic of either persecution as a crime 
against humanity or violations of the laws and customs of war. Af­
firming that convictions for violations of the laws or customs of war 
65. See Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll 465. 
The abuses against non-Serbs were motivated by religious and political reasons. The 
curse directed at Muslims most often was the derogatory term, "balija," as well as "Fuck 
your Alija," referring to the SDA leader Alija Izetbegovic. These indicate the motiva­
tions of the perpetrators. Abuse was also directed towards Croats for political reasons. 
There was repeated testimony that men were forced to hold their hands in the three­
finger Serb salute, which is a traditional Serb greeting and has meaning within the 
Serbian Orthodox Church, and several witnesses testified that crosses were carved on 
men's bodies. Numerous witnesses testified to hearing discriminatory curses such as 
"balija mother," "Ustasa mother," and "Alija mother," usually in association with a 
beating. Many were required to sing Serb nationalistic songs and some of the camp 
guards wore the "Chetnik kokarda," the two-headed eagle described as equivalent to 
wearing a Nazi swastika. 
Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll 467. 
66. Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll 472. 
67. Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll 477. For the Chamber, this evidence includes Tadic's 
active involvement in political affairs on behalf of a "Greater Serbia," including TadiC's re­
puted desire to name his child after Slobodan Milosevic, his many actions and statements 
directed against Muslims and his evincing a desire to "disturb relations between ethnic 
groups." Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll 475 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll 185. 
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and for crimes against humanity require, apart from a demonstra­
tion that the acts allegedly committed are within those enumerated 
under those laws, that they be committed within the context of 
"armed conflict,"68 the judges find that these requisites are met 
since Tadic's actions relating to the take-over of Kozarac and other 
villages were directly connected to this "ethnic war and the strategic 
aims of the Republika Srpska to create a purely Serbian State."69 
Similarly, they conclude that Tactic's actions in the prison camps 
were also directly connected to the ongoing armed conflict, since 
they "clearly occurred with the connivance or permission of the au­
thorities running these camps" and "effected the objective of the 
Republika Srpska to ethnically cleanse, by means of terror, killings 
or otherwise, the areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
controlled by Bosman Serb forces."70 
In the tribunal's view, discriminatory animus is also a significant 
component with respect to each of the additional requirements 
needed under the law for a "crime against humanity."71 They con­
firm that discriminatory intent is, as would be expected, crucial to 
determining that the accused committed the specific type of crime 
against humanity charged under article S(h) of its statute, "persecu­
tion." Though the chamber candidly admits that persecution "has 
68. Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll'll 572-76. 
69. Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll 574. 
70. Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll 575. 
71. According to the chamber's interpretation of article S's reference to "crimes against 
humanity," these crimes require, in addition, a showing: (1) that at the time of the commis­
sion of the acts or omissions there was an ongoing widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population; (2) that the defendants' acts were undertaken on a widespread 
or systematic basis and in furtherance of such a policy; (3) that all relevant acts be under­
taken on discriminatory grounds; and (4) that the perpetrator have knowledge of the wider 
context of his actions. See Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll 626. The judges determined that 
the need to have actions "directed against a civilian 'population"' requires a widespread 
course of conduct, suggesting a large number of victims, or systematic mass action, suggesting 
a pattern or methodical plan, and not "isolated or random" acts. Tadic Judgment, supra note 
4, 'll 646. In addition, persons must be "victimised not because of [their] individual attributes 
but rather because of [their] membership [within] a targeted civilian population." Tadic 
Judgment, supra note 4, 'll 644. In deference to the Report of the Secretary-General that 
recommended that the Security Council establish the Yugoslavia tribunal, the judges affirm 
that "discrimination" is required and must rest on "national, political, ethnic, racial or reli­
gious grounds." Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'JI 652. They also agree that the acts must be 
part of a formally adopted, or at least consciously pursued, policy directed against particular 
groups of people, whether or not pursued by a state. See Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll 653. 
As for the defendant's intent, they require a showing that 
the perpetrator has knowledge, either actual or constructive, that these acts were occur­
ring on a widespread or systematic basis and does not commit his act for purely personal 
motives completely unrelated to the attack on the civilian population . . . . Therefore the 
perpetrator must know that there is an attack on the civilian population, know that his 
act fits in with the attack and the act must not be taken for purely personal reasons 
unrelated to the armed conflict. 
Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll 659. 
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never been clearly defined in international criminal law nor . . .  in 
the world's major criminal justice systems,"72 it indicates "that what 
is necessary is some form of discrimination that is intended . to be 
and results in an infringement of an individual's fundamental 
rights" based on the specific grounds of "race, religion or poli­
tics."73 The judges contend that "it is not necessary to have a sepa­
rate act of an inhumane nature to constitute persecution" since 
discrimination, the "violation of the right to equality in some seri­
ous fashion," "itself makes the act inhumane."74 
The Chamber's reliance on discriminatory animus as a critical 
part of both its factual and legal arguments in favor of conviction 
serves a multitude of didactic purposes. First, it is an affirmation of 
and an appeal to universal values in defense of fundamental human 
dignity. The judges are relying on the closure model's premise that 
such a judicial affirmation will demonstrate, to everyone's satisfac­
tion, that it is appropriate - and perhaps necessary - to have an 
international tribunal pronounce on crimes that constitute universal 
threats.75 Second, their emphasis on irrational prejudice as the mo­
tivator encourages condemnation of Tadic as an individual culprit 
and mollifies the victims of his irrational, but calculated, behavior. 
Third, as in the Chamber's factual findings, it heightens the sharp 
break between the defendant's treatment of his victims· and the 
judges' treatment of him. Fourth, by stressing the ethnic and reli­
gious underpinnings of the conflict in the Balkans in a way that the 
Nuremberg trials largely failed to do, the judges attempt to 
strengthen the accuracy of their historical account and thereby pre­
serve a record that does not dishonor the memory of the Balkan 
72. Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'lI 694. 
73. Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'lI 697; see also Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'lI 707 
(noting that forms of persecution vary, but the prerequisite for all is discrimination with re­
spect to a "fundamental right"). 
74. Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'lI 697. Although the chamber does not attempt a defini­
tive list of acts that would constitute persecution, it surveys the wide variety of acts that have 
been included in the literature or in prior practice, including Nuremberg itself - from killing 
to limitation of the type of professions open to the targeted group, from restrictions on family 
life to infia=atory writings inciting a population to anti-Semitic persecution - and con­
cludes that the crime encompasses "a variety of acts, including, inter alia, those of a physical, 
economic or judicial nature, that violate an individual's right to the equal enjoyment of his 
basic rights." Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'lI 710; see also Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll'll 
707-09. 
75. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 17-21 (discussing need for international fora). 
Thus, for example, the requirement that crimes against humanity be directed at "any civilian 
population . . .  gives the crime the requisite international dimension and . . .  permits extrater­
ritorial prosecution, thus distinguishing it from an 'ordinary crime' that the state is expected 
to prosecute." The Queen v. Fmta [1994] S.C.R. 701, 752 (Can.) (La Forest, J., dissenting) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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conflict's victims. Finally, the judges' unstinting account of the eth­
nic and religious stereotyping engaged in by Tadic and the society 
around him seeks to promote revulsion against such tactics and en­
courages societal consensus in favor of national reconciliation along 
integrationist lines. 
As the foregoing example illustrates, the Tadic judgment as well 
as his sentencing76 wholeheartedly embrace the closure model. The 
purportedly authoritative and lengthy77 historical account that the 
judges supply in their preliminary factual :findings, extending to 
facts and situations far removed from the charges directly at issue, 
presents a wealth of detail intended to evoke shared revulsion in 
court observers - the better to prevent barbarism's recurrence, to 
promote sympathy and solidarity with victims, and to strengthen 
the court's moral and legal legitimacy vis-a-vis Tadic and defend­
ants generally. Those findings are also intended to lend credibility 
to the court's later factual and legal conclusions, and not merely 
because the court's version of history helps it to determine that the 
law's demand for a demonstration of discriminatory animus has 
been fulfilled. The black-and-white lines drawn by the court be­
tween perpetrator and victim and between the region's harmonious 
past and its recent decline into ethnic cleansing are intended to but­
tress the court's :findings of guilt, to strengthen social solidarity on 
behalf of the universal values reflected in humanitarian law, and to 
support as well TadiC's sentence. At the same time, the apolitical 
tone adopted in those preliminary factual findings - as in the 
court's scrupulous attempt to avoid explicit condemnation of 
Serbian political goals, Serbian political or cultural institutions or 
Serbs generally - keeps the focus on TadiC's individual culpability, 
76. Tadic's sentencing, as reported in the press, included an oral statement by Chief Judge 
Gabrielle Kirk McDonald. As quoted in news accounts, Judge McDonald noted that Tadic 
beat his Muslim and Croat victims "intentionally and with sadistic brutality, using knives, 
weapons, iron bars, the butt of a pistol, sticks and by kicking . . .  tightening a noose around 
the neck of one of them until he lost consciousness. Why?" War Criminal Sentenced to 
20-Year Term, CliARLESToN DAILY MAIL (yV. Va.), July 14, 1997, at AS, available in 1997 WL 
7110580. Judge McDonald also alluded to political leaders' encouragement of ethnic hatred 
and indicated to Tadic, "[y]ou responded to this campaign and you must bear responsibility 
for your criminal conduct." Id. She concluded that "[t]o condone your actions even when 
committed in this context is to give effect to a base view of morality and invite anarchy." Id. 
Judge McDonald's statements, including her presumably rhetorical question to the defend­
ant, were obviously intended to enhance collective revulsion against Tadic's acts and en­
courage unanimity in favor of the severity of the chamber's sentence. See also Sentencing 
Judgment, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T (Trial Chamber, Intl. Trib. For the Prose­
cution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Intl. Humanitarian Law Committed 
in the Territory of Former Yugo. since 1991, July 14, 1997) <http://www.un.org/icty/ 
70714se2.htm> (hereinafter Sentencing Judgment). 
77. The preliminary factual findings extend from paragraph 193 of the judgment to para­
graph 477 in an opinion that has 765 paragraphs total. 
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the better to avoid destabilizing implications of collective guilt. Fi­
nally, the court's careful delineation of evidence relative to particu­
lar charges, along with its effort to reduce reliance on credibility or 
other comparable "subjective" findings, seeks to promote closure 
with respect to the judges' adherence to the neutral application of 
law. In all these respects, Tadic's trial and judgment seem, as in­
tended, at least the equal of the Nuremberg trials that inspired 
them. 
III. CRACKS IN THE EDIFICE 
To date, the reaction to TadiC's conviction and sentence does not 
resemble anything remotely approaching closure. Despite the me­
ticulous case presented by the prosecution, the relatively strong de­
fense mounted by Tadic's attorneys, the more than 120 witnesses 
and hundreds of exhibits, the 7000 pages of trial transcripts, and the 
painstaking and lengthy written judgment, the Tadic verdict has 
generated, at least in Serbian circles, chilly indifference or worse.78 
The official Serbian reaction has been that the Tadic proceedings 
and verdict constitute further evidence that the tribunal is a fraud 
perpetrated by hostile foreign interests pursuing political show tri­
als to undermine the Serbian nationalist cause.79 This reaction, 
while extreme, is likely to find an echo even among some commen­
tators in the West.80 And, while most international lawyers con-
78. See, e.g., Madise Simons, A War-Crimes Trial, but of Muslims, Not Serbs, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 3, 1997, at A3. See generally Dufan Cotic, Introduction, 5 CruM. L.F. 223 (1994). The 
reaction to Tadic's conviction and sentence was, within the Balkans, strongly divided along 
Serb/non-Serb lines. The deputy justice minister of the Bosnian Serb republic at Pale, Goran 
Neskovic, expressed the view of many Serbian observers when he pronounced that the Tadic 
sentence proved the tribunal's "bias against Serbs." Mike Corder, Tribunal Sentences 
Bosnian Serb to Serve 20 Years for Terror Campaign, WASH. PoST, July 15, 1997, at Al3. 
According to Neskovic, "Tadi[c] was convicted only because he lived in Prijedor . . . .  That 
man is not guilty, and not a single witness could confirm that he was responsible." Id. In­
deed, the absence of Serbian support for the Yugoslav tribunal, long apparent given the lack 
of cooperation, indeed obstruction, by government officials and others to the tribunal's ongo­
ing investigations, only seemed to deepen after the verdict was rendered and NATO forces 
undertook two modest raids to arrest other indicted individuals. Instead of closure, bomb 
and other threats emerged as a resnlt of the verdict and the NATO actions, and Serbian 
media reports lambasted both the verdict and the NATO actions as biased attacks on the 
Serbian cause. See Jovana Gee, Serb Anger Grows due to NATO Raid, Tribunal Sentencing, 
AssocIATED PRESs, July 14, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4874854; see also Jovana Gee, Serbs 
Bury War Crimes Suspect, Accuse NATO of Murder, AssoCIATED PRESS, July 13, 1997, avail­
able in 1997 WL 4874729. 
79. Indeed, Serbian anti-tribunal propaganda has been so vitriolic that it prompted 
NATO attempts to disrupt television transmissions within Bosnia. See, e.g., Chris Hedges, 
NATO Troops in Bosnia Silence Karadzic's [sic] Television Station, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1997, 
at A3. 
80. See, e.g., Hayden, Schindler's Fate, supra note 40, at 743; Hayden, Reply, supra note 
40, at 767; Rubin, supra note 40, at 41-42. 
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tinue to applaud the tribunal's efforts, its proceedings are 
generating considerable and contentious debates and reviving 
Nuremberg-era issues even among its foremost advocates.81 There 
is little evidence that either the principal intended audience of the 
closure model - the diverse peoples living within the former 
Yugoslavia - or the international community as a whole are reach­
ing consensus in or through the tribunal's efforts. On the contrary, 
as with Nuremberg and national war crimes prosecutions since, it 
seems likely that many revisionists are now waiting in the wings and 
will soon emerge to challenge the tribunal's legitimacy and its ca­
pacity to fulfill its goals. 
While it remains possible that closure will yet emerge as a result 
of the Yugoslav prosecutions, we need to consider the possibility 
that, at least in. the context of present conditions in the former 
Yugoslavia, the model of closure needs reconsideration. In this sec­
tion, I will address how, despite the Tadic judges' best efforts, 
TadiC's trial fell short with respect to the four critical aspects of the 
model of closure: the presentation and preservation of collective 
memory, the application of "apolitical" rules of law, and fairness to 
both defendants and victims. At the end of the section, I will sug­
gest why the difficulties in applying the model of closure are not 
limited to either the Tactic case or the Yugoslav tribunal but extend, 
possibly with even greater force, to the international tribunal for 
Rwanda. Finally, I will suggest why the failures of the closure ap­
proach suggest a need to get beyond the purported "lessons" of 
Nuremberg. 
A. Flawed History 
Consider first the contrast between the demands for a definitive 
and enduring historic account acceptable to all sides and what 
Tactic's judges actually produced: a simple story of Serbian aggres­
sion and its horrific consequences. The judges' account, containing 
scarcely a mention of the possibility of competing versions of events 
or shades of gray, lacks the complexities, nuances and cross­
disciplinary insights of contemporaneous scholarly accounts of the 
same events. As might be expected, scholars' versions of the 
81. See, e.g., SCHARF, supra note 3, at 207-28; Chaney, supra note 22, at 60; Monroe 
Leigh, The Yugoslav Tribunal: Use of Unnamed Witnesses Against Accused, 90 AM. J. INTL. 
L. 235 (1996); Scharf, supra note 31; Michael Scharf & Valerie Epps, The International Trial 
of the Century? A "Cross-Fire" Exchange on the First Case Before the Yugoslavia War Crimes 
Tribuna� 29 CORNELL INn.. L.J. 635, 643-63 (1996); Sienho Yee, The Erdemovic Sentencing 
Judgement: A Questionable Milestone for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, 26 GA. J. INTL. & CoMP. L. 263 (1997). 
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Balkans' descent into violence are much more nuanced. Even 
while finding the Serbs primarily at fault, they give the conflict a 
much longer and more complex pedigree, highlighting the ways that 
economic and other forms of discontent, for example, were chan­
neled first under Tito and then Milosevic and other politicians. The 
best of these accounts tells a story quite distinct from the Tadic 
judges' simplistic tale of an ethnically harmonious region that, 
nearly overnight, exploded into ethnic cleansing. Academic histo­
ries, such as Sabrina Ramet's and Noel Malcolm's, bring to bear a 
rich texture of cultural, psychological, sociological, and political 
facts, along with their historical precedents, to explain how the so­
cial fabric of the former Yugoslavia frayed over time.82 Unlike the 
tale told in the Tadic case, these accounts: (1) distinguish among 
cultural, religious, and political phenomena instead of relying on an 
undifferentiated mantra of race, religion, or politics; (2) scrutinize 
and challenge the numerous claims to historical victimization con­
tained in regional nationalisms; and (3) attribute blame to a large 
number of specific persons and groups, including churches and 
political associations. 83 
In these and many other ways, TadiC's judges are demonstrably 
poor historians. It seems inconceivable that anyone, even those fa­
vorably disposed to the judges' version of the facts, can read the 
judges' historical account as a convincing or definitive history. De­
spite the Yugoslav tribunal's and its prosecutor's able attempts to 
exceed the level of historical accuracy achieved at the Nuremberg 
trials, their effort to seek closure with respect to the preservation of 
collective memory seems both a Sisyphean effort and a pale and 
woefully inadequate version of a story better told elsewhere. 
Some of the reasons for this lie with the traditional demands of 
the criminal law. As scholars like Osiel have noted, the 
perpetrator-driven nature of the rules of evidence, the require-
82. See SABRINA PETRA RAMET, BALKAN BABEL: THE DISINTEGRATION OF 
YUGOSLAVIA FROM THE DEATH OF Trro TO ETHNIC WAR (2d ed. 1996); NoEL MALcoLM, 
BOSNIA: A SHORT HISTORY (1996). 
83. See MALcoLM, supra note 82; RAMET supra note 82. Although Ramet does not rely 
on atavistic ethnic hatreds to explain recent massacres, she describes the various ways institu­
tions, such as the Serbian Orthodox Church, and individuals, such as Milosevic, journalists, 
and rock stars, revived and exploited nationalist sentiments that go back at least to 1918. 
Separate chapters in Ramet's book are devoted to "distinct spheres of influence" - culture 
and society, religion, and politics - and she chronicles, for example, the forms of "victim 
complex" that became manifest within each sphere. See RAMET, supra note 82, at 91-112, 
198-200; see also id. at 275-98 (discussing the "[r]epercussions of the War in religion, gender 
relations, and culture"). Malcolm's is a more traditional historical account which begins with 
the origins of racial myths in Bosnia in 1180 and takes readers through distinct historical 
periods until modem times. See generally MALcoLM, supra note 82. 
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ments of the substantive law, and the respective roles, as tradition­
ally conceived, of prosecutor, defense attorney, and judge, suggest 
the need to draw bright lines that are often - perhaps usually -
inconsistent with the rendering of a nuanced history.84 From the 
perspective of TadiC's judges, to emphasize, as some scholars have, 
the personal culpability of Milosevic or the impact of certain cul­
tural or religious institutions85 would be of questionable relevance 
to the narrow legal issues presented. A canvassing of the role of the 
Serbian Orthodox Church in encouraging ethnic cleansing, even if 
grounded in expert testimony, would, in addition, have raised ob­
jections as to unfair prejudice as well as legal relevance, irrespective 
of its unquestioned historical relevance.86 The judges' flawed his­
torical account simply responds to what the bench heard and what 
both sides introduced into evidence under the relevant rules and 
the substantive law. 
Additional problems arise because of the political circumstances 
faced by the tribunal. Prosecutors in the Yugoslav tribunal are very 
much aware that their decisions as to whom to indict are being 
closely scrutinized for evidence of bias.87 Their efforts to follow a 
trial of a Serbian defendant, Tadic, with trials against Croatians and 
Muslims, as well as their efforts to achieve greater balance among 
the ethnicities in indictments announced to date, show the lengths 
to which they will go to show the tribunal's evenhandedness and 
legitimize its efforts before suspicious or incredulous audiences.88 
These efforts, while understandable, are not necessarily consistent 
84. See OsIEL, supra note 6; see also Alan M. Dershowitz, Life ls Not a Dramatic 
Narrative, in LAw's STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 99 (Peter Brooks & 
Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) [hereinafter LAw's STORIES]; David N. Rosen, Rhetoric and Result 
in the Bobby Seale Tria� in LAw's STORIES, supra, at 110. 
85. Ramet states, for example, that 
it is precisely in "macho" Serbia that patriarchal backlash was strongest . . . •  The entire 
Milosevic phenomenon is, in fact, rooted in fear: fear of Albanians, Croats, and even, 
eventually, Slovenes; fear of new political movements; fear of randomness, freedom, 
chaos; and fear of women. The primordial linkage of these fears is the explanation as to 
why Slobodan Milosevic 's support comes ovenvhelmingly from males - middle-aged 
peasant males being the core and largest part of his support - while his opposition 
draws women as well as men to its ranks and to its rallies. 
RAMET, supra note 82, at 122. It is difficult to see how a comparable passage could have 
appeared in the Tadic judgment - at least without drawing a severe objection complaining 
of the judges' partiality or incompetence. 
86. Cf. ICTY Rules, supra note 33, rule 89 (requiring the admission only of "relevant 
evidence" with "probative value" and requiring the exclusion of any evidence whose proba­
tive value "is substantially outweighed by the need to ensure a fair trial"). 
87. Cf. Hayden, Schindler's Fate, supra note 40; Hayden, Reply, supra note 40, at 771; 
Rubin, supra note 40, at 42-43. 
88. See, e.g., Akhavan, supra note 38 (manuscript at 64-66) (discussing the efforts to 
achieve, and the risks of, "ethnic parity" in the context of the tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia). 
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with the production of faithful history. If it is true, as historians like 
Malcolm assert,89 that the vast majority of the most serious crimes 
- and certainly genocidal actions - were committed on the 
Serbian side, a series of evenhanded trials among the diverse 
ethnicities in the Balkan region is more likely to contribute to pre­
vailing myths that all sides were equally guilty than it is to preserve 
an accurate collective memory. For similar reasons, TadiC's judges 
were understandably leery about rendering a historical account that 
attributes blame to persons not in the dock, including Milosevic. 
Quite apart from limits imposed by evidentiary or procedural rules, 
it would be impolitic for the tribunal to give as frank an assessment 
of the historical facts as would an academic. In the context of the 
Balkans, where it is said that at least one group is waging a war 
against history itself,90 the telling of accurate history is as much a 
political act as is a decision to indict. 
Finally, some of the tribunals' problems rendering collective 
memory are attributable to the closure model's internal contradic­
tions. As noted, closure demands not merely a definitive historical 
account but also a trial record that is the equal of any liberal court's. 
It requires that judges render a credible history in the midst of con­
ducting proceedings. that are as fully convincing as any conducted 
by a national court. Judged from the perspective of this second 
goal, the judges' preliminary :findings in this case are all that they 
should be. Tuey provide what lawyers expect - only so much his­
tory as is needed to support a plausible finding of guilt. 
Tue need for closure as to the verdict implies that the defend­
ant's guilt or innocence should be the focus of attention. Closure 
itself demands that no one in court have the overriding goal of in­
dicting or examining the broader society of which the defendant is 
only a part or of truly analyzing the moral complexity of these hor­
rific crimes, including an examination of competing perceptions of 
victimhood. It demands that the court tell a linear story that a his-
89. See MALCOLM, supra note 82, at 234-52. 
90. See id. at xxiv (describing the Serbian "war against the history of their country"); see 
also MICHAEL A. SELLS, THE BRIDGE BETRAYED (1996) (discussing how "ethnoreligious 
militants" waged a campaign of "cultural eradication" by targeting architectural, literary, and 
other monuments as well as people); Chris Hedges, In Bosnia's Schools, 3 Ways Never to 
Learn from History, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1997, at Al (reporting on separate history, art, and 
language classes now in place in schools throughout Bosnia for the various ethnicities in that 
country). This facet of the Balkan conflict, is not, of course, unique to it but is a characteris­
tic of many, if not all, situations involving administrative massacres. See generally IMPUNITY 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 73-280 (detailing case studies involving battles over 
national history). 
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torian might disparage.91 If Tactic's judges spent little time on the 
pre-1990 history of the region, if they failed to convey in depth the 
underlying motivation of the aggressors or omitted considerable de­
velopments that probably contributed to the violence, they were 
merely responding to the need to judge the accused and not the 
former Yugoslavia. 
Further, Tactic's judges can hardly be blamed if they avoided the 
equivocal statements of cause and effect and subjective judgments 
incapable of straightforward empirical verification that characterize 
historical accounts by academics.92 Because Tactic's judges took se­
riously closure's needs for the rendering of a plausible verdict, they 
usually avoided subjective conclusions, confining them to those nar­
row pockets expressly sanctioned by the law, such as determina­
tions as to witnesses' credibility.93 
B. The Taint of Politics 
As is suggested by the tribunal's problems with the presentation 
of history, a second crack in the model of closure appears with re­
spect to the demand that the judges remain above politics. As was 
suggested above, problems begin simply because of the political 
ramifications of the factual findings the judges render. When the 
judges themselves disagree - as they did - with respect to 
whether the JNA exercised effective control over the YRS after 
May 19, 1992, it strains credulity to believe that the tribunal will 
generate a settled consensus as to this attempt to render a legal 
judgment about a political state of affairs.94 More significantly, 
even TadiC's judges found that they could not ignore the clear 
91. See generally Robert A. Ferguson, Untold Stories in the Law, in LAw's STORIES, supra 
note 84, at 84, 85 (describing similar issues for domestic courts). Of course, had Tadic's attor­
neys chosen to contest the prosecution's account of the rise and goals of ethnic cleansing in 
Prijedor, it is possible that the Tadic trial would have taken a different tum. Cf. Guyora 
Binder, Representing Nazism: Advocacy and Identity at the Trial of Klaus Barbie, 98 YALE 
L.J. 1321 (1989) (discussing how Barbie's defense team attempted to put recent French his­
tory on trial). Nonetheless, as the Barbie case itself demonstrates, even then prosecutors and 
judges are likely to seek to avoid being mired in such extraneous arguments, the better to 
build a convincing verdict. Further, to the extent they fail, the prospects for closure as to the 
verdict seem especially remote. 
92. See, e.g., supra note 85 (Ramet quote). 
93. As discussed, the Tadic bench was even circumspect with respect to indicating the 
extent to which it relied on witness credibility. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text. 
94. Compare Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll 603-08 with McDonald Dissent, supra note 
42, 'll 6-10, 33. As the differences between the judges suggest, the lack of consensus is partly 
due to the lack of clarity in the applicable legal standards. For one example of the political 
implications of this finding, see Marlise Simons, Defining a War to Determine the Crime, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 18, 1997, at E4 (suggesting that the tribunal's finding strengthened Milo�evic's 
political position). 
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political dimensions of the defendant's crimes. Under the relevant 
law as interpreted by the judges, the defendant's actions in the 
course of a general political operation such as the Serbian take-over 
of Kozarac or his activities in prison camps run by the Republika 
Srpska were crimes precisely because they were committed as part 
of a broad political campaign to commit ethnic cleansing. 
All of Tadic's convictions are premised on the proposition that 
persecution on the grounds of political beliefs is, at least in this 
case, legally and factually indistinguishable from persecution on the 
grounds of race, ethnicity, or religion. The Tadic judgment, particu­
larly in its reliance on the nexus between Tadic 's intent and that of 
the broader society, suggests that Serbian nationalism, and by ex­
tension political activity on behalf of a "Greater Serbia," depending 
on the specific act committed, constitutes criminal activity and even 
perhaps complicity in genocide. At the very least, the Tadic judg­
ment concludes that being motivated by Serbian nationalism is a 
relevant factor leading to convictions for crimes against humanity 
- as both inhumane acts and persecution are - and violations of 
the laws and customs of war. When the tribunal cites, in support of 
its determination that Tadic was aware of the policy of discrimina­
tion against non-Serbs, evidence of the defendant's reputed desire 
to name his child after Slobodan Milosevic, or his political associa­
tions with prominent Serbian groups, or his statements in defense 
of a "Greater Serbia," is it any surprise that politically active Serbs 
should regard his conviction as an attack on their political cause? 
Are these determinations, however apolitically rendered, any the 
less a condemnation of the political goal of creating by force an 
ethnically and religiously homogeneous state? 
Throughout the opinion, from its preliminary findings through 
the specific factual and legal findings against Tadic, it is hard to es­
cape the conclusion that the judges' target is not merely Tadic, but 
Serbian nationalism, and that the judges' tacit endorsement of com­
munity values in favor of an integrationist ethic is also incidentally 
an endorsement of the Dayton formula for peace. Because of this, 
the tribunal's solid legal case for criminal liability under interna­
tional humanitarian law itself poses risks that the tribunal will con­
tinue to be perceived as the political tool of those states who were 
most instrumental in establis!rlng it. 
Further, these political dimensions threaten the Yugoslav tribu­
nal's claim that it is a truly denationalized body independent of na­
tional interests and distinguishable from Nuremberg's victor's 
justice. The judges' criminalization of the goals for a "Greater 
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Serbia" taints governments and leaders who have engaged or are 
engaging in forced expulsions to create ethnically or religiously 
pure - or purer - states.95 The judgment tacitly delegitimizes 
those nations that define themselves in ethnic or religious terms.96 
The judges seem to be saying that such nations, if established by 
force, entail criminal liability for their begetters. But since a 
number of modern nations share such origins, the tribunal's judg­
ment risks revisionist critiques of ex post facto imposition of liabil­
ity, hypocritical double standards, and political bias.97 The judges' 
faith that their verdict will find ready acceptance among all people 
of good faith appears misplaced. To the extent that those engaged 
in such nationalist struggles believe themselves to be politically and 
otherwise justified, there may be little shame attached to a tribunal 
conviction that finds an individual guilty of such "patriotic" acts. 
As this implies, a basic flaw in the model of closure as applied to 
the Balkan conflict is that such cases of mass atrocities in fact arise, 
as Osiel has argued, because there are few shared community senti­
ments and therefore little on which tribunals can draw - at least to 
elicit a shared emotional response.98 There is also the problem that 
the prospects for the restoration of some shared values may de­
pend, at least when the effort involves international tribunals, on a 
broad consensus that if political acts are condemned as crimes be­
cause they violate fundamental values, international efforts to con­
vict should apply to all members of the international community.99 
To the extent this is true, reliance on ad hoc tribunals, instead of a 
permanent international court with worldwide jurisdiction over at 
least some crimes, is incompatible with the closure model's expecta­
tions and demands from the outset.100 
95. See generally Hayden, Schindler's Fate, supra note 40, at 732-33 (citing, among other 
examples, Pakistan in 1946-47, the partition of Cyprus by Turkey in the aftermath of the 
Ottoman Empire, and Croatia in 1941-44). 
96. Cf. Thomas M. Franck, Clan and Superclan: Loyalty, Identity, and Community in 
Law and Practice, 90 AM. J. !Nn.. L. 359, 360-68 {1996) {discussing differences between con­
cepts of "state" and ethnic "nation"). 
97. See generally Hayden, Schindler's Fate, supra note 40; Rubin, supra note 40. 
98. But see infra Part IV as to other useful functions of such prosecutions. 
99. See, e.g., Simpson, supra note 23, at 24-26. To this extent, bringing international prose­
cutions may pose greater difficulties than national attempts. 
100. For an argument that the United States' policies to encourage Haitian officials not to 
prosecute criminally those involved in earlier atrocities, as well as the United Nations' efforts 
to pursue immunity for peace in other places, threaten the legitimacy of current international 
criminal prosecutions, see Michael P. Scharf, Swapping Amnesty for Peace: Was There a Duty 
to Prosecute International Crimes in Haiti?, 31 TEXAS INTL. L.J. 1 (1996) (noting recent U.N. 
attempts to encourage amnesty for peace in El Salvador, Cambodia, and South Africa as well 
as in Haiti); see also SCHARF, supra note 3, at 87 (noting U.N. amnesty efforts in Somalia). 
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C. Unfairness to the Defendant 
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The third crack in the model of closure relates to its insistence 
on evoking a shared consensus that defendants have been fairly 
tried, in accordance with all due process.101 
Despite the strenuous efforts to improve on the Nuremberg 
model in these respects, the Balkan tribunal continues to labor 
under Nuremberg's shadow with respect to basic principles of fair­
ness, including nullum crimen sine lege.102 There is widespread 
agreement among both international and domestic lawyers the 
world over that the rule against ex post facto criminal liability, codi­
fied in a number of international instruments,103 seeks to provide 
fair notice and protects against the "unbridled abuse of power," in­
cluding the risk that selective prosecutions amount to revenge dis­
guised as justice.104 The requirement that criminal liability be 
based on preexisting law, at least in a democratic polity subject to 
checks and balances, is also seen as providing further assurance that 
criminal laws do not depart from community sentiments.1os 
Although the creators of the tribunal recognized the need to ap­
ply only those "rules of international humanitarian law which are 
beyond any doubt part of customary law,"106 the legal decisions 
rendered in the Tadic case are not likely to quell doubts that the 
judges were legislating from the bench. 
101. But see Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion Requesting Protective Measures for 
Victims and Witnesses, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, 'lI 28 (Trial Chamber, Intl. 
Trib. for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Intl. Humanitarian 
Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugo. since 1991, Aug. 10, 1995) 
<http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/decision-e/100895pm.htm> [hereinafter Decision on the 
Prosecutor's Motion] (stating that the tribunal is "in certain respects, comparable to a mili­
tary tribunal, which often has limited rights of due process and more lenient rules of 
evidence"). 
102. See generally RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 3, at 19-22. As these authors note, this 
principle comes into play in a variety of contexts, including in "constitutional prohibitions on 
ex post facto laws, judicial rules of construction limiting the use of analogy in interpreting 
criminal laws, doctrines prohibiting ambiguous criminal laws, and provisions in international 
human rights instruments barring prosecutions for acts not criminal at the time of their com­
mission." Id. at 19. 
103. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 15, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171, 177 (providing in relevant part: "No one shall be held guilty of any crimi­
nal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, 
under national or international law, at the time when it was committed."). 
104. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying 
International Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions, 3 
DUKE J. CoMP. & bm.. L. 235, 290 (1993). 
105. See, e.g., ANNE SA'ADAH, GERMANY'S SECOND CHANCE: TRUST, JUSTICE, AND 
DEMOCRATIZATION (forthcoming Fall 1998, manuscript at 192, on file with author). 
106. Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 2, 'lI 34. 
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Consider, for example, the tribunal's convictions for the crime 
against humanity known as persecution. The Chamber's candid ad­
mission that this crime has "never been clearly defined" in either 
international or national law107 suggests that, despite closure's de­
mands that the tribunal remain within the confines of established 
and precisely defined international crimes, reliance on this crime 
with a fifty-year-old pedigree may not be sufficient. Closure's de­
mands do not seem satisfied by the Chamber's numerous convic­
tions for something that it can only define as some form of 
discrimination infringing on an individual's fundamental rights.108 
Ultimately, the Chamber convicts Tadic of a crime that it can only 
vaguely define.109 
This is not to suggest that TadiC's judges did anything un­
expected or unusual in this respect. As Cherif Bassiouni has noted, 
the criticism that prosecutions for crimes against humanity violate 
principles of legality because these crimes are not as precisely de­
fined as some domestic criminal laws is as old as Nuremberg.110 
Bassiouni attributes this endemic problem to the fact that interna­
tional humanitarian law develops without "legislation" but through 
"common law" developments in national and international tribu­
nals, the practice of states, and the patchwork fabric of overlapping 
conventions.111 While admitting that this is a weakness that needs 
107. Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll 694. 
108. See Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll 696-97. The tribunal even suggests that no act 
"separate" from the violation of the right to equality "in some serious fashion" needs to be 
shown, and refuses to give any definite shape to the types of "fundamental rights" it has in 
mind. Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll 697. To the extent that the Chamber provides exam­
ples of "persecution," the wide gamut of examples it provides - from violent acts that are 
already illegal under all states' laws, such as killing, to hate speech, which only some states 
would find criminally liable under domestic law - and the Chamber's refusal to say anything 
definitive about these examples add to the likelihood of confusion in future cases. See Tadic 
Judgment, supra note 4, 'll'll 703-10. 
109. Even the tribunal's defenders recognize the vagueness of a charge for "persecution.'' 
See, e.g., RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 3, at 72-73. 
110. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, "Crimes Against Humanity": The Need for a Specialized 
Convention, 31 CoLUM. J. TRANsNTL. L. 457, 461-71 (1994); see also Pavel Dolenc, A 
Slovenian Perspective on the Statute and Rules of the International Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L.F. 451, 457-59 {1994) (criticizing articles 3 & 5 of the Statute of the 
tribunal for, among other things, failing to define precisely its targeted offenses); Edward M. 
Wise, General Rules of Criminal Law, DENV. J. lNTL. L. & POLY. 313, 315-16 (1997) (criticiz­
ing international crimes as currently defined). 
111. See Bassiouni, supra note 110, at 469-72; see also Theodor Meron, The Continuing 
Role of Custom in the Formation of International Humanitarian Law, 90 AM. J, INTL. L. 238 
(1996). But Christopher L. Blakesley attributes vagueness difficulties to the problem that the 
international lawyers who have tried to define international crimes are insufficiently prac­
ticed in the needs of the criminal law. He contends that the requirements of "actus reus" and 
"mens rea" must be included in future definitions of specific international crimes and notes 
that "[i]t is debatable whether customary international law or general principles derived from 
the clarification of national law suffice.'' Christopher L. Blakesley, Atrocity and Its 
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to be remedied, he argues that the requirements of this system "are 
necessarily different from those of a codified system, and [that] th"e 
same legal standards of specificity cannot be expected of it. "112 
The model of closure, however, demands such specificity, espe­
cially given the specificity of today's human rights entitlements for 
criminal defendants.113 The lack of guidance provided by the Tadic 
bench suggests why. In the wake of the Tadic case, criminal defend­
ants before the Yugoslav tribunal now have no clear notice about 
whether acts such as advocacy on behalf of Serbian nationalism, the 
discriminatory firing of non-Serb employees, or the refusal to treat 
a Muslim patient at a hospital constitute the crime of persecution 
under crimes against humanity.114 Prospective defendants, of any 
ethnic or religious group, have no firm guarantee that international 
prosecutors, under pressure to bring evenhanded charges against all 
groups in the Balkans, will not be tempted to respond to such pres­
sures by inventing novel interpretations of persecution. Moreover, 
the prospect that a chamber of an ad hoc international tribunal cre­
ated by the Security Council may be defining new forms of interna­
tional liability in the course of deciding the fate of individual 
defendants. can hardly be comforting to those concerned about 
keeping international lawmaking processes accountable to repre­
sentative processes. 
While the violent acts encompassed by TadiC's convictions for 
persecution would appear to be securely within the types of actions 
that all states would punish under their domestic laws, the 
Chamber's readiness to impose the stigma of a conviction for perse­
cution as a crime against humanity115 raises questions about the 
precise scope of this international crime and the fairness of leaving 
its definition to the discretion of a court in the course of an ongoing 
trial.116 This is all the more likely to become an issue given the 
Prosecution: The Ad Hoc Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, in THE LAW OF 
WAR CRIMES, supra note 23, at 189, 204. 
112. Bassiouni, supra note 110, at 471. 
113. As Bassiouni himself concedes elsewhere, there are ever higher expectations that 
international criminal law will meet the standards of national law in this regard. See 
Bassiouni, supra note 104, at 241. 
114. These possibilities are not farfetched if we take seriously the Tadic judgment's con­
clusion that persecution requires no inhumane act other than a serious violation of the right 
to equality. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
115. Cf. supra note 75 (discussing how crimes against humanity are different from "ordi­
nary crimes"). 
116. Cf. Bassiouni, supra note 110, at 471 ("The observance of the 'rule of law' is far 
more important than the ad hoc prosecution or punishment of any offender or group of 
offenders."). 
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probable popularity of this charge for acts that do not clearly fall 
within other, less vaguely defined offenses within the tribunal's 
statute. 
And the Tactic Chamber's conclusions as to persecution are just 
the tip of the iceberg. As critics of prosecutions for low-level per­
petrators have noted, a common problem with respect to such pros­
ecutions relates to uncertainties with respect to the requisite intent, 
as well as defenses like self-defense, necessity, and mistake of fact 
or law.117 None of these basic elements of a criminal prosecution 
are defined within the tribunal's statute.118 The Tactic judgment 
provides little reason for optimism that fifty years of post­
Nuremberg developments have now settled most of the uncertain­
ties in the scope or interpretation of international humanitarian law 
that prompted the initial criticism of those World War II trials on ex 
post facto grounds. Attempts to give shape and content to the 
crimes now contained in the tribunal's statute will inevitably give 
rise to debates over judicial legislation and novel criminal liability, 
including the liability of juveniles and the scope of the tribunal's 
restitution of property remedies, as well as the interpretation of in­
tent requirements for the crime of genocide.119 
Other fairness issues loom large. For some continental system 
lawyers, it seems inappropriate that the very judges charged with 
their application and interpretation are, under the tribup.al's statute, 
delegated the authority to devise their own rules of evidence and 
procedure.12° Others are troubled by the provision in the tribunal's 
statute permitting retrials of those previously tried in national 
courts if the tribunal decides such proceedings involved convictions 
or acquittals for ordinary crimes, or finds that such trials were not 
impartial or independent, were designed to shield the defendant 
from internatfonal liability, or were not diligently prosecutect.121 
Some common law lawyers, on the other hand, question the ability 
117. See generally Suzanne Walther, Problems in Blaming and Punishing Individuals for 
Human Rights Violations: The Examples of the Berlin Wall Shootings, in IMPUNITY AND 
HUMAN Rlmrrs, supra note 3, at 99. 
118. See Dolenc, supra note 110, at 457. 
119. See generally id.; Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal 
Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INTL. L. 554 {1995). 
120. See ICTY Statute, supra note 2, art. 15; Dolenc, supra note 110, at 459-60. 
121. See ICTY Statute, supra note 2, art. 10(2). This provision raises concerns as to its 
relationship with constitutional provisions against double jeopardy, despite arguments, as 
under U.S. constitutional law, that a second prosecution by the Yugoslav tribunal is analo­
gous to a prosecution by a different sovereign and therefore is not constitutionally barred. 
See, e.g., Dolenc, supra note 110, at 460-61. 
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of the prosecutor to request appellate review of a judgment.122 
Troubling open-ended issues remain concerning the scope of reme­
dies for the accused, including whether individuals will have a right 
to seek compensation from the tribunal for unlawful arrest, impris­
onment, or perhaps harm to their reputations as a result of a public 
indictment.123 Objections concerning unequal treatment from 
those ultimately convicted by the tribunal but sent to serve time in 
prisons in different states are also likely to eme_rge.124 
TadiC's trial also raises issues under the tribunal's evidentiary 
rules. Among the most discussed has been the evidentiary ruling by 
the Tadic chamber to permit the use of anonymous witnesses. That 
ruling, premised on article 22 of the tribunal's statute,125 was issued 
over the stinging partial dissent of the Australian judge, who feared 
that this would violate TadiC's rights under a different provision of 
the tribunal's Statute "to examine, or have examined, the witnesses 
against him."126 The trial chamber's majority decision has since 
prompted considerable criticism, particularly among common law 
attorneys, and led a former Legal Advisor of the U.S. State 
Department, who had been prominently involved in the tribunal's 
creation, to lead a charge within the American Bar Association and 
elsewhere to reverse this decision or to seek amendment of the 
U.N. Charter by attaching a "Bill of Rights."127 Others have ques­
tioned even the more moderate provisions within the tribunal's 
rules permitting in camera proceedings or other measures to pro-
122. See, e.g., Michael P. Scharf, Trial and Error: An American Jurisprudential 
Assessment of the First Judgment of the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribuna� 30 N.Y.U. J. INTI.. 
L. & PoL. (forthcoming 1998) (manuscript on file with author). 
123. On the tribunal's right to conduct public indictments, see ICTY Rules, supra note 33, 
rule 61(B)-(C). 
124. For now it appears that the rules within the distinct national systems will govern 
issues involving the enforcement of sentences, including early release, rights to visitation, and 
type of confinement. See ICTY Statute, supra note 2, art. 27. For a discussion of other uncer­
tainties with respect to the Yugoslav Tribunal's approach to sentencing, see Cors & Fisher, 
supra note 44; Yee, supra note 81. 
125. Article 22 provides: "The International Tribunal shall provide in its rules of proce­
dure and evidence for the protection of victims and witnesses. Such protection measures 
shall include, but shall not be limited to, the conduct of in camera proceedings and the pro­
tection of the victim's identity." ICTY Statute, supra note 2, art. 22; see also ICTY Rules, 
supra note 33, Rules 70, 75. 
126. Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion, supra note 101 (separate opinion of Stephen, 
J.) (relying on article 21(4)(e) of the tribunal's statute). In the end, two anonymous wit­
nesses, L and H, were permitted to testify against Tadic and one of these witnesses' testimony 
(L's) was later withdrawn. 
127. See Leigh, supra note 81, at 238. But see Christine Chinkin, Arnicus Curiae Brief on 
Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, Submitted by Dean and Professor of Law 
Christine Chinkin, in 7 CRIM. L.F. 179 (1996). 
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tect victims' and witnesses' identities, as well as the tribunal's ap­
parent willingness to admit hearsay.12s 
Other fairness issues emerge because of circumstances within 
the Balkans. In the Tadic case, the vast bulk of the evidence to 
convict came not in the form of irrebuttable physical evidence of 
atrocities - including contemporaneous and meticulously docu­
mented written records of atrocities, as at Nuremberg129 - but 
through the oral testimony of self-interested live eyewitnesses - in 
all cases, Serbian witnesses for the defense and non-Serbs - mostly 
Muslim victims - for the prosecution.13o For the judges, this situa­
tion posed considerable difficulties. How does a tribunal generate 
confidence in its conclusions regarding a body of conflicting testi­
mony in the face of the charge that Muslim witnesses will say any­
thing against those who they believe are at war with them and that 
Serbian witnesses will do the same against non-Serbs? How does 
the tribunal's treatment of the inevitable conflict between the bi­
ases of Serb and non-Serb witnesses avoid replicating amongst trial 
observers in the region the prevalent ethnic and religious strains 
that gave rise to the conflict in the first place?131 How does a court 
generate credibility about its findings as to credibility? 
As noted, the Tadic bench reached for the kind of solution fa­
miliar to any court in a liberal state - it dismissed the relevance of 
witnesses' ethnic or religious affiliations and deftly avoided nearly 
all reference to such affiliations when stating its reasons for deter-
128. See, e.g., Dalene, supra note 110, at 463 (noting article 22 of the Statute and rules 75 
and 79); Prosecuting and Defending Violations of Genocide and Humanitarian Law: The In· 
temational Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 88 ASIL PROC. 239, 247-51 (1994) [hereinaf· 
ter Prosecuting and Defending Violations] (remarks of Steven J. Lepper) (discussing the 
development of the Balkan tribunal's rules). For a survey of the lacunae in the tribunals' 
rules, see, for example, Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko, Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the 
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L.F. 507 (1994); Prosecuting and 
Defending Violations, supra, at 243-45 (remarks of Christopher L. Blakesley); Scharf, supra 
note 122 (manuscript at 11-22). As Ratner and Abrams indicate, international lawyers have 
attempted to fill these lacunae through resort to evidentiary rules used in international com· 
mercial tribunals, including arbitrations, with mixed results. See RA1NER & ABRAMS, supra 
note 3, at 216-17. There are obvious uncertainties for defendants and their attorneys posed 
by the wide-open license given to the tribunal to apply "rules of evidence which will best 
favour a fair determination of the matter" and "are consonant \vith the spirit of the Statute 
and the general principles of law." ICTY Rules, supra note 33, § 3, rule 89. Defense attor­
neys are likely to argue that fairness dictates that they have notice, in advance of trial, 
whether, for example, co=on law rules of privilege apply. 
129. At Nuremberg, the prosecution submitted some seven million pages of meticulously 
kept Nazi documents. See SCHARF, supra note 3, at 117. 
130. See id. at 212. 
131. For a su=ary of the difficulties such oral testimony produced, see id. at 111-205, 
212-13. See also id. at 64 (discussing the credibility problems presented by both the absence 
of a Muslim member of the bench and the fact that four of the eleven judges of the tribunal 
came from predominately Muslim countries). 
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mining credibility.132 Yet, in this context, arguments that such affili­
ations matter make a great deal of sense. Ordinary trials, even 
those at Nuremberg, are not conducted in the midst of ongoing hos­
tilities between the parties where witnesses, after .giving their testi­
mony, return to separate enclaves to continue their verbal - and 
sometimes physical - combat.133 In such contexts a Serb or 
Muslim witness, only temporarily in The Hague, faces enormous 
pressure to give testimony favorable to his or her side.134 
Although, as indicated, the tribunal attempted to avoid any accusa­
tions that any witness, Serb or non-Serb, was lying,135 in most cases 
it found credible the testimony of victims in the face of an incom­
plete alibi testimony by defense witnesses, including Tadic's wife. 
Regardless of what the judges chose to acknowledge, they decided 
that certain defense testimony, as by those who adamantly testified 
that Tadic could not have been physically present in Kozarac or in 
certain camps, was not credible because it was self-serving.136 But 
they refused, in most cases, to accept comparable defense claims 
with respect to the testimony of Muslims.137 
Quite apart from significant questions about whether parties in 
such situations truly enjoy equality of arms, the Tadic bench's credi-
132. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text. 
133. See generally Michael J. Keegan, The Preparation of Cases for the ICTY, 7 
TRANSNATL. L. & CoNTEMP. PRoBs. 120 (1997). 
134. This fact also raises a problem that the tribunal only briefly addresses: the lack of 
equal access to evidence given the locations of defense and prosecution witnesses. The tribu­
nal notes the number of steps taken to alleviate the "inherent difficulties" of this "difficulty 
encountered by both parties," including video-conferencing links and the grant of safe con­
duct to testify at The Hague. Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll'll 530-31. Of course, defense 
lawyers would argue that lack of equal access to evidence should not be presented as a prob­
lem of equal weight to both sides: lack of access to Muslim-held areas may crucially disad­
vantage a defendant who is unable to rebut prosecution testimony. Further, the prosecution 
has available tools, such as the possibility of U.N. sanctions, that the defense does not have. 
For a discussion of these and other disadvantages suffered by defense counsel before the 
Balkan tribunal, see Mark S. Ellis, Comment, Achieving Justice Before the International War 
Crimes Tribunal: Challenges for the Defense Counsel, 7 DUKE J. CoMP. & INTL. L. 519 
(1997). See also Keegan, supra note 133 (discussing similar issues from the prosecutor's 
perspective). 
135. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text. 
136. The testimony of at least some of those witnesses was on some issues so unequivocal 
that it appears that the tribunal found them sub silentio not credible. For example, the 
judges apparently simply chose not to believe one defense witness who testified that the 
Serbian-run checkpoints in which Tadic served were established not to confirm ethnic iden­
tity but merely to check for stolen cars. See SCHARF, supra note 3, at 184. 
137. Indeed, it was unusual when the judges chose to disregard the testimony of any 
Muslim witness in this case - as they did some of the testimony of witness Hakija Elezovic. 
See Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'J[ 296 (citing the witness's "confused" state). Far more 
commonly, the judges disregarded "minor" discrepancies in oral testimony and gave 
credence to victims' testimony. See, eg., Tadic Judgment, supra note 4, 'll 275 (finding the 
testimony of Hase Icic credible). 
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bility determinations, grounded in subjective factors such as de­
meanor, routine in ordinary trials, assume problematic proportions. 
Given ongoing hostilities on the ground and the suspicion among at 
least some that the tribunal serves the interests of only some ethnic 
groups,138 the judges have little reservoir of good will upon which to 
draw. Closure as to their factual conclusions would seem to require 
a great deal more smoking-gun physical evidence than was 
presented at trial. 
In these respects, the Tadic trial raises significant doubts about 
the prospects for generating settled consensus with respect to the 
treatment of defendants. These concerns also raise doubts about 
whether such trials truly will provide the international community 
the opportunity to endorse in solidarity liberal values or the rule of 
law. 
D. Unfairness to Victims 
Closure demands that victims be mollified and, if possible, com­
pensated - at least through the return of lost property. At a mini­
mum, the international criminal process is supposed to afford 
opportunities for victims to tell their stories, to find psychological 
comfort through their participation at trial, to rehabilitate their rep­
utations, and to draw comfort from the defendant's shame, punish­
ment, and acts of contrition.139 
TadiC's trial satisfied few of these goals. His victims were not 
compensated for lost property, for injuries suffered, or for emo­
tional distress caused. Nor were they able to tell their full stories at 
trial, during sentencing, or in the bench's record of their testimony. 
Despite the parade of Muslim victims at trial, their testimony was 
circumscribed by the needs of this litigation and by the formal rules 
of the relevant criminal law. Prosecution witnesses were en­
couraged only to present "fragmented narratives"140 - to identify 
whether they actually saw Tadic engaged in the acts charged and, 
briefly, to describe what happened to them at a specific date and 
138. See, e.g., Cotic, supra note 78; Cedric Thornberry, Saving the War Crimes Tribunal, 
FOREIGN PoLY., Fall 1996, at 72. 
139. See, e.g., Roht-Arriaza, supra note 3, at 19-21 (identifying the elements of a "victim­
centered approach" as involving "public recognition" of the wrongs done to victims and, 
where possible, compensation); see also ICTY Statute supra note 2, at 2 (authorizing restitu­
tion as a possible remedy). 
140. Cf. Paul Gewirtz, Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law, in LAw's STORIES, supra note 
84, at 2, 8. 
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time relevant to the precise charges.141 Though often identified by 
name in the judgment, victims became essentially faceless place­
holders for dates, times, and acts connected to specific counts in the 
indictment. Beyond giving brief identifications, they were not en­
couraged to tell their life stories, to indicate their political views, or 
to unburden themselves and give voice to fears or hopes. Witnesses 
were not asked to describe in detail the psychological or physical 
anguish they suffered after being detained at the various detention 
camps. Muslim victims were not encouraged to tell the judges the 
emotional scars incurred as a result of being treated as subhuman 
by their tormentors or whether this treatment, along with the per­
vasive ethnic and religious slurs they endured, had an impact on 
their perceptions of self-worth, their relationship with family mem­
bers, or their views of Serbs generally. Family members of the Mus­
lim policemen who were killed were not asked to testify what the 
absence of these men had meant to them. Victims were not en­
couraged to put a price on their injuries.142 
On the contrary, the encouragement of emotional testimony by 
victims, however presented, would probably have been seen as "un­
fairly prejudicial," "insufficiently probative," or even "irrelevant" 
by the tribunal's judges, at least during trial.143 Here, as elsewhere, 
the closure model's demands point in contradictory directions: it 
seeks to provide closure for victims while requiring that judges up­
hold the "dignity and decorum of the proceedings."144 The latter 
seeks to elicit societal consensus on the premise that tribunal deci­
sions are based on the application of rules of law, not raw 
emotion.145 
141. For a summary of eyewitnesses' testimonies at trial, see SCHARF, supra note 3, at 
139-73. 
142. See Akhavan, supra note 38 (manuscript at 42) (approving of the fact that proceed­
ings before the Yugoslav tribunal focus on the perpetrator, not the victim). For arguments 
that the tensions between the needs of victims and the traditional needs of the criminal law 
may be endemic, see, for example, Paul Gewirtz, Victims and Voyeurs: Two Narrative 
Problems at the Criminal Trial, in LAw's STORIES, supra note 84, at 135. 
143. Cf. ICTY Rules, supra note 33, rule 89 (weighing probative value of evidence against 
its prejudicial effect). At Tadic's pre-sentencing hearing, the prosecutor did present, how­
ever, "victim input statements." See Sentencing Judgment, supra note 76, at para. 4. Still, the 
Tadic judges refused to consider the amount of victims' alleged economic loss for purposes of 
sentencing. Id. 
144. See, e.g., ICTY Rules, supra note 33, rule 80. 
145. See Anthony Kronman, Leontius' Tale, in LAw's STORIES, supra note 84, at 54, 56 
(arguing that, to the extent such rules suppress emotional stories that ought to be told, the 
judicial account can be rendered less persuasive). But see Robert Weisberg, Proclaiming 
Trials as Narratives: Premises and Pretenses, in LAw's STORIES, supra note 84, at 61, 82 (argu­
ing that imposition of constraints is "designed to vindicate the co=unal majesty of the 
law"). As these conflicting arguments imply, the tribunal's rules concerning decorum sug­
gest, in microcosm, inherent tensions within the model of closure. 
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Under the circumstances, it seems doubtful that Tactic's victims, 
whether or not they testified, were really able to assert "their sense 
of control and autonomy," enhance their dignity, "lessen their isola­
tion . . .  increase their feeling of belonging to a community, [and] 
. . .  find some meaning in their victimization."146 While some of 
TadiC's victims may indeed have experienced some catharsis in 
pointing a finger at their torturer at trial and may have derived 
some satisfaction from TadiC's conviction and penalty, some may 
have found a penalty of effectively ten years in prison equivalent to 
a slap on the wrist given the brutality they endured at his hands. 
Certainly no victim received, as the closure model would imply, any 
acknowledgment of shame or any other act of expiation from Tactic 
or any of the Serbian officials that he served.141 
Least mollified at the end of the Tactic trial was, presumably, 
witness F, the unnamed female prisoner whose charges of rape 
against Tactic were ultimately withdrawn because of her refusal to 
be a witness at trial. As part of its evidentiary decision regarding 
anonymous witnesses, the trial chamber had decided to delay dis­
closure of witness F's identity to the defense until shortly before 
trial, to withhold her identity from the public and the media, and to 
withhold her and her family's address and present whereabouts 
from both defense and public.148 While the trial chamber's decision 
was not reversed,149 wj.tness F nonetheless declined to testify.150 Ir­
respective of the trial chamber's evidentiary edict, the rape accusa­
tions were never aired. Indeed, continued opposition to the 
prospect of secret witnesses is likely to put pressure on prosecutors 
in future cases to insist that most if not all witnesses be identified 
regardless of the trial chamber's evidentiary decision in this case. 
The dismissal of the rape charge in the Tactic case raises more 
general concerns that the tribunal may not be able to cope with the 
needs of the many women in the Balkan region who were victims of 
systematic rapes;- including those Bosnian women who, it is alleged, 
were systematically raped while in detention in order to be impreg-
146. Robt-Arriaza, supra note 3, at 19. 
147. For a discussion of how some forms of expiation or apology can be adapted to theo­
ries of "reintegrative shaming," see Stanley Cohen, State Crimes of Previous Regimes: 
Knowledge, Accountability, and the Policing of the Past, 20 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 7, 40 (1995). 
148. See Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion, supra note 101, 'JI 53, 90; see also Chinkin, 
supra note 127, at 186 n.2. 
149. Indeed, as a procedural decision, it was not subject to interlocutory appeal under the 
tribunal's rules. See ICTY Statute, supra note 2, art. 25; ICTY Rules, supra note 33, rule 73. 
150. See Chinkin, supra note 127, at 186 n.2. 
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nated with chetnik children as part of a policy of ethnic cleansing.151 
Some victim groups have charged that the procedures and modest 
witness protection capabilities of both the ICTR and the ICTY are 
inadequate to the enormous task of prosecuting such claims.152 The 
dismissal of the rape charge in the Tadic case is likely to prompt 
fears of similar dismissals in other cases, along with complaints that 
victims of gender-specific crimes will never be heard, especially if 
the defendant can be prosecuted on other charges.153 
More generally, worries exist that, despite the tribunal's recog­
nition that rape is indeed a cognizable crime under international 
humanitarian law, its bench and prosecutors remain constrained by 
the U.N.'s154 and international law's155 gendered nature. There is 
concern that the gender-specific tactics deployed in the Balkan con­
flict, including the alleged use of rape as a tool of genocide directed 
specifically at women because they are women, will go unrecognized 
not merely in the Tadic case where rape charges were deemed irrel­
evant, but in future prosecutions - to the detriment of the needs 
and rights of victims, the credibility of the tribunal, and the preser­
vation of collective memory.156 For these reasons, at least absent 
amendments to the tribunal's definition of covered offenses to give 
explicit recognition to the many forms of gender-specific violence, it 
is possible that the record of the tribunal's prosecutions will, in the 
end, be as unjust to the memory of women victimized by the Balkan 
conflict as Nuremberg arguably was with respect to the victims of 
the Holocaust.157 
151. See Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council (May 
24, 1997) (transmitting Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to 
S.C. Res. 780 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., at IV(F)(3), U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (1994) [here-
inafter Final Report]). · 
152. Cf. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHELTERED LIVES 9-10 (1996) (outlining specific steps 
needed to reform prosecutions and investigations before the !CTR to enable it to pursue 
permutations of gender-specific violence); id. at 24-26 (noting specific ways that the ICTR's 
methods and procedures fall short). 
153. See generally Christine Chinkin, Rape and Sexual Abuse of Women in International 
Law, 5 EuR. J. !Nn.. L. 326 (1994). For one set of recommendations intended to respond to 
the needs of victims of gender-specific violence, see Mission of the Women in the Law Pro­
ject, No Justice, No Peace: Accountability for Rape and Gender-Based Violence in the Former 
Yugoslavia, 5 HASTINGS WoMEN's L.J. 91 (1994). 
154. See generally Hilary Charlesworth, Transforming the United Men's Club: Feminist 
Futures for the United Nations, 4 TRANSNATL. L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 421 (1994). 
155. See generally Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law, 
85 AM. J. INTL. L. 613 (1991). 
156. See generally Simon Chesterman, Never Again . . .  and Again: Law, Order, and the 
Gender of War Crimes in Bosnia and Beyond, 22 YALE J. INTL. L. 299, 324-42 (1997). 
157. See supra text accompanying notes 25-27. For a survey of the many ways interna­
tional humanitarian law, as recorded in the tribunal's statutory jurisdiction, fails to take suffi­
cient account of the Balkan's "gender-based" terrorism, see Amy E. Ray, The Shame of It: 
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Despite the best intentions of Tactic's judges, their judgment 
perpetuates the inadequacies of international humanitarian law 
with respect to the treatment of women. The judges' preliminary 
findings and their account of the Serbian policies in which Tactic 
joined focus only on issues of ethnicity, race, religion, or politics, 
but not gender. The judges invite revulsion against particular kinds 
of offenses committed against fundamental human dignity while ig­
noring other indignities that were equally a part of the Balkan land­
scape. The stories of how mass rape and its threat have been used 
in the Balkans158 - as a tool of expulsion; of how forced impregna­
tion became a weapon of genocide and territorial and emotional 
conquest; of how sexual invasion has been employed as a device to 
undermine the honor of both victim and her family and as symbolic 
castration of her spouse159 - were not addressed in the tribunal's 
account of the rise of "ethnic conflict" in the region and it may 
never be part of the Yugoslav tribunal's accounts of relevant his­
tory.160 Guided by the gender-neutral definitions of relevant 
crimes, which fail to recognize explicitly these acts as cognizable 
crimes,161 the narrow confines of the specific charges against Tactic 
and the dismissal of the sole charge of rape, the Tactic bench sup-
Gender-Based Terrorism in the Former Yugoslavia and the Failure of International Human 
Rights Law to Comprehend the Injuries, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 793 (1997). For an enumeration 
of proposed changes to the definitions of international crimes that would encompass changes 
to the definition of "grave breaches" of the Geneva Convention, the laws or customs of war, 
genocide, and crimes against humanity, see KELLY DAWN AsKIN, WAR CRIMES AGAINST 
WoMEN 380-403 (1997). See also Chinkin, supra note 153; Catharine A. MacKinnon, Crimes 
of War, Crimes of Peace, 4 UCLA WoMEN's L.J. 59 (1993). 
158. See Final Report, supra note 151, at 55-60. 
159. See generally M. CHERIF BAss10um & MARCIA McCORMICK, SEXUAL VIOLENCE: 
AN INvismLE WEAPON OF WAR IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (Intl. Hum. Rts. L. Inst. 
Occasional Paper No. 1, 1996). In fact, allegations of genocidal rape go back at least to 
Soviet actions in World War II. See, e.g., Colloquy, Comparative Analysis of International 
and National Tribunals, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 545, 629 (comments of Professor Istvan 
Deak). For a historical survey of war crimes against women and humanitarian law's equivo­
cal attempts to confront these prior to the creation of the Yugoslav and Rwanda tribunals, 
see AsKIN, supra note 157, at 1-203, 243-60. 
160. Cf. RAMET, supra note 82, at 117-29 (discussing the role of "gender culture" in the 
Balkans); Ray, supra note 157, at 801-21 (describing the many ways women have been terror­
ized in the former Yugoslavia). For consideration of what "neutral" terms like "ethnic con­
flict" conceal, see generally MacKinnon, supra note 157. 
161. Ray argues that the gender-neutral definitions of "grave breaches," the "laws and 
customs of war," "persecution," or "crimes against humanity" generally, fail to give a name 
to gendered forms of victimization, including explicit recognition for the crimes of forced 
prostitution, pregnancy, and maternity under both "grave breaches" and "crimes against hu­
manity." She also argues that "persecution" ought to extend to persecution on the basis of 
gender. Ray, supra note 157, at 826. From the perspective of the Tadic judgment, Ray's 
proposals would also imply that the judges should reconsider their insistence that "grave 
breaches" require interstate conflict. See generally id. at 830-35 (critiquing the "public/pri­
vate dichotomy" as applied to recent events in the Balkans). 
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pressed the stories of many victims in its preliminary findings. It 
rendered gender-specific violence and its many forms of victimiza­
tion nearly invisible.162 
Absent modification of the tribunal's statute to include the 
crimes - and recognize the harms - identified by its feminist crit­
ics, it seems quite likely that prosecutorial arguments that particular 
defendants were driven by the express intent to, for example, de­
mean women as women or demean men because of the treatment 
of their wives and daughters, will not be made. After all, none of 
the crimes within the tribunal's jurisdiction, including persecution, 
require a specific showing of intent to force pregnancy or to castrate 
men symbolically through the rape of their spouses. Yet if no one 
asks about these injuries and indignities, victims of gender-specific 
violence will be revictimized to the extent that their crimes go 
unnamed. 
On the other hand, meeting these and other demands of the clo­
sure model on behalf of victims and for the sake of collective mem­
ory could conflict with the model's competing requisite: fair notice 
to defendants and avoidance of ex post facto criminal liability.163 
Proposals to modify existing definitions of war crimes explicitly to 
recognize gender-specific violence run into probable objections that 
such legal innovations, especially if undertaken by a tribunal in the 
course of pending trials, would replicate one of Nuremberg's princi­
pal fl.aws.164 Whether or not this is the case, the tensions between 
the retributive demands of victims and demands for due process for 
defendants is likely to lead to protracted debates, not closure. 
162. For a suggestion that comparable failures may turn the tribunal into an "agent of 
persecution," see Chinkin, supra note 127, at 182 (citing AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM CoMMN. 
REP. No. 69, PART I, EQUALITY BEFORE THE LAw: JusnCE FoR WoMEN 250 (1994)) (dis­
cussing what may happen should the tribunal fail to protect victims' identities). 
163. See supra text accompanying notes 30-33. 
164. Cf. supra note 32 and accompanying text. Even without going to the lengths de­
manded by critics like Ray and Askin, the tribunal is still likely to run into criticism that it is 
making new law and imposing ex post facto criminal liability, as is suggested by the prior 
discussion on persecution. See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text. Moreover, should 
it pursue, as expected, prosecutions for mass rape, the tribunal will face a number of novel 
questions, including the liability of nongovernmental paramilitary units and the classification 
of mass rape. Should mass rape be considered as a crime against humanity, grave breach of 
the Geneva Conventions, violation of the laws and customs of war, or genocide, conspiracy to 
commit genocide, an attempt to commit genocide, or complicity in genocide? 
As noted, trials for human rights violations often invite litigation of such issues over retro­
active legislation. See, e.g., SA' ADAH, supra note 105 (manuscript at 190-91); Walther, supra 
note 117. 
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E. Lessons from Rwanda 
The problems enumerated above are not unique to the Tadic 
case nor to the Yugoslav tribunal. Although the Rwanda tribunal, 
whose jurisdiction extends to a somewhat different set of interna­
tional crimes, faces differing political conditions on the ground and 
within the U.N., it faces comparable challenges. That international 
tribunal faces possibly greater obstacles in balancing the rights of 
criminal defendants - mostly Hutu - with the rights and expecta­
tions of victims - mostly Tutsi. It seems clear that most of the 
nearly 90,000 detainees in Rwanda now awaiting trial will not re­
ceive the full-scale speedy trial to which each is entitled under inter­
national human rights standards before either Rwandan courts or 
the international tribunal.165 On the other hand, even if hundreds 
are ultimately convicted before the international tribunal in 
Arusha, there are strong indications that many victims will not be 
mollified by a process that, over the opposition of the present Tutsi 
government in Rwanda, will refuse to apply the death penalty.166 
There is an understandable thirst for revenge within Rwanda.167 
Many there see the recent horrific slaughters in their country - in 
which anywhere from 500,000 to 1,000,000 people were killed - as 
even more ignominious than the ethnic cleansing of the Balkans, at 
least in the number of victims and arguably in the clearer genocidal 
intent evidenced by the culprits.168 The sheer scale of the Hutu kill-
165. What is worse, as Blakesley points out, those detained in Rwanda's prisons are there 
solely because of denunciations by persons who could have been motivated by any number of 
personal grudges and there are estimates that anywhere from 20 to 40% percent of those now 
jailed may be innocent. See Blakesley, supra note 111, at 198. 
166. For a description of the response of the U.N. and human rights advocates to 
Rwanda's demands for application of the death penalty, see Shraga & Zacklin, supra note 3, 
at 510-11. 
167. There are ongoing reports of "hundreds, perhaps thousands" of Tutsi revenge kill­
ings amidst periodic waves of civil strife and a "government in exile" periodically threatening 
to seize power, again in part to grant "amnesty" for Hutus and charge Tutsis with genocide. 
See, e.g., Blakesley, supra note 111, at 197. 
168. Alain Destexhe, the Secretary-General of Medecins Sans Frontieres, argues that the 
Hutu killings, motivated by the attempt to destroy Tutsis as a group and not merely by the 
desire to seize territory or possessions, compose one of only three real genocides of the twen· 
tieth century. See ALAIN DESTEXHE, RWANDA AND GENOCIDE IN THE TWENTIETH CEN· 
TURY 20 (Alison Marschner trans., 1995). He contends that the incomparable stigma of the 
term "genocide" ought to be confined, consistent with international law and Nuremberg's 
legacy, to killings seeking the destruction of ethnic, national, or religious groups as such be­
cause "[k]illing someone simply because he or she exists . . .  is a crime against the very 
essence of what it is to be human." Id. at 4. He argues that politically motivated murders or 
those motivated by forcing a particular group from certain territory, such as Serbian killings 
of Muslims, that fall short of seeking the total elimination of the targeted group should not be 
considered "genocide." See id. at 18-19. Of course, since the creators of Yugoslav tribunal 
specifically included "genocide" within that tribunal's jurisdictional mandate, they took a 
broader view of that crime. 
June 1998] War Crime Tribunals 2075 
ings - as well as some of the Tutsi reprisals - only increases the 
challenge for those trying to channel the quest for revenge into the 
peaceful confines of a courtroom. 
As with the Yugoslav tribunal, proceedings in Arusha are draw­
ing objections from those who see political motivations behind that 
tribunal's establishment and ongoing prosecutorial and judicial de­
cisions. While the Rwanda international prosecutions will draw 
fewer complaints from human rights advocates than will domestic 
prosecutions in Rwanda that are far more likely to be tainted by 
charges of bias and victor's justice, the Rwanda tribunal's jurisdic­
tion is not free from controversy. That body's jurisdiction extends 
to the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and a larger 
number of crimes against the laws of war than are included in the 
Yugoslav tribunal's statute.169 But it is limited to acts committed 
during calendar year 1994, a compromise between the desires of the 
current Tutsi government in Rwanda, which was instrumental in the 
tribunal's creation - though it ultimately voted against its estab­
lishment - and members of the U.N.170 Though the Rwanda tribu­
nal's temporal and subject-matter jurisdictional limitations permit 
trials against some Tutsis who are known to have committed iesser 
crimes in the second half of 1994, they do not reach all crimes by all 
sides as closure demands. Further, the limitations on the tribunal's 
jurisdictional reach and the resources available to it171 dim the pros­
pects that its proceedings will preserve an accurate or definitive ac­
count of the Rwanda genocide and its aftermath. On the contrary, 
the tribunal's reliance on the continued cooperation of the current 
Rwanda government is likely to compromise its ability to present a 
complete rendering of the Tutsis' role in acts of violence. 
International proceedings in Arusha, no less than those in The 
Hague, are also likely to draw complaints from defense attorneys 
169. Compare ICTY Statute, supra note 2, at 2 with !CTR Statute, supra note 2, at 3-5. 
170. See Madeline H. Morris, The Trials of Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Case of Rwanda, 
7 DuKE J. CoMP. & INn.. L. 349, 353-57 (1997). The Rwanda government would have llin­
ited the tribunal's jurisdiction solely to genocide. It would also have funited its jurisdiction to 
cover only the period from October 1, 1990, when they considered the foundations of the 
genocide to have been laid by the then-Hutu government, to July 17, 1994, by which time the 
present Tutsi government had taken control. Effectively this would have meant that the in­
ternational tribunal would try only Hutus. For a description of the temporal and subject­
matter jurisdiction of the Rwanda 'tribunal, discussing the relevant compromises and drawing 
comparisons with the Yugoslav tribunal, see Shraga & Zacklin, supra note 3, at 506-10. 
171. The ICTR's financial difficulties have been the subject of considerable media atten­
tion. See, e.g., Steven Lee Myers, In East Africa, Panel Tackles War Crimes, and Its Own 
Misdemeanors, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1997, § 1, at AS. 
2076 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 96:2031 
and scholars about lack of fairness for defendants.112 For the 
Rwanda tribunal, the charge of ex post facto liability is likely to 
prove particularly troublesome. In creating the Rwanda tribunal, 
the Security Council departed from its prior attempt - in the 
course of creating the Yugoslav tribunal - to include only well­
established international crimes. It extended the Rwanda tribunal's 
jurisdiction to violations of Common Article Three of the Geneva 
Conventions173 and Article Four of Additional Protocol II to the 
Geneva Conventions.174 Many do not believe that the latter consti­
tutes established customary international law, and this effort marks 
the first time Common Article Three has been read as a basis for 
criminal responsibility.175 Even if it is assumed that culprits in 
Rwanda were under fair notice that their violent acts would subject 
them to criminal liability - at least under national law - the scar­
city of applicable precedents under international humanitarian law 
means that the Rwanda tribunal's judges, when they lay out the 
requisites of proof with respect to the wide variety of acts now cov­
ered, will be developing and not merely applying the law. As noted 
with respect to the Tactic judgment, this prospect will surely lead to 
challenges on the basis of violation of the principle of nullem cri­
men sine lege.176 Nor is it yet clear how this tribunal will manage 
the treacherous problems of defining defenses such as mistake of 
fact or superior orders in a way that does not, for example, view the 
anti-Tutsi radio broadcasts of Radio Mille Collines as giving such 
defenses an air of reality.111 
172. For discussions of the problematic areas, including diverse interpretations of the 
standard of proof, the presumption of innocence, the right to legal counsel, non-bis-in-idem/ 
double jeopardy, the interpretation of evidentiary rules, and uncertainties with respect to 
enforcement of sentences and incarceration, see, for example, Blakesley, supra note 111, at 
209-18; Rod Dixon, Developing International Rules of Evidence for the Yugoslav and Rwanda 
Tribunals, 7 TRANSNATL. L. & CoNrEMP. PROBS. 81 (1997). 
173. See !CTR Statute, supra note 2, art. 4. 
174. See !CTR Statute, supra note 2, art. 4. 
175. See Shraga & Zacklin, supra note 3, at 510. For a defense of the Rwanda tribunal's 
statute on this point, see Meron, supra note 119, at 565-68. 
176. Cf. supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text (on persecution); supra note 111 (dis­
cussing Blakesley's views on inadequacies of international criminal law). Article 4 of the 
Statute of the Rwanda Tribunal includes as cognizable crimes violence to life, health, or phys­
ical or mental well-being of persons, and, in particular, murder; cruel treatment; collective 
punishment; taking of hostages; acts of terrorism; outrages against personal dignity; rape and 
enforced prostitution; pillage; the passing of sentences and the carrying out of execution 
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court; and threats to com­
mit any of the foregoing acts. See !CTR Statute, supra note 2, art. 4. For one response to the 
ex post facto challenge, see Meron, supra note 119, at 567 (arguing that "[m]urder is murder 
all over the world"). 
177. See The Queen v. Fmta, (1994) 1 S.C.R. 701, 848 (Can.). 
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It also remains unlikely that the Rwanda tribunal will be able to 
go much farther than the Yugoslav tribunal in assisting victims. The 
financial and personnel problems with respect to the Rwanda tribu­
nal, which to date have proven even more difficult than with its 
Balkan cousin,178 dim the prospects for such amenities as psycho­
logical counseling and effective witness protection. Further, 
although the Rwanda tribunal's specific recognition of some 
gender-specific crimes, such as enforced prostitution, has won ap­
plause from victims' groups in comparison with the Yugoslav tribu­
nal, the tribunal's listing of cognizable crimes still falls short of 
according full recognition to the many faces of gender-specific 
victimization.179 
F. Getting Past Nuremberg 
On the basis of the preceding discussion, it would be tempting to 
conclude that both ad hoc tribunals have failed to correct Nurem­
berg's flaws, and that their ongoing trials - like those at the end of 
World War II and many national trials for human rights violations 
since - fail to resolve inherent contradictions between the founda­
tional, political, and epic goals of their creators.180 It is tempting to 
conclude that the model of closure fails simply because it demands 
that judges, from Nuremberg to Arusha, reconcile the irreconcila­
ble: that is, because it demands that they must render a definitive 
history but convict only identifiable perpetrators; provide an edify­
ing public spectacle to buttress the national and international rule 
of law while providing defendants scrupulously fair trials; and ac­
complish all of these while mollifying victims.181 
Moreover, it appears that neither the Rwanda nor Yugoslav tri­
bunal has managed to mediate successfully the political divides be­
tween east and west, north and south any better than the 
Nuremberg or the Tokyo tribunals did. Charges of double stan­
dards, American exceptionalism, victor's justice, or judicial neo­
colonialism have been deflected but not altogether avoided in each 
178. For a survey of some of the financial dilemmas which these tribunals have posed 
within the U.N., see, for example, ScHARF, supra note 3, at 44-49, 79-84; Shraga & Zacklin, 
supra note 3, at 512; Myers, supra note 171, § 1, at 6. Indeed, the Tadic trial itself, initially 
"scheduled to begin in November 1995, was postponed until May 7, 1996, for want of $78,000 
for expenses for defense counsel and investigators." See SCHARF, supra note 3, at 83. 
179. Cf. supra notes 151-62 and accompanying text. "Forced pregnancy" was given ex­
plicit recognition only in later drafts of the Rwanda tribunal's statute. See Blakesley, supra 
note 111, at 211. 
180. See generally LUBAN, supra.note 21, at 335-78, 379-91 (discussing the "foundational," 
"political" and "epic" aspects of Nuremberg and other trials). 
181. See generally id.; OsIEL, supra note 6, passim; Simpson, supra note 23, at 20. 
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case.182 Despite the attempt to create denationalized entities, these 
tribunals remain tainted by the national interests that dominate the 
organ that created them: the Security Council. Some countries, 
both on and off the Security Council, have expressed qualms about 
the expansive reinterpretations of the Security Council's powers 
that permitted establishment of these ad hoc bodies.183 The Secur­
ity Council's assumptions of power are not merely perceived by 
some as a threat to sovereignty.184 Some U.N. members and schol­
ars have lingering concerns about the actual judicial independence 
these tribunals enjoy.185 The Yugoslav tribunal, the first to be con­
fronted squarely with some of these issues in the course of the Tadic 
case, has given nearly as many answers as there are nationalities 
182. See LESCURE & TRINTIGNAc, supra note 18, at 96; Cotic, supra note 78, at 233-35; 
Hayden, Schindler's Fate, supra note 40, at 742; Thornberry, supra note 138. See also 
ALFR.Eo P. RuBIN, ETHics AND AUTHORITY IN lNrERNATIONAL LAW 170-206 (1997). As 
one co=entator has noted, the Tadic trial had an "unmistakable 'American flavor"' since 
its presiding judge was from the United States, along with three out of four persons on the 
prosecution team. See Scharf, supra note 122 (manuscript at 8). Further, since the United 
States has provided 22 lawyers and investigators to the Yugoslav tribunal, far more than any 
other Security Council member state, this may be true of other trials at The Hague as well. 
Id. at 8, n. 23. 
183. See, e.g., Barbara Crossette, China Refuses to Go Along With Creation of Pol Pot 
Tribuna� N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1997, at A6 (reporting on China's objections to a proposed ad 
hoc tribunal for Cambodia). After all, the Security Council's decisions in these instances are 
unprecedented: it has determined the precise scope of individual criminal liability; codified 
- and probably progressively developed - international criminal law by giving Council 
sanction to two lists of cognizable international crimes contained in the tribunals' respective 
statutes; boosted the prospects for a permanent international criminal court; and lent its con­
siderable enforcement powers to all these efforts at the expense of national courts and the 
hitherto exclusive rights of each state to determine for itself whether to cooperate with an­
other's criminal investigation or whether to extradite a criminal suspect upon request. For 
examples of the resulting qualms among some member states, see Report of the Special Com­
mittee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organi­
zation, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 33, U.N. Doc. A/49/33 (1994). 
184. See, e.g., Dolenc, supra note 110. 
185. Since independent criminal courts created by U.N. executive action are unprece­
dented, no one knows whether the Security Council retains residual authority over these 
tribunals to amend either tribunal's statute or to terminate either tribunal before its cases are 
concluded based, for example, on a determination that a threat to the international peace no 
longer exists. No one knows whether the Council can direct either tribunal not to indict or 
not to prosecute particular high government officials whose prosecution might be detrimental 
to the maintenance of the international peace. No one knows whether either tribunal is 
legally entitled - or willing - to tell the Council that such attempts to interfere are null and 
void - or what would happen if either tribunal tried. Thus far, only hints of answers to 
many such fundamental questions about the relative independence and powers of these 
tribunals have come in earlier trial and appellate chamber decisions in response to jurisdic­
tional challenges brought by TadiC's attorneys. See Decision on Defence Motion on 
Jurisdiction, supra note 19; Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 
19; see also Jose E. Alvarez, Nuremberg Revisited: The Tadic [sic] Case, 7 EuR. J. INTL. L. 
245, 249-60 (1996); Christian Tomuschat, International Criminal Prosecution: The Precedent 
of Nuremberg Confirmed, 5 CRIM. L.F. 237, 244-46 (1994); Geoffrey R. Watson, The Humani­
tarian Law of the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal: Jurisdiction in Prosecutor v. Tadic [sic], 
36 v A. J. INTL. L. 687 (1996). 
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represented .on its bench. Judicial unanimity has been understanda­
bly elusive given the novelties of that tribunal's creation and the 
wide gaps in international criminal practice. 
Yet the specter of Nuremberg misleads. Merely correcting 
Nuremberg's flaws would not necessarily lead to closure. The Yu­
goslav and Rwanda tribunals face many issues reminiscent of those 
faced by earlier war crimes prosecutions. But their greatest chal­
lenges are unique: both tribunals are expected to fashion 
Nuremberg-styled justice in the absence of D-Day. Each of today's 
ad hoc tribunals faces challenges unknown to those who organized 
and conducted World War !I's trials. 
The Yugoslav tribunal has issued approximately seventy-five in­
dictments but has only a handful of people in custody - none of 
whom is a key member of the relevant political or military leader­
ship. Absent further arrests by NATO forces or other forceful ac­
tion by the Council on recalcitrant governments in the region, the 
Yugoslav tribunal's list of indictments is likely to continue to be 
distinguished by the lack of high profile defendants. The selective 
prosecutions of small fry like Tadic are likely to draw complaints 
that the process mocks justice.186 While the Rwanda tribunal may 
encounter fewer difficulties in bringing indictments against some 
high-level former government officials, its actual number of indict­
ments has been low.187 Despite the thousands being detained in 
Rwanda prisons, it is not yet clear whether most of the major lead­
ers, planners, and organizers of the Rwanda genocide will face pros­
ecution or remain "shielded by States or non-State entities."188 
In neither region do likely perpetrators truly face a certainty of 
international prosecution. In both cases, effective prevention of fu­
ture mass atrocities is rendered dubious by the sheer numerosity of 
probable culprits and by the international community's equivoca­
tions as to their capture and as to committing the necessary finan­
cial and other resources to try them.189 Moreover, advocates of 
increasing the number of arrests and trials lose sight of a trouble-
186. See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, Nuremberg Sensibility: Telford Taylor's Memoir of the 
Nuremberg Trials, 7 HARv. HUM. Rrs. J. 281, 292-94 (1994) (reviewing TAYLOR, supra note 
1). 
187. See Myers, supra note 171. & of September 1997, of the 21 suspects in custody at 
Arusha, many were high-ranking officials in the former Hutu-dominated regime, including 
the former Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense. See id. 
188. Shraga & Zacklin, supra note 3, at 517. 
189. While NATO seems, at this writing, to be assuming, tentatively, greater responsibil­
ity for arrests in the Balkans, the likelihood that it will continue to do so remains in doubt -
as does the effectiveness of any such efforts absent a much more massive military presence. 
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some reality: the detention of even prominent leaders does not al­
ways deter fanatical followers. A charismatic leader can just as 
easily inspire continued violence from inside a jail cell. In the 
Balkans, and even more so in Rwanda, the sheer number of people 
likely to have been involved in mass atrocities poses considerable 
difficulties for the prospects of deterrence through the criminal pro­
cess. Is effective deterrence even possible when such large numbers 
have been complicit?190 Even far more stable national govern­
ments than are now found in the Balkans or in Rwanda, with con­
siderably more effective control over their own territories and with 
a longer history of national institutions committed to the rule of 
law, have often demurred from conducting criminal trials in the 
face of such dilemmas.191 
But if deterrence is unlikely, so are the prospects for effective 
punishment of culprits or for the rehabilitation for victims. The vin­
dication of victims seems scarcely attainable given prevailing polit­
ical conditions in the Balkans or Rwanda. Even under the best of 
circumstances, only a tiny percentage of the survivors of the mas­
sacres in Rwanda and the Balkans are likely to have an opportunity 
to confront their tormentors in court, and those who do are likely to 
have to settle for the opportunity to present fragmented narratives 
before defiant perpetrators unlikely to express remorse. 
Similarly, the prospects for restoration of public order, antici­
pated by the model of closure, seem meager. In both Rwanda and 
the Balkans it seems more probable that former victims and tor­
mentors will encounter each other on the street than in an interna­
tional courtroom. The small number of international prosecutions 
is not likely to forestall acts of vengeance or mob violence as vic­
tims come across former torturers and rapists, particularly if unsta­
ble conditions continue in either region. Further, sparse 
international prosecutions are not merely the products of scarce in­
ternational resources. The difficulty of bringing cases to trial in 
either region owes a great deal to the absence of victor's justice. 
Thus far in both Rwanda and the Balkans, many survivors and wit­
nesses have not been willing to come forward because they con­
tinue to live in areas where retaliation remains likely.192 For much 
190. Cf. Cohen, supra note 147, at 37 (arguing that the deterrent value of individual pun­
ishment in cases involving these politicized crimes remains more uncertain and may be a 
great deal less than with respect to conventional crimes). 
191. See generally IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3 (presenting case studies 
from around the world). 
192. See, e.g., supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text. 
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the same reason there has to be profound skepticism that these 
tribunals will be able to generate the other goals sought by the 
model of closure, including renewed respect for the rule of law and 
national reconciliation. 
These doubts suggest that the closure model makes erroneous 
factual assumptions about the solidarity-enhancing effects of prose­
cutions under prevailing conditions in Rwanda and the Balkans. 
They imply that closure's advocates were wrong to assume that a 
model that is presumed to work domestically for ordinary crimes 
can be successfully adapted for international use in cases of mass 
atrocity. 
But is closure a valid model even within national courts? Post­
modern challenges to law's ability to fashion objective solutions or 
to tell anything other than politically predetermined stories pose 
challenges not known at the time of the Nuremberg trials. To many 
people today, the notion of closure through judicial processes seems 
the product of an antiquated legal romanticism long subject to 
"cognitively relativist, morally nihilistic, and politically anarchistic" 
critiques.193 
And the new skepticism about law's prospects is not limited to 
academe. Even outside the legal academy and its "crits," for per­
haps the majority of people in the United States the idea that courts 
and lawyers stand as a socially unifying bulwark to protect civiliza­
tion seems naYve.194 Many, perhaps most, only rarely view what oc­
curs inside of courtrooms as praiseworthy attempts to secure 
neutral justice and often as thoroughly calculated maneuvers that 
reflect - and sometimes inflame - society's prejudices. Particu­
larly in cases involving race or ethnicity, there is pervasive doubt 
that all are really equal before the law or that the status of persons 
or the ethnic or other affiliations of witnesses, judges, or juries is 
irrelevant. There is profound skepticism that a societal consensus 
exists with respect to issues of race in the United States, or that our 
judicial judgments can either rely on objectivity in the face of it or 
generate confidence in neutrally applied justice. 
These doubts would seem to apply all the more in the context of 
societies as fractured as those in the Balkans and Rwanda. Despite 
the premises of the model of closure, confidence in judges and the 
law were among the first casualties of mass atrocities in both re-
193. OsIEL, supra note 6, at 294. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER 
LAWYERS 199-229 (1994) (surveying developments in the "new" legal academy). 
194. For one assessment of the reasons underlying the "crisis" in the U.S. legal profes­
sion, see GLENDON, supra note 193. 
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gions, and the absence of a shared faith in the shared values of the 
law hinders pursuit of closure's goals - at least under the closure 
model's terms. 
IV. THE HARD CASE FOR THE YUGOSLAV AND RWANDA 
TRIBUNALS 
In the wake of the difficulties with the model of closure, are we 
to conclude that the Rwanda and Yugoslav tribunals should cease 
operations?195 If not closure, what is the argument for sporadic in­
ternational war crimes trials, often of small fry like Dusko Tadic, 
while the majority of wrongdoers in both Rwanda and the Balkans, 
including perhaps the majority of those who gave the orders, avoid 
international accountability? What justification is there for the is­
suance of judgments in future cases that are likely to be as flawed as 
the one in Tadic? 
As Part III indicates, the Tadic judgment, indeed the very exist­
ence of the Yugoslav tribunal, constitutes a provocation. As the 
reaction to the Tadic verdict and sentence suggests, the judges did 
not succeed in applying a soothing emotional balm; instead, their 
judgment inspires unsettling and difficult questions among trial ob­
servers and participants on all sides and both within and outside the 
region - and not merely among those who are skeptical about ju­
dicial claims to apolitical neutrality. 
The failure of the model of closure need not lead to the conclu­
sion that the Tadic trial or international prosecutions generally may 
not advance at least some of the mythic goals of their proponents. 
For one year, during the Tadic trial, Serb and non-Serb met in the 
relative peace of a courtroom. During this time, both sides were 
forced, by the substantive law, to address only issues licensed by 
that law. Because of the constraints of the rules of evidence and 
procedure - including rules of relevance and decorum - both 
sides, including Tadic's Serbian legal defense team, were required 
to address relatively narrow factual and valuative inquiries. Both 
sides were forced to ask whether events at particular times and 
places occurred as described, whether certain witnesses were mis­
taken or lying, and whether particular evidence was relevant to 
these questions. 
195. For an argument that the proper response may indeed be to "[d]o nothing," see 
RUBIN, supra note 182, at 183-85. 
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Because of the high stakes for the defendant, all trial partici­
pants took seriously the need to address Tadic's guilt or innocence 
solely through the rhetoric and the tools sanctioned by the law. 
The way issues have been channeled at trial also has had effects 
outside the courtroom. To be credible, even the trial's critics have 
needed to rebut the specific evidence presented. Responsible crit­
ics have been made to feel that they need to give their own answers 
to questions about TadiC's whereabouts on particular dates and 
times. Critics have been invited to give an account of Tadic's dispo­
sition toward non-Serbs and to describe his motivations when he 
accepted certain political positions. To be credible, competing con­
clusions that contradict the judges' factual findings have required 
support from a chain of inferences comparable to those on which 
the judges relied. If people disagree with the judges' specific con­
clusions, they are expected to say why - was it due to witnesses' 
composure on the stand, the inadequacies of the paper record, or 
some flaw in the bench's logic? They are invited to point to wit­
nesses or documents that prove TadiC's alibi or at least to indicate 
why, given the prosecution's case, it is unfair to put the burden on 
the defendant to prove an alibi at all. 
Both the conduct of the trial and the way the judgment was ren­
dered discourage, but do not wholly preclude, arguments that all 
Muslims lie or that all the Muslim witnesses at this trial did so. Fur­
ther, the judges' findings affirmatively discourage as outside the 
terms of civil discourse irredentist claims that the beatings, torture, 
and executions were justified because the victims deserved it. 
There is an attempt to channel even the most vitriolic accusations of 
the judgment's Serbian critics into arguments over the political na­
ture of the case and the tribunal, the bias of prosecution witnesses, 
and the inadequacies of particular trial procedures. 
While the judges' admittedly flawed attempts to keep their own 
inquiries within relatively less politicized channels do not prompt 
closure in the Durkheimian sense of emotional release - as antici­
pated by the model of closure - their efforts still invite reasoned 
responses about the law and the application of the law to facts. 
Critics are encouraged to indicate where the judges misapplied or 
misread the law. But they are discouraged from giving an emo­
tional response to what, at least in substantial part, is a decidedly 
unemotional, sober - and sobering - account. Irredentist re­
sponses that rape or torture is "perfectly consistent with the law of 
nations," or that "the law of nations does not exist and is a pack of 
lies,'' are discouraged. Such contentions are not within the judges' 
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views of tolerable discourse. The judges' preliminary findings, 
while hardly definitive as demanded by closure, invite heated but 
reasoned responses that "comparable" atrocities were committed 
by non-Serbs. These findings affirmatively discourage, as not 
within the judges' terms of civil discourse, emotional or righteous 
responses, such as a claim that ethnic cleansing is an affirmative 
good because "Muslims are unfit to live." 
Both in the Balkan region and outside it, the attention given to 
the public spectacle that the media billed as the "trial of the cen­
tury"196 and its historic judgment tend to ensure continued dis­
course among a variety of observers. The Tadic judgment will 
inevitably be read critically, even by those generally favorable to 
the tribunal and its goals - as was Nuremberg's. Feminists and 
victims' groups will scrutinize the judgment, as will human rights 
advocates generally and the criminal defense bar. Scholars and 
practitioners of international humanitarian law will look to see if 
the judges got the law right, historians will examine judicial findings 
of fact, and advocates of a permanent international criminal court 
will be looking for precedents and lessons. 
If these international criminal proceedings ultimately assist in 
the principal goal of helping to promote social solidarity - both 
inside the region and outside it - they will do so because the crimi­
nal process - including the rules of evidence and procedure, the 
application of the substantive law, and the professional ethics of bar 
and bench - enables and facilitates civil discourse in all its respects 
and among all these audiences.197 Consistent with Osiel's concept 
of "civil dissensus," trials such as TadiC's might better be seen not as 
occasions for generating closure but as discursive phenomena that, 
if conducted as "effective public spectacle, stimulate public discus­
sion in ways that foster the liberal virtues of toleration, moderation, 
and civil respect. "198 If so, the value of such trials actually increases 
the greater the preexisting hostility or suspicions between the par­
ties, since the greater these are, the less apt the parties are to seek 
other occasions for dialogue except when forced to in a court of law. 
Particularly in instances like Rwanda and the Balkans, where the 
conflicts that gave rise to mass atrocities are far from over, trial 
196. See, e.g., SCHARF, supra note 3, at xii. 
197. Cf. Osiel, supra note 5, at 486-97 (arguing that criminal trials foster "social solidar­
ity" by encouraging discourse "with an initially unwilling interlocutor"). 
198. OsIEL, supra note 6, at 2. 
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confrontations may provide rare occasions for "public deliberation 
over continuing disagreement."199 
Further, the nature of legal narratives matters: legal storytelling 
is, after all, constructed within a "culture of argument" whose goal 
is to persuade.200 Accordingly, trials may elicit a kind of solidarity 
premised on 
civil engagement in disagreements by way of procedures entailing dis­
play of respect for one's adversary, respect that may be entirely pro­
cedural (and a matter of rule following) at the outset but that often 
tends to grow into something more substantive - if not between the 
most unreconstructed of antagonists, then among the larger numbers 
of their more moderate sympathizers. There is a kind of solidarity, in 
other words, in continuing exchanges that result in the mutual recog­
nition that agreement on a question of common concern is strongly 
desirable and ultimately possible, even if only at some uncertain point 
in the future.201 
The premise is that legal deliberation, by forcing parties to inhabit a 
common legal culture, can help to reconstruct social solidarity 
within nonlethal bounds and generate a measure of trust.202 
International war crimes prosecutions should not be portrayed 
as group therapy designed to generate societal consensus on estab­
lished community values. Especially when such trials involve in­
flamed ethnic passions that have degenerated into mass violence, 
the prospects for such consensus are slim. But the efforts of the 
Tadic judges to apply the conscience of the international commu­
nity, to affirm what they claim are universal values, at a minimum 
forces observers to address whether there is consensus with respect 
to any such fundamentals. Perhaps the international community as 
a whole does not agree that leaders who seek "ethnically pure" na­
tions are guilty of criminal acts. Still, there may be emerging areas 
of agreement that certain violent acts directed at the creation of 
ethnically homogeneous nations are indeed criminal - or ought to 
be. International trials may help facilitate a search for agreement 
199. Id. at 17 n.22. 
200. See Gewirtz, supra note 140, at 2, 5. 
201. Osiel, supra note 5, at 499. 
202. See OsIEL, supra note 6, at 17 n.22, 38-39. Those who examine law as a rhetorical 
process reach similar conclusions. See generally JAMES BoYD WHITE, HERACLES' Bow xi, 
115-18, 130-31 (1985) (examining the effects of the co=on language of the law, including 
the effects of judicial opinions as "socially constitutive literature"). But see Jennifer J. 
Llewellyn & Robert Howse, Institutions for Restorative Justice: The South African Truth 
and Reconciliation Co=ission as a Model for Dealing with Conflicts of the Past 2 (Jan. 20, 
1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (arguing that the retributivist aspects of 
punishment undermine the goal of restoring social equality and reco=ending the use of 
truth commissions as an alternative application of "restorative justice"). 
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as to these acts; perhaps they can even present "moments of trans­
formative opportunity" for international and national communi­
ties. 203 Such trials, if publicized enough, may provide opportunities 
for "social deliberation" and "collective examination of the moral 
values underlying public institutions. "204 
These tribunals' roles with respect to the question of collective 
complicity is a great deal more complex than advocates of closure 
seem ready to acknowledge. It is understandable that tribunal ad­
vocates want to eradicate the concept of collective complicity root 
and branch. Particularly with respect to the Balkans, it seems clear 
that at least Serbs and Croats have become adept at using each 
group's prior victimhood status - of either Serb victims of "fascist 
Croatia" or Croat victims of "communist persecution" - as an ex­
cuse to wage unrestricted war against all who bear the stain of col­
lective and hereditary guilt for such crimes.205 Concepts of 
collective guilt made it easier to justify a war that targeted civilians, 
most of whom were not alive at the time of earlier alleged atroci­
ties. Tribunal advocates are correct when they argue that the inter­
national criminal process, like the criminal process in any liberal 
state, rejects such pre-Enlightenment notions of hereditary guilt. 
They are right that the Tadic trial, by convicting only Tadic and not 
members of Tadic's ethno-religious community or his political asso­
ciates, recognizes that individuals are responsible and accountable 
only for what they themselves have done of their own free will and 
not for the sins of their fathers. 
But tribunal advocates are wrong when they go on to suggest 
that the Tadic trial or similar trials produce closure with respect to 
collective complicity. The findings at Tactic's trial affirm that there 
indeed were victims and aggressors, and not merely feuding neigh­
bors in a brawl in which all sides were equally guilty.206 In doing so, 
203. See OsIEL, supra note 6, at 2. 
204. NINo, supra note 36, at 131 (comparing trials for human rights violations to 
Ackerman's "constitutional moments"); see also id. at 132-34 (discussing effects of these col· 
lective debates); Gewirtz, supra note 142, at 151 (discussing trials as constituting "a central 
moral arena for society"); cf. WHITE, supra note 202, at 174 (discussing the "openness" of the 
language of the law to new points of view). 
29s. See, e.g., Tom Gallagher, My Neighbour, My Enemy: The Manipulation of Ethnic 
Identity and the Origins and Conduct of War in Yugoslavia, in WAR AND ETHNICITY: 
GLOBAL CONNECTIONS AND LoCAL VIOLENCE 47, 60-64 (David Turton ed., 1997). Indeed, 
according to Amnesty International, some victims have been seen as complicit by affiliation. 
Thus, Balkan perpetrators have singled out Muslim women allegedly "as a form of retribu­
tion because of the perpetrators' presumptions of the actions or intentions of the women's 
male relatives." Id. at 62. 
206. See generally GENOCIDE AFrER EMOTION: THE POSTEMOTIONAL BALKAN WAR 
(Stjepan G. Mestrovic ed., 1996). 
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TadiC's trial perpetuates certain types of questions about the culpa­
bility of the collective.207 Rather than convincing anyone that we 
have managed to capture the only culprits, trials like Tactic's en­
courage reasonable questions about the comparative guilt of 
groups, including Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. 
Some believe the resulting debates are detrimental to national 
reconciliation. Robert M. Hayden argues, for example, that an ac­
cusation of genocide, even when directed against an individual, as­
sumes the larger guilt of that individual's society and "works to 
establish the collective guilt of those in whose name it is said to 
have been carried out."208 Hayden contends that bringing criminal 
charges in such contexts, far from individuating guilt, perpetuates 
the idea of collective vengeance and self-defense into the next gen­
eration.209 Further, attemps to pin the blame on individuals, even 
leaders such as KaradZic, only prompts broader inquiries (such as 
Hayden's) into likely causes, thereby extending blame to those 
Western countries that prevented Bosnia's partition and prema­
turely recognized a state that had been rejected by the Bosnian 
Serbs and Herzegovinian Croats.210 
The argument from civil dissensus starts from the premise that 
such questions can only be ducked for so long and need to be raised 
if there is to be any real prospect for national reconciliation. It is 
based on the proposition that youngsters in the former Yugoslavia 
ought to be encouraged to ask their parents a few years hence, 
"What exactly were you doing in 1992, Mom and Dad? Did you 
support the people doing these terrible things?"211 Like Hayden, I 
assume that war crimes trials keep alive difficult issues of the mean­
ing and scope of complicity and that even the conviction of one low­
level local torturer implicates, for example, bystanders who chose 
to remain silent.212 Like Hayden, I acknowledge that even such tri-
207. Compare Schrag, supra note 3, at 19 with Diane Johnstone, Selective Justice in The 
Hague, THE NATION, Sept. 22, 1997, at 16. 
208. Hayden, Schindler's Fate, supra note 40, at 743. 
209. See id. at 743; see also Susan L. Woodward, Genocide or Partition: Two Faces of the 
Same Coin? 55 SLAVIC REv. 755, 756 (1996). 
210. See Hayden, Reply, supra note 40, at 774, 777. 
211. See NINO, supra note 36, at 147 (arguing that such questions need to be part of "daily 
discourse" in the context of Argentina). 
212. Notions of complicity tend to evolve, as seems clear given ongoing debates about 
complicity in Nazi war crimes. See, e.g., Detlev F. Vagts, Switzerland, International Law and 
World War II, 91 AM. J. lNTL. L. 466 (1997) (arguing that Swiss behavior during and after 
World War II was consistent with contemporaneous legal rules governing neutrals); William 
H. Honan, Curators as Partners In War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1997, at ES (suggesting 
museum curators who "fenced" Nazi trinkets were parties to war crimes); see also Swiss Fed­
eral Banking Commission-Independent Committee of Eminent Persons-Swiss Bankers _Asso-
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als can be the start of national debates with respect to what com­
plicity means.213 I differ from Hayden, however, in believing that 
the ways these issues are addressed matter and that trials can help 
channel these debates along legalistic lines. When trials effectively 
promote civil disserisus, they encourage discussions about "collec­
tive complicity" that focus on what people may have done or failed 
to do under the law - and away from hereditary notions of guilt.214 
We begin to make the hard case for international war crimes 
prosecutions when we reject the premise that the continued discus­
sion of unresolved issues is necessarily destructive because it is det­
rimental to closure. The argument for the Balkan and Rwanda 
prosecutions' prospects for generating national reconciliation may 
need to be made on the premise that contentious courtrooms and 
ensuing debates are preferable to situations where antagonists in­
flamed to kill lack opportunities for civil discourse. Trials and ver­
dicts that elicit passionately felt accusations and counter­
accusations among neighbors and even within families may be not 
only justifiable but necessary in societies as fractured as the former 
Yugoslavia or Rwanda. As we have seen already in the Balkans -
and, at a much less bloody level, even within the United States215 -
judicial verdicts or attempts to prosecute may prompt sporadic vio­
lence outside the courtroom. The case for arguing that despite such 
risks, trials ought to be attempted is, under civil dissensus, that soci­
eties in which such divisive issues are not raised at least in a court-
ciation: Statement on Comprehensive Claims Resolution Process for Dormant Accounts In 
Swiss Banks Dating From Prior to the End of World War II and Announcement on Claims 
Resolution Process, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 1379 (1997); Switzerland: Decree on the Legal In· 
vestigation of the Assets Deposited in Switzerland After the Advent of the National-Socialist 
Regime and Decree on the Special Fund for Needy Victims of the Holocaust, reprinted in 36 
l.L.M. 1272 (1997). 
213. Continuing a dialogue about tbe prevalence of collective complicity may also be 
useful to understanding the urge for continued violence in the Balkans, since encouraging 
notions of complicity was itself a conscious tool of, for example, Serbian aggression. See 
GENOCIDE AFTER EMOTION: THE PosTEMOTIONAL BALKAN WAR, supra note 206, at 21-22 
(describing how Serbian propaganda drew on the alleged collective complicity of Croatians 
during World War II); MALCOLM, supra note 82, at 217, 252 (arguing that Serbian leaders 
consciously implicated larger numbers in atrocities in order to align their interests with those 
of Greater Serbia). 
214. This is suggested by the surge in interest in international humanitarian law that the 
tribunals have helped to engender, along with a rise in the number of countries that have 
adopted statutes under the principle of universal jurisdiction to permit national war-crimes 
trials. See Living History Interview with Judge Richard Goldstone, 5 TRANSNATL. L. & 
CoNTEMP. PROBS. 373, 377 (1995); Meron, Answering for War Crimes, supra note 3, at 7. 
215. The bloody aftermath of tbe Rodney King case, see, e.g., Richard C. Paddock & 
Jenifer Warren, King Case Aftermath: A City in Crisis, L.A. TIMES, May 2, 1992, at A4, is 
only tbe most well-known recent example within the United States. 
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room face a greater danger of having these questions vetted in 
renewed mass atrocities instead of in more controlled settings. 
But if civil dissensus and not closure should be the justificatory 
approach, what follows? 
(1) Under civil dissensus, what matters is that an institutionalized 
process exists to promote discussion of how such events happened 
and who should be accountable, not the number of verdicts or indict­
ments issued, the number of trials conducted, or even who - lowly 
local torturer or high-level government official - stands accused. 
As noted, for advocates of closure, the prospect that only trials 
of small fry may occur within the Rwanda and Yugoslav tribunals is 
a problem that needs to be corrected as quickly as possible lest clo­
sure be undermined.216 Various Nuremberg-inspired arguments, 
both philosophical and practical, are used to justify this conclusion. 
It is argued that jurisprudential needs for consistency demand that 
those who are equally culpable should also face criminal liability. It 
is said that the rule of law requires punishing all those who are 
equally culpable, regardless of social rank or level of responsibility. 
Others, of a more instrumentalist persuasion, contend that the law 
requires devoting its scarce resources to those who, because of the 
greater numbers of persons they put at risk, their higher social rank, 
or their greater degree of education, have greater culpability.217 It 
is also argued that punishing the superior official who gave the 
genocidal orders or instituted them as policy is more useful for pur­
poses of deterrence, retribution, or affirmation of the rule of law.21s 
While many of these arguments have considerable force and 
merit, it is not yet clear which of these, if any, generate widespread 
consensus. From Rwanda to the Balkans, from Argentina to El 
Salvador and South Africa, we have considerable evidence that the 
peoples and governments of the world, when faced with mass atroc­
ities, equivocate not only about whether to impose criminal liability 
but also about whom to indict.219 Punishment for mass atrocities is 
216. See, e.g., Scharf & Epps, supra note 81, at 659 ("The ultimate test of the Tribunal's 
success . . .  will turn on whether the Tribunal gains custody of the major planners, strategists, 
and co=anders in the war and successfully prosecutes a fair number of them."). 
217. See RATNER & ABRAMs, supra note 3, at 172-73, 176-77, 296-97. 
218. See id. at 297. 
219. See sources cited supra note 100 (noting U.N. encouragement of amnesties else­
where). For a critical history of such efforts, concluding that criminal prosecutions remain 
"rare" and that "[i]naction, amnesties, and pardons" remain the norm, see NINO, supra note 
36, at 5-40. See also id. at 118-27 (explaining why this is the case). For more detailed ac­
counts involving particular countries' attempts to deal with war crimes, see, for example, 
Suzanne Daley, South African Court Approves Amnesty for Apartheid Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 26, 1996, at A3 (reporting on the South African Constitutional Court's approval of am-
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and has always been undoubtedly selective at both the international 
and national levels. National courts have varied tremendously with 
respect to their reactions to violations of humanitarian law by their 
own nationals. Selective national prosecutions for such crimes ap­
pear to be the norm.220 Indeed, it is arguable that selective prose­
cutions that target, perhaps unfairly, small fry instead of higher-ups 
is, as is suggested by the number of small-time drug couriers who 
are convicted as compared with drug kingpins within the United 
States, endemic to much of the criminal law. 
The lack of consensus on such issues should hardly surprise. We 
ought to expect debates about whether the failures of political will 
that render difficult the arrests of suspects or make impossible the 
imposition of sanctions on states who fail to cooperate with the 
tribunals make those trials that do proceed illegitimate. Insofar as 
we have a choice as to whether to prosecute large or small fish, we 
can expect disagreements over the types of collective memory that 
are best to preserve as well as the kind of national reconciliation 
that is envisioned as a result. The lack of consensus on whom to 
prosecute reflects the lack of agreement on these other issues as 
well. As Robert Jackson recognized in the course of the 
Nuremberg trials, the decision there to spotlight men who played 
important roles in politics, the economy, and the military was in 
part intended to send a message that these leaders, and not the av­
erage German, bore decisive responsibility.221 It was a strategy that 
was intended to absolve the general population on the theory that 
such absolution, whether or not grounded in fact, facilitates na­
tional reconciliation.222 Those who decide to cast a broader net, 
whether in the course of trials or truth commissions, send a differ­
ent message about who was implicated in barbarism, and presuma­
bly act on the premise that a more truthful collective memory is a 
more promising starting point for national reconciliation. 
nesty for apartheid crimes); Axel Marschik, The Politics of Prosecution: European National 
Approaches to War Crimes, in THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES, supra note 23, at 65 (European 
efforts); Gillian Triggs, Australia's War Crimes Trials: All Pity Choked, in THE LAW OF WAR 
CRIMES, supra note 23, at 123 (Australia); Sharon A. Williams, Laudable Principles Lacking 
Application: The Prosecution of War Criminals in Canada, in THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES, 
supra note 23, at 151 (Canada). But see Robt-Arriaza, supra note 3, at 22-23 (distinguishing 
individualized pardons from generalized amnesties); Naomi Robt-Arriaza, Conclusion: 
Combatting Impunity, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 281, 299 (arguing 
that despite the practices of states, there is an "emerging" international legal norm that re­
quires states "to investigate, prosecute, and provide redress" for war crimes). 
220. See generally IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 73-280 (discussing 
case studies). 
221. See, e.g., SA' ADAH, supra note 105, at 201. 
222. See id. at 200-01. 
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Under civil dissensus, it is not assumed that in the international 
community as a whole, or within societies where mass atrocities 
have recently taken place, there is yet consensus on any of these 
issues. Under civil dissensus, we expect further debates concerning 
the meaning and significance of selectivity. War crimes prosecu­
tions continue to be selective at any of a number of levels. The 
Yugoslav tribunal's statute - like Nuremberg's Charter itself - is 
limited in scope: it only deals with acts that occurred after 1991 and 
only with certain crimes. The Rwanda tribunal reaches a somewhat 
longer list of crimes but only insofar as these were committed dur­
ing 1994. Do these limitations - and the underlying failure to 
reach anyone guilty of comparable acts at different times - under­
mine the legitimacy of punishing those who were guilty in the rele­
vant time periods? Does it matter if, as in the Rwanda case, the 
temporal jurisdictional limit may be at least partly explained by the 
need to prevent prosecution of Tutsis in order to secure the contin­
ued cooperation of the current government of Rwanda? Moreover, 
the U.N. has seen fit to establish tribunals only for the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda but not for Haiti, Iraq, Cambodia, or a 
number of other places. Do these failures undermine the legitimacy 
of its former efforts, or do we accept the proposition that we must 
start somewhere? International humanitarian law reaches only 
some acts, such as indiscriminate targeting of civilians by low-tech 
scud missiles, but apparently not, for example, high-tech aerial 
bombardment - as by the United States over Baghdad in 1991 -
nor, at least in the view of nuclear powers, the threat or use of nu­
clear weapons.223 Are all of humanitarian law and all prosecutions 
thereunder thus suspect because they are selective at least along 
North/South lines?224 
Under civil dissensus we expect further debates concerning 
whether the goals of the international criminal process are best fur­
thered through high profile trials of major political figures as com­
pared to proceedings against more ordinary culprits. While some of 
the arguments from the standpoint of deterrence, retribution, and 
the rule of law favor the Nuremberg precedent emphasizing trials of 
major figures, there are competing arguments emphasizing the 
goals of, for example, the vindication of victims or the preservation 
of an accurate collective memory. 
223. See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 1996 Op. I.C.J., reprinted 
in 35 l.L.M. 809 (1996). 
224. Cf. Chris af Jochnick & Roger Normand, The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical 
History of the Laws of War, 35 HAR.v. INTI.. LJ. 49 (1994). 
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Some might contend that victims and survivors would derive 
more satisfaction from participation in trials leading to convictions 
of their actual torturers and rapists; that both groups might find 
greater catharsis from seeing such persons in the dock than from 
seeing their commanders - usually strangers to those victimized -
who gave impersonal orders or encouraged such crimes gener­
ally.225 From the perspective of collective memory, some may claim 
that there is greater merit to devoting scarce resources to punishing 
low-level functionaries who actually inflict crimes on other human 
beings, since exposing both the banality of such individuals and 
their apparent indifference to the pain they directly inflict tells us 
more about how such barbarity can become routinized or wide­
spread. 226 Emphasis on such persons tends to produce accounts of 
mass atrocities that provide more satisfactory explanations of their 
bureaucratization.221 
Whatever else might be said for and against the selective prose­
cutions of small fry, there are some practical reasons, from the 
standpoint of civil dissensus, in favor of starting with such trials. 
First, it may be that civil dissensus works best if deliberations start 
small - or at least where both sides do not perceive the political 
stakes to be as great. With the political temperature reduced, there 
is a greater likelihood that civil discourse will proceed, notwith­
standing controversial verdicts or other tensions, as reactions by 
even vehement opponents are less likely to be violent or prone to 
totally irredentist arguments.228 Trials such as TadiC's permit par­
ticipants, including those within the defense bar, to gain confidence 
in the procedures and the deliberative process itself. And, under 
civil dissensus, it may be that as more trials proceed, as repeated 
225. See SCHARF, supra note 3, at 223. 
226. Such arguments presume, as Carlos Santiago Nino has suggested, a utilitarian theory 
of punishment in which trials are deemed a means to prevent crimes or to achieve other 
collective societal goals, and are shaped in terms of efficacy in attaining these goals. Under a 
more retributivist approach, society as a whole and victims in particular might be regarded as 
having a right to punish and to punish all those guilty of commensurate crimes equally. Nino 
defends a utilitarian approach under which "nobody has a right that certain persons be pun­
ished and, consequently, nobody has a right not to be punished because others are not." 
NINo, supra note 36, at 184-85. He defends selective punishment aimed at "efficiently 
achieving legitimate goals." Id. 
227. Cf. DANIEL JONAH GoLDHAGEN, HITLER'S WILLING EXECUTIONERS: ORDINARY 
GERMANS AND THE HOLOCAUST (1997); LUBAN, supra note 21, at 362-74 (critically examin­
ing Nuremberg's handling of "bureaucratic" Nazi crimes). 
228. Consider, for example, tbe likely Serbian reaction if the first defendant before the 
Balkan tribunal had been Milosevic or KaradZic instead of Tadic. Indeed, one tribunal in­
sider has suggested that tbe tribunal's prosecutors have consciously avoided issuing an indict­
ment against Milosevic precisely because of the political risks. See SCHARF, supra note 3, at 
89-90. 
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encounters in civil engagement occur, participants and observers 
will have greater opportunities to generate more substantive com­
mitments and may have more of a personal stake in the tribunal. 
Second, such trials provide the bench and bar an opportunity to 
test the scope of the substantive rules of humanitarian law, along 
with the tribunal's rules of procedure and evidence, and, based on 
reaction, work out kinks while the stakes are not perceived to be as 
high.229 It is arguably better, certainly from the perspective of 
likely political reaction, that the Yugoslav tribunal work out an ap­
proach to secret witnesses in a case like TadiC's rather than in a 
higher-profile proceeding.230 With respect to the substantive law, it 
may be easier to legitimize international prosecutions directed at 
the lowly torturer whose acts would undoubtedly justify criminal 
liability under any state's law than to bring charges of persecution 
against, for example, the infamous operators of Radio Mille 
Collines in Rwanda whose acts, though undoubtedly responsible for 
many deaths, might be dismissed as "hate speech."231 
Third, the pragmatic concerns of litigation may suggest the 
bringing of smaller cases, at least initially. Starting with cases like 
Tactic's permits prosecutors to build a pyramid of factual evidence 
that ultimately leads upward to higher-level officials.232 In addition, 
the prosecution gains experience in developing the historical ac­
count needed to try small fry in the context of a smaller geographi­
cal region - for example, Prijedor in the case of Tadic - and these 
accounts can later be used and improved upon when the history of 
the entire region proves to be at issue, as it would be in the trial of 
Karadzic. From the perspective of civil dissensus, this can only im­
prove the credibility of the later judgments issued, as well as the 
judges' historical accounts. 
Finally, we need to consider the conviction of someone like 
Tactic from the perspective of the goal of deterrence. In cases like 
229. See id. at 223. While working out particular problems can benefit either the defense 
or the prosecution, the removal of ambiguities with respect to procedures and evidentiary 
rules tends to be especially crucial to the defense over time. 
230. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text (discussing controversy about anony­
mous witnesses). 
231. See generally Stephanie Farrior, Molding the Matrix: The Historical and Theoretical 
Foundations of International Law Concerning Hate Speech, 14 BERKELEY J. INTL. L. 1 (1996). 
For a survey of the problems involved in ascribing legal responsibility to those who plan or 
oversee mass atrocities but do not themselves directly participate in them, see generally 
Nmo, supra note 36. 
232. See SCHARF, supra note 3, at 223; Scharf & Epps, supra note 81, at 662-63. But see 
Akhavan, supra note 38 (manuscript at 60-62) (suggesting that it might be easier to bring 
cases against higher-level perpetrators in some instances). 
2094 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 96:2031 
TadiC's, prosecutors do not begin, before war crimes indictments 
are issued, with an entirely blank slate. Long before the Yugoslav 
tribunal was established, the media, individual governments, and 
the U.N. Commission of Inquiry had already identified numerous 
crimes and likely culprits.233 The question is not whether war 
crimes trials will bring to the attention of the public crimes they 
would otherwise never hear about; the question is whether punish­
ing some crimes and some individuals that are known and that 
chance brings to the attention of the public may be important. If 
nothing is done about known or rumored crimes or culprits like 
Tadic when they are caught, does this not induce or encourage fur­
ther violence among those who are not prosecuted as well as among 
those seeking vengeance? Whether or not war crimes trials can be 
said to deter, the punishment of the publicized crimes of those who 
are caught at least prevents their crimes from being cited as an ex­
ample of what one can get away with, and, at least for the term of 
imprisonment, prevents those convicted from themselves commit­
ting more offenses. We need to ask whether, given what is already 
known about particular individuals and particular crimes, whether 
or not they are small fry, the failure to attempt to prosecute those 
whom we can reach encourages or induces violence.234 
(2) The civil dissensus model emphasizes deliberation, not a par­
ticular kind of forum, national or international. 
The international lawyers who successfully lobbied for the crea­
tion of these ad hoc tribunals and who are now devoting substantial 
energy to the establishment of a permanent international criminal 
court generally accept the proposition that such international fora 
are only one tool among many for dealing with such offenses, and 
that other possible methods include national criminal investigations 
and prosecutions and truth commissions.235 They accept the propo­
sition that sanctions on perpetrators vary from imprisonment to 
fines and duties to compensate victims, from purges from govern­
ment employment to other civil sanctions such as bans from polit­
ical office or de facto travel restrictions such that those under 
233. For a description of efforts to identify cronies and perpetrators prior to the establish­
ment of the ICIY, see, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Commission of Experts Established 
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780: Investigating Violations of International Hu­
manitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, 5 CruM. L.F. 279 (1994); see also Final Report of 
the U.N. Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780, SI 
1994/674 (1994) (also available at <http://www.cij.org/cij/commission.html>). 
234. See generally SCHARF, supra note 3, at 207-28; Scharf & Epps, supra note 81, at 638-
40. 
235. See, e.g., BRINGING WAR CRIMINALS TO JUSTICE, supra note 39, at 28-33; RATNER & 
ABRAMS, supra note 3, at 139-287; Robt-Arriaza, supra note 219, at 281-304. 
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suspicion are not free to leave their home base. Further, they ac­
cept that remedies for victims vary as well, and include government 
reparations and commemorative measures. At the same time, in­
ternational lawyers, especially those within human rights advocacy 
organizations, see their role as serving to nudge reluctant govern­
ments to accept their duty to prosecute.236 
The many reasons advanced for establishing international, as 
opposed to national, fora to adjudicate crimes in Rwanda and the 
former Yugoslavia are consistent with the Nuremberg-inspired 
goals for these tribunals, as well as the premises of the model of 
closure. First and foremost, advocates of these international prose­
cutions argue that there is scarcely any real prospect that such 
crimes will be fairly, evenhandedly, or promptly prosecuted within 
national courts within the regions affected.237 Especially with re­
spect to the Balkans, international lawyers have argued that the 
choice is simple: for the foreseeable future, it is either international 
trials under U.N. auspices or no trials at all.238 In addition, they 
have argued that even if national prosecutions emerge, interna­
tional fora are preferable and require jurisdictional primacy be­
cause international tribunals are more legitimate - that is, less 
susceptible to accusations of bias or vengeance.239 
Further, since most war crimes charges involve at least the indi­
rect attribution of state responsibility, international fora are seen as 
more appropriate since they are better positioned to get around the 
236. See, e.g., BRINGING WAR CRIMINALS TO JUSTICE, supra note 39, passim; RATNER & 
ABRAMS, supra note 3, at 134; Roht-Arriaza, supra note 13, at 5. 
237. It is argued that ongoing ethnic or religious tensions continue to make the prospects 
of anything other than one-sided show trials untenable. In addition, courts outside these 
regions remain unlikely fora for criminal proceedings in the absence of a tangible national 
connection. See RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 3, at 159-61, 176-77. With respect to 
Rwanda especially, there are also doubts about that nation's capacity to undertake even­
handed prosecutions that respect defendants' rights to speedy but full-fledged trials while 
relieving victims' fears that the evidence of crimes is rapidly vanishing. See, e.g., DESTEXHE, 
supra note 168, at 68-71; RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 3 at 154-56; William A. Schabas, 
Justice, Democracy, and Impunity in Post-genocide Rwanda: Searching for Solutions to Im­
possible Problems, 7 CRIM. L.F. 523 (1996). 
238. Similar arguments have been used to justify the creation of a permanent interna­
tional criminal court. See, e.g., Wexler, supra note 18, at 707-13. 
239. See !CTR Statute, supra note 2, art. 8, § 2 (requiring primacy with respect to jurisdic­
tion over national courts); ICTY Statute, supra note 2, art. 9, § 2 (same); see also DESTEXHE, 
supra note 168, at 69; BARBARA I!ARFF, GENOCIDE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL AND PoLmCAL IssuES (1984); Roht-Arriaza, supra note 13, at 5; Shraga & Zacklin, 
supra note 3, at 505 (outlining arguments that proved persuasive for the creation of the 
Rwanda tribunal). For views that appear to be representative of the human rights NGO 
community, see, for example, LEScuRE & TRINTIGNAC, supra note 18, at 3-9. Indeed, ac­
cording to some of the tribunals' advocates, these tribunals must be accorded primacy even if, 
for example, the present government in Rwanda were to ask that international prosecutions 
in Arusha be discontinued. See, e.g., Goldstone, supra note 21, at 497-98. 
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long-standing - if discredited - rule of international law that os­
tensibly prohibits one state from sitting in judgment of another.240 
Moreover, international fora, when available, avoid the main argu­
ment against providing criminal accountability for war criminals, 
namely, that trials "may destabilize a still-fragile transitional gov­
ernment past the breaking point."241 If the international commu­
nity is responsible for prosecutions, there is less danger that the 
authority of a new civilian government will be undermined by that 
government's own attempt to subject former rulers to legal 
process.242 
In addition, international trials more credibly advance the goal 
of denouncing these crimes as an affront to universal values or to 
preemptory norms of international law.243 International lawyers ar­
gue that it is only appropriate that these, the most grievous injuries 
done to individuals as human beings, should be both judged and 
condemned not by any national order or court system but by the 
international community on behalf of all humanity.244 For all of 
these reasons, the international lawyers involved in the establish­
ment of the Yugoslav and Rwanda tribunals successfully argued 
that, whatever was the response by the relevant national authori­
ties, the international criminal process, when triggered, should be 
accorded primacy.24s 
That many international lawyers should tend to prefer interna­
tional processes should scarcely surprise. Solutions are often prede­
termined by one's definition of the problem. If the problem is 
defined as the lack of closure, it is easier to arrive at the conclusion 
240. See Simpson, supra note 23, at 15. 
241. Robt-Arriaza, supra note 13, at 9; accord Reisman, supra note 3, at 185-86. 
242. Cf. Robt-Arriaza, supra note 13, at 9 (discussing the destabilizing dangers presented 
when fragile, transitional governments attempt to prosecute former rulers and others com­
plicit with the former regime). 
243. See, e.g., id. at 5-6. 
244. To the extent most of the ad hoc tribunals' advocates accept the continued signifi­
cance of war crimes prosecutions in national courts, they appear to do so out of deference to 
political realities - that is, because few alternatives to such courts appear to exist - and not 
because they articulate particular reasons in favor of such proceedings. See Meron, supra 
note 119, at 555. But see RA.1NER & ABRAMS, supra note 3, at 159 (acknowledging that while 
national war crimes trials lack the "aura" of international proceedings they are "likely to 
have a stronger psychological and deterrent effect on the population," and also are likely to 
be less expensive and easier to institute). 
245. Cf. ICTY Statute, supra note 2, art. 10(2) (setting forth standards for trying person 
in international court even after national court verdict); ICI'R Statute, supra note 2, art. 9(2) 
(same). It is not entirely clear, however, how the ostensible international legal duty to prose­
cute at the national level ought to be reconciled with the duty, under both ad hoc tribunals, to 
accord jurisdictional primacy to these international bodies. Cf. Meron, supra note 119, at 576 
& n.120. 
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that we need to give primacy to processes that invoke universal val­
ues and supply definitive results based on the invocation of such 
values by the international community. Civil dissensus, by contrast, 
because it defines the problem as the need for opportunities for 
reasoned discourse, does not insist that an international criminal 
forum be accorded primacy over other alternatives.246 
On the contrary, the flaws of the Tadic judgment, and of ad hoc 
tribunals generally, from the perspective of the model of closure 
raise doubts about whether international fora for war crimes prose­
cutions should always be preferred, especially where alternative 
fora for criminal prosecutions exist.247 The arguments, canvassed 
above,248 for the primacy of international prosecutions over na­
tional fora, are quite tenuous. First, as the analysis of the Tadic 
judgment here suggests, international proceedings are not apolitical 
in terms of the discretion of whom to indict or to prosecute; judges' 
decisions as to how to render their verdicts - or even whether one 
unanimous judgment ought to be issued as opposed to individual 
judicial opinions - reflect political calculations. Although interna­
tional judges and prosecutors may hold different political agendas 
than those involved in national proceedings, both sets of individuals 
have them. Nor, for the reasons noted, can international proceed­
ings be regarded as denationalized.249 Second, the premise that in­
ternational judges have a legal expertise or competence that 
national judges lack, dubious to begin with, fails to address con­
cerns about international humanitarian law's imprecision (relative 
to domestic criminal law) and its origins. It fails to consider how 
the application of international criminal law imposes costs on the 
credibility and arguable fairness of international verdicts, for vic­
tims as well as defendants. Third, the contention that states can 
more credibly judge each other'before international tribunals, while 
perhaps significant with respect to the interstate dimensions of the 
underlying conflicts in Rwanda and the Balkans, is less relevant 
when addressing their significant intrastate dimensions - as from 
the perspective of victims. Fourth, the assumption that greater in­
ternationalism readily translates into greater success in applying 
universal values presumes that international law has been demon­
strably better at overcoming such problems as gender bias. As fem-
246. See generally OsIEL, supra note 6, at 8 n.22 (recognizing the possible role of other 
legal fora for civil dissensus ). 
247. As discussed, this is true at least in the case of Rwanda. See supra section 111.E. 
248. See supra notes 237-45 and accompanying text. 
249. See supra section 111.B. 
2098 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 96:2031 
inist critics have noted, it is not clear that international 
humanitarian law is better at protecting the rights of half of the 
world's population than at least some states' laws and some na­
tional fora.25° Finally, arguments premised on the Security Coun­
cil's expansive precedents under chapter VII of the U.N. Charter 
fail to address skepticism about the representative nature of the 
Council or about its ability to create truly independent courts.251 
While the lack of realistic alternatives for criminal prosecutions 
in the Balkans and doubts about the viability or fairness of 
Rwanda's national proceedings suggest that the present interna­
tional fora may be the best hope in those places for the encourage­
ment of some forms of civil discourse, the existence of these ad hoc 
tribunals should not serve as a substitute for considering the virtues 
of complementary venues. Freed from Nuremberg as the single in­
escapable model, we are better able to put those World War II trials 
in context. We need not give international criminal prosecutions 
greater significance than they deserve.252 Neither after World War 
II nor at any time before have nations relied exclusively, or even 
primarily, on international criminal trials to achieve the mythic but 
worthy goals that have been articulated for today's ad hoc interna­
tional tribunals. Even since World War II, the number of such war 
crimes prosecutions has been dwarfed by myriad efforts, not involv­
ing the use of the criminal law, in pursuit of deterrence, punish­
ment, national reconciliation, et al.253 
H we see the accomplishments of the Rwanda and Yugoslav 
tribunals from the perspective of civil dissensus, it becomes easier 
to accept the possibility that other fora may encourage deliberation 
equally well, and that it may be unwise to rely on the international 
criminal process to achieve goals that would be more quickly or 
better fulfilled through other means. With respect to the Balkans, a 
number of legalistic deliberative processes exist, from the diplo­
matic level - as through the Dayton peace process and beyond -
to the World Court - as in Bosnia's case against Serbia and 
Montenegro and the latter's counterclaim; from other international 
250. See supra notes 148-62 and accompanying text. 
251. See supra notes 182-85 and accompanying text. For related doubts about the need 
for international tribunal "primacy," see also Morris, supra note 170. 
252. For an early plea urging that American lawyers not get "sucked into this infatuation 
with - or addiction to - criminal punishment," see Frank Newman, Commentary, 88 ASIL 
PROC. 253 (1994). 
253. See, e.g., RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 3, at 193-215; Terence S. Coonan, Rescuing 
History: Legal and Theological Reflections on the Task of Making Former Torturers 
Accountable, 20 FORDHAM INTI.. L.J. 512 (1996); Robt-Arriaza, supra note 219, at 281-92. 
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organizations - including the Security Council, its sanctions com­
mittees, and numerous human rights bodies - to nongovernmental 
organizations - such as the Red Cross - and even to national 
courts - as with respect to suits seeking the release of documents 
or civil actions for damages. Seeing these existing fora, as well as 
potential new ones we could devise - such as a U.N. compensation 
commission along the lines of the entity now resolving claims 
against Iraq - as options along a spectrum of deliberative opportu­
nities helps identify tensions among our sometimes conflicting goals 
and emphasizes the need to coordinate efforts across venues. It 
also helps us to match our goals with appropriate fora. 
Some of these other approaches might achieve some of the goals 
we now seek to accomplish better than the international criminal 
process. The goal of expressing community outrage against the ac­
tions of states qua states, for example, might be better suited to 
ongoing proceedings before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
between Serbia and Bosnia or other possible proceedings before 
that court. Particularly since the Yugoslav tribunal can only hear 
cases directed against individuals and has no jurisdiction over the 
crime of aggression, the ICJ remains the only judicial forum for 
making the case that, for example, Serbia, as a government, en­
gaged in a conspiracy to wage aggressive war.254 If, as many be­
lieve, it is important, for its symbolic value if nothing else, to 
establish that states as such can be criminally liable,255 the ICJ may 
be the proper forum in which at least to begin to make that case.256 
In addition, to the extent that the international community has a 
legitimate interest in conflicts such as those within the Balkans and 
Rwanda because of the threats they pose to international peace,257 
these issues might be more appropriately addressed in the ICJ, 
either through contentious cases between states or through requests 
for advisory opinions, as by the Security Council or the General 
254. See generally FRANCIS A. BOYLE, THE BosNIAN PEOPLE CHARGE GENOCIDE at xi­
xxi (1996). But see Kenneth Anderson, Illiberal Tolerance: An Essay on the Fall of 
Yugoslavia and the Rise of Multiculturalism in the United States, 13 VA. J. lNTI.. L. 385, 394-95 
(1993) (arguing that the !CJ is an inappropriate forum to conduct the necessary factual in­
quiry to make out the charge of intent to commit genocide). 
255. See, e.g., Joseph H.H. Weiler, On Prophets and Judges: Some Personal Reflections on 
State Responsibility and Crimes of State, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMES OF STATE 319, 322-29 
(Joseph H.H. Weiler et al. eds., 1989). 
256. See generally Jose E. Alvarez, Judging the Security Counci� 90 AM. J. lNTI.. L. 1, 28-
36 (1996) (describing the role of the ICJ in promoting the international community's expres­
sive values). 
257. See !CTR Statute, supra note 2, at 1 (stating that "the situation in Rwanda . . .  consti­
tute[s] a threat to international peace and security"); ICTY Statute, supra note 2, at 1 (label­
ing the situation in former Yugoslavia "a threat to international peace and security"). 
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Assembly. Whatever one thinks of the Tactic chamber's determina­
tion of the nature of the conflict in the Balkans, rendered in the 
course of that tribunal's determination of whether Tadic can be 
convicted of grave breaches of the Geneva Convention,258 it seems 
odd to suggest that the best forum for judicial consideration of this 
vital legal issue should be a criminal suit against a low-level perpe­
trator before a body with a limited jurisdiction and mandate and 
not in the World Court. 
The goal of establishing an accurate historical record of barba­
rism that is untainted by the needs of the criminal law to render a 
convincing perpetrator-driven account,259 or by the needs of the in­
ternational community to undertake evenhanded prosecutions,260 
may be better suited to truth commissions, to take another exam­
ple. Despite the many variations among truth commissions estab­
lished throughout the world, they are usually designed not to inflict 
legal punishment but as "a kind of non-adversarial process of re­
establishing democratic justice by exposing the truth of what hap­
pened under the dictatorship."261 As commentators have noted, 
such procedures are constructed precisely to provide an accounting 
of what has occurred, both because victims demand it and because 
recording what has occurred is one way to respond to perpetrators' 
assertions of anonymity and immunity.262 Because the process is 
putatively nonadversarial, truth commissions can avoid at least 
some of the problems that undermine the accuracy of judicial histo­
ries. While it might be true that only the crucible of a trial renders 
a convincing verdict with respect to the guilt or innocence of an 
individual,263 such criminal proceedings may not, for reasons dis­
cussed, facilitate the rendering of an accurate account of the scope 
and nature of a massacre as a whole.264 There is certainly little ba­
sis for any assertion that a criminal trial will invariably draw more 
public attention, encourage greater public deliberations, or produce 
258. See supra note 42. 
259. See, e.g., Osiel, supra note 5, at 520-67. 
260. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text. 
261. SA'ADAH, supra note 105 (manuscript at 232). 
262. See, e.g., RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 3, at 193-204; Coonan, supra note 253, at 
512-13. 
263. See, e.g., Akhavan, supra note 38 (manuscript at 3, 95); Scharf & Epps, supra note 
81, at 641. 
264. See supra section III.A. 
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more significant political - or moral - consequences than truth 
commissions.265 
Given doubts that the Rwanda and Yugoslav tribunals will pro­
vide victims much in the way of recompense - psychological or 
otherwise - certain goals relating to the vindication of victims 
might need to be pursued elsewhere - as through civil suits like 
the ones brought by a number of Balkan rape victims against 
Karadzic in federal district court in New York.266 Whatever else 
might be said of such lawsuits,267 the civil cases against Karadzic 
are, in some respects, more inviting vehicles for some of the victims 
of gender-specific violence in the Balkans. Certainly the plaintiffs' 
need to prove damages caused by KaradziC's alleged acts seems 
likely to permit a more thorough airing of victims' stories than was 
possible in the Tadic case, along with an expression of judicial solic­
itude.268 Such a proceeding - or comparable attempts to provide 
265. See, e.g., Suzanne Daley, Winnie Mandela is Defiant, Calling Accusations 'Lunacy,' 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1997, at Al; Suzanne Daley, Winnie Mandela Killed Youth, Apartheid 
Inquiry Is Told, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1997, at A3 (discussing the worldwide publicity gener­
ated by truth commission inquiries into alleged acts by Wmnie Mandela). Even some of the 
principal defenders of the Yugoslav tribunal acknowledge that criminal proceedings can be 
expected neither to establish the "official" truth nor to "substitute for a commission of truth 
based on popular participation." Akhavan, supra note 38 (manuscript at 95). 
266. See Doe v. KaradZi.c, 866 F. Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), revd. sub. nom. Kadic v. 
KaradZic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied 518 U.S. 1005 (1996); see also Mushikiwabo 
v. Barayagwiza, No. 94 Civ. 3627 (JSM), 1996 WL 164496, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 1996) 
(default judgment for over $105 million on behalf of five plaintiffs against Rwanda political 
leader who "played an instrumental role in the torture and massacre of thousands of 
Rwanda's Tutsi minority"). For a brief survey of the requisites of such suits within U.S. 
courts, see RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 3, at 204-11. See also Ralph G. Steinhardt, 
Fulfilling the Promise of Ftlartiga: Litigating Human Rights Claims Against the Estate of Fer­
dinand Marcos, 20 YALE J. lNTI.. L. 65 (1995) (surveying some of the legal issues raised by 
these attempts to supply a civil component to Nuremberg). 
267. See, e.g., Wtlliam Aceves, Affirming the Law of Nations in U.S. Courts: The 
Karadzic [sic] Litigation and the Yugoslav Conflict, 14 BERKELEY J. lNTI.. L. 137 (1996); 
David S. Bloch, Dangers of Righteousness: Unintended Consequences of Kadic v. Karadzic 
[sic], 4 TULSA J. CoMP. & lNTI.. L. 35 (1996); Jordan J. Paust, Suing Karadzic, 10 LEIDEN J. 
INTL. L. 91 (1997); Peter Schuyler Black, Recent Development, Kadic v. Karadzic [sic]: 
Misinterpreting the Alien Tort Claims Act, 31 GA. L. REv. 281 (1996); Amy E. Eckert, Recent 
Development, Kadic v. Karadzic [sic]: Whose International Law?, 25 DENY. J. lNTL. L. & 
POLY. 173 (1996). 
Of course, other civil suits, such as suits for libel threatened by Wmnie Mandela against 
her accusers before the South African Truth Commission, can also present opportunities for 
airing these issues and for public deliberation. 
268. As suggested by commentative gestures offered by governments, such as 
Switzerland's decision to offer token payments to Holocaust survivors, such expressions of 
solicitude mean a great deal to victims. See, e.g., Michael Specter, In Latvia, the First Token 
of Swiss Remorse: $400, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1997, at A4 (reporting victims' reactions to 
Swiss payments); see also Coonan, supra note 253, at 545 (arguing for forms of government 
acknowledgment of atrocities and not for mere dissemination of information). 
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victims with compensation269 - are driven by a need at least to 
pronounce on the amount of compensation that in justice is owed to 
victims - as opposed to a proceeding seeking primarily to punish 
the culprit. Whether or not such civil judgments prove enforceable, 
civil suits are less susceptible to judicial timidity for fear of impos­
ing ex post facto criminal liability. For that reason, such suits are 
more likely to address the many forms of gendered victimization 
imposed by ethnic cleansing.210 
For these reasons, civil suits, controlled by plaintiff/victims and 
their chosen attorneys, and not prosecutors responsive to other 
agendas, may also be more effective in preserving a collective mem­
ory that is more sensitive to victims than some judicial accounts 
rendered in the course of criminal trials.271 Indeed, if studies about 
litigants' relative satisfactions with adversarial versus inquisitorial 
methods of criminal procedure are an accurate guide,272 it may be 
that having greater control of the process, including the selection of 
attorneys and the ability to discover and present one's own evi­
dence and develop one's own strategy, is itself a value for victims, 
and one that is better met through civil suits such as those now 
occurring in United States courts.273 
For similar reasons, victims, including those of gender-specific 
violence, may sometimes find truth commissions or similar 
processes more attractive than international criminal prosecutions. 
As with civil suits, truth commissions do not need to be as con­
cerned about preexisting limits on definitions of international 
crimes, may be better able to expose gender-specific crimes to pub­
lic scrutiny, and may provide victims with greater opportunities to 
269. See, e.g., Robt-Arriaza, supra note 219, at 290-91 (discussing attempts at civil re­
dress); Tetreault, supra note 9, at 204-06 (discussing U.N. Compensation Commission and its 
handling of claims by Kuwaiti rape victims). 
270. Cf. supra notes 148-62 and accompanying text. 
271. Although Karac!ZiC's decision not to appear in the pending civil suit in New York has 
deprived the plaintiffs in that suit of the opportunity to confront him personally during trial, 
this need not be the outcome in all such suits. At least some civil suits may provide plaintiff/ 
victims with the psychological and other relief that has been associated with such courtroom 
confrontations. 
272. See, e.g., JoHN W. THIBAUT & LAURENS WALTER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 67-116 (1975). 
273. Perhaps this factor should, in addition, lead creators of future international criminal 
courts to use less inquisitorial proceedings than the ones now in place for the ad hoc tribunals 
for Rwanda and Yugoslavia. Compare, e.g., GENEVA (Swrrz.) CRIM. PROC. CoDB art. 7 (per­
mitting civil action for damages caused by crime to be brought at the same time and before 
the same court as a criminal action) with ICTY Rules, supra note 33, rule 105 (leaving matters 
of restitution of property to the initiative of the prosecutor but according third parties the 
right to be "summoned" to "justify their claim to the property or its proceeds"). 
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vindicate themselves and tell their stories.274 In addition, it is not 
clear that truth commissions have no deterrent effects. At least 
those truth commission reports that identify culprits by name mo­
bilize shame against offenders and warn future perpetrators not to 
bank on anonymity.21s 
It may also be that an emphasis on the need to provide opportu­
nities for civil deliberation can help us to modify our list of goals, or 
at least refine them to include, for example, the promotion of civil 
society. As is suggested by the progress of the Nunca Mas move­
ment throughout much of South America,276 such truth-telling en­
deavors, whatever their flaws, are often bottom-up grass-roots 
movements rather than top-down undertakings by either national 
governments or the U.N. Such instances of self-help from below 
may reawaken individuals' sense of rights and help the governed to 
demand the restoration of the authority of their own institutions, 
including their judiciary.277 It may be that certain deliberative 
processes are better at assisting the reconstruction of dvil society 
because they empower those engaged in them and do not rely on 
international pressure.21s 
(3) As is implied by (2) above, the model of civil dissensus helps 
refine what it is that we expect the international criminal process to 
accomplish. 
Once we see international criminal prosecutions as only a part, 
perhaps not even the most significant part, of the spectrum of activ­
ities that have always been pursued to achieve the many goals in­
spired by Nuremberg, it becomes easier to prioritize among the 
goals that we now insist must be achieved through proceedings 
before the Rwanda and Yugoslav tribunals. At the same time, the 
model of civil dissensus helps redirect attention to the potential vir­
tues of international criminal prosecutions. 
274. See Llewellyn & Howse, supra note 202, at 10-11, 39-40 (making these arguments-in 
support of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission). 
275. See generally Coonan, supra note 253; Margaret Popkin, El Salvador: A Negotiated 
End to Impunity?, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHrS, s"':pra note 3, at 198. 
276. See generally Coonan, supra note 253. 
277. Cf. Jamie Malamud-Goti, Punishing Human Rights Abuses in Fledgling 
Democracies: The Case of Argentina, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RioHrS, supra note 3, at 160, 
163 (arguing in favor of punishing human rights abuses on the basis that punishment "con­
tribute[ s] to establishing democracy by reasserting the authority of institutions"). 
278. For suggestions along these lines, see Colloquy, supra note 159, at 545, 610-11 (com­
ments of Paul Hoffman); id. at 614 (co=ents of Neil Kritz); SA' ADAH, supra note 105, at 
233-34. If there is, as some assert, an emerging international obligation to defend, protect, 
and promote democratic governance, see, e.g., Robt-Arriaza, supra note 219, at 299, interna­
tional lawyers themselves should be the first to give priority to such grass-roots efforts. 
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World War II's tribunals cannot be credited with achieving all, 
or even a significant part of, the goals that were articulated on be­
half of their creation;279 and this was not merely because those 
tribunals were flawed. Within nation-states, the judicial branch, 
traditionally the weakest, is not expected to carry the weight of gov­
ernance; this is all the more true internationally.28° Attempts to 
make international criminal tribunals carry as much freight as some 
of their advocates recommend - whatever the cost - may endan­
ger alternative processes and possibly undermine competing goals 
for the international community and the United Nations. 
As is evident from the discussion above, many of the Tadic 
bench's problems with respect to collective history, politicization, 
and fairness to defendants and victims, originate in closure's contra­
dictory demands. - International judges might do better if they were 
expected to accomplish fewer things and if they were given clearer 
priorities among these. 
Professor Osiel argues that judges would better accomplish the 
pedagogical purposes of war crimes trials, in terms of preserving 
collective memory, if they were urged to give this goal a higher pri­
ority over the more common purposes of the criminal law, such as 
deterrence and retribution. He argues that judges need to make 
their hisforical accounts, for the sake of collective memory, "reso­
nate more with the public debate beyond the courthouse walls."281 
To this end, he recommends, for example, that judges do more to 
"contextualize" historical arguments by admitting more evidence 
than would be regarded as legally relevant and that they tell a more 
"circuitous" story less likely to portray defendants as "'radical evil' 
incamate."282 He argues that the resulting historical accounts not 
only would be more accurate and nuanced, but also would prove 
less likely "to shut off the very dialogue that most needs to be ini­
tiated among fiercely h ostile opposing camps of political 
partisans. "283 
While Professor Osiel insists that the traditional goals of the 
criminal law, including supplying a plausible verdict against the de­
fendant, are reconcilable with his recommendations, this appears 
doubtful. In the Tadic case at least, where the prosecutors' histori­
cal evidence was not contested by the defense, producing a more 
279. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
280. See Forsythe, supra note 40, at 421. 
281. OsIEL, supra note 6, at 296. 
282. Id. at 296-97. 
283. Id. at 297. 
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nuanced historical account would have required considerable judi­
cial activism, including a demand to the parties that they produce 
additional historians or other policy witnesses. Quite apart from 
the potential impact on the length of Tadic's trial and its costs, such 
activism is likely to be particularly dangerous for judges with such 
tenuous legitimacy and is likely to be seen as embroiling the tribu­
nal even more deeply in the politics of the region.2s4 
We need to consider which tasks are better suited to the judicial 
role, given the context in which the Rwanda and Yugoslav tribunals 
are operating, and adjust our expectations of the goals of interna­
tional criminal trials accordingly. At its best, a trial like TadiC's pro­
duces a plausible verdict as to the guilt or innocence of one 
particular individual. Contrary to Professor Osiel's recommenda­
tions, we may choose to place a higher value on achieving such a 
plausible verdict than on the production of a judicialized history 
that more closely approximates scholarly standards, particularly if 
trying to achieve the latter threatens the success of the former. But 
if so, we need to consider what alternative fora we will rely upon to 
preserve collective memory or whether we are content with flawed 
judicial histories such as that rendered in the Tactic case. Pace 
Osiel, we might opt for flawed historical accounts in the course of 
criminal judgments on the assumption that the process of civil dis­
sensus will correct bad history but is incapable of truly rectifying a 
mistaken verdict against a defendant, at least from the perspective 
of an individual who unjustly serves prison time.285 
This does not mean that war crimes trials have no role in the 
preservation of collective memory. As the preceding description of 
the beneficial effects of the Tadic judgment suggests, even the 
flawed historical account contained in that judgment is likely to 
contribute to collective memory in at least two respects. First, con­
trary to the assumptions of the model of closure, an authoritative 
account for purposes of collective memory, if it ever emerges, may 
take considerable time and will come about through a variety of 
actors and sources, including courtroom-generated accounts. 
Whether one agrees with such revisionist accounts of the Holocaust 
as Daniel Goldhagen's - whose recent portrayal of "Hitler's will-
284. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
285. For a view that at least some historic judicial opinions have proven effective because 
they have not attempted consciously to educate - or accuse - see Sanford Levinson, The 
Rhetoric of the Judicial Opinion, in LAw's STORIES, supra note 84, at 187, 197-200 (discussing 
the absence of historical context in Brown v. Board of Education). See also Robt-Arriaza, 
supra note 3, at 21 (quoting Henry Rousso on victim's need for justice over the needs to 
teach history or raise consciousness). 
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ing executioners" is sharply different from the story conveyed by 
the Nuremberg trials286 - the fact remains that Goldhagen's and 
other revisionist accounts are as much a product of Nuremberg as 
they are responses to it. Today's collective memory of the 
Holocaust owes a great deal to the historical account provided at 
Nuremberg, though it is not limited to it. The same is likely to be 
true of the Tadic judgment's preliminary findings, a partial render­
ing of historic truth that, given its prominence and its source, will 
undoubtedly emerge as a point of reference for further histories of 
the Balkans and especially of the Prijedor region. 
Second, trials such as Tactic's are one way in which accurate his­
torical accounts by others are rendered more likely. While the pro­
ceedings at Nuremberg presented a one-dimensional and 
misleading picture of the Holocaust, they preserved documentary 
and other factual evidence, including eyewitness accounts, that 
could otherwise have been lost. It is equally clear that the effort to 
bring indictments in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda, and the 
Tactic proceeding itself, has led to the preservation of considerable 
evidence, especially oral testimony by survivors. The evidence pro­
duced at The Hague and in Arusha seems destined to be part of 
subsequent accounts of recent history in Rwanda and the 
Balkans.287 
Freed from the need to attempt closure with respect to the full 
panoply of Nuremberg-inspired goals, we might articulate other 
achievable goals for international criminal processes. Along with 
the rendering of plausible verdicts, such trials, if competently done, 
might be expected to establish the truth of certain facts that are put 
directly at issue in the course of particular trials - such as the 
number of beatings, tortures, killings, or rapes committed in certain 
detention camps over a certain period - with greater certainty 
286. See GoLDHAGEN, supra note 227. 
287. The significance of preserving such evidence, particularly corroborated physical evi­
dence of atrocities and sworn eyewitness accounts that have been subjected to cross­
examination, can scarcely be exaggerated. From the Holocaust to the killing fields of Cam­
bodia, the first defense of the guilty has been to deny what happened. See, e.g., Seth Mydans, 
In an Interview, Pol Pot Declares His Conscience is Clear, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1997, at A12 
(reporting Pol Pot's denial that "millions" died as victims of the Khmer Rouge). See gener­
ally Cohen, supra note 147, at 12-22 (discussing the "truth phase" of state crimes). Establish­
ing reliable facts as to the number of victims, the types of crimes committed, and the motives 
of perpetrators - the kind of evidence presented in the Tadi6 case - helps to prevent plausi­
ble denials and seems even more vital where the prospects of renewed violence continue to 
exist. For example, despite the numerous reports of human rights organizations, U.N. bodies, 
and the media, there is today considerable debate about whether 20,000 to 50,000 Bosnian 
women were indeed raped since 1991 or a few thousand. See, e.g., Johnstone, supra note 207, 
at 18. 
June 1998] War Crime Tribunals 2107 
than is possible within truth commissions or within national courts 
that do not have the requisite resources. For families of victims, 
establishing, in the crucible of a criminal trial, the fate of a particu­
lar individual and the circumstances of his or her death has obvious 
significance. Most obviously, international criminal trials, like do­
mestic ones, help to ensure that some perpetrators are made ac­
countable to governmental authority, if not victims as such, and are 
punished. Further, once the international criminal process is seen 
as part of a spectrum of deliberative venues, it becomes easier to 
appreciate that investigations done in anticipation of indictments, 
as well as the indictments themselves, have consequences for other 
deliberative fora; that merely indicting someone like Karadzic, for 
example, because it serves to delegitimize him as a negotiator, may 
have an effect on the outcomes of diplomatic negotiations and may, 
therefore, itself be worth doing even without the certainty of an 
arrest or a conviction. 
(4) Civil dissensus demands an examination of a continuing se­
ries of exchanges across time. Success or failure is not determined by 
examination of one judgment at one moment in time. 
Unlike the model of closure, which focuses attention on the 
judgment,288 civil dissensus suggests that we evaluate the interna­
tional criminal process-that is, that we view the Tactic proceedings 
as part of a continuing series of events that include, but are not 
limited to, the issuance of the judgment and reactions through 1997. 
As J.B. White has noted, the language of a judicial verdict is not 
self-validating, and its acceptance turns on its appeal to the values 
of the community from which it seeks acceptance. As he notes, 
such a legal text "does not conclude the difficulties of the real 
world, but begins a process, a process of its own interpretation."289 
The alternative to the model of closure discourages evaluative 
closure. It implies that we continually reevaluate the Yugoslav and 
Rwanda tribunals as trials progress and as conditions in the affected 
regions change. This suggests that evaluators need to remain mod­
est and accept that at least some of our judgments regarding how 
well TadiC's judges did their job remain historically contingent -
and that even our perceptions of what the judges ought to be doing 
may change.290 
288. See, e.g., Madise Simons, U.N. Panel Convicts Bosnian Serb of War Crimes, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 8, 1997, at Al (suggesting that the judgment and reactions to it would determine 
the future of the tribunal). 
289. WHITE, supra note 202, at 185. 
290. Thus, perceptions of the Balkan tribunal's "anti-Serb" bias may yet change, as trials 
against non-Serbs progress. See, e.g., Mike Corder, Stop-and-go trial adds to U.N. war crime 
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At the same time,• as Osiel implies, civil dissensus is not pre­
mised on moral relativism by either judges, participants, or observ­
ers. Civil dissensus assumes that judges will continue to attempt to 
articulate community values - but that others will respond and 
that these values will evolve as a result. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons suggested, the Tadic judgment is not likely to 
generate closure with respect to collective memory, the fairness or 
political neutrality of the existing rules of humanitarian law as ap­
plied to the recent Yugoslav conflict, or the fairness accorded either 
Tadic or his victims. For the foreseeable future, it seems likely that 
court observers will differ, perhaps vociferously, on such questions 
as the accuracy of the judges' version of history (either for Yugosla­
via as a whole or the Opstina Prijedor region in particular), on 
whether the law condemns all attempts to secure ethnically pure 
nations, on whether the judges were equally fair to prosecution and 
defense, or on whether victims, particularly women, were given 
short shrift during the trial. The prospects for closure with respect 
to broader issues raised in the course of TadiC's trial - such as the 
degree of "collective complicity" by others - seem even more re­
mote. Upon reflection, it is not difficult to see why existing realities 
within Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia greatly diminish the 
prospects for closure on such issues. International processes that 
will probably convict only small numbers of low-level functionaries 
and leave many of their superiors untouched do not seem likely to 
absolve the collective. Further, as in the Tadic case, other Yugoslav 
and Rwanda prosecutions will continue to rely primarily on the tes­
timony of live witnesses - persons who will replicate, inside the 
courtroom, the religious and ethnic divisions that characterize the 
underlying conflicts in these regions. Again and again, Serb will be 
pitted against non-Serb, Hutu against Tutsi. In both tribunals, con­
victions or acquittals will be based, at least in substantial part, on 
credibility findings rendered not by the peers of anyone who was 
involved in the underlying conflicts, but by panels of learned judges 
who do not include a Serb, a Muslim, or a Croat, a Hutu or a Tutsi. 
As suggested by reactions to the Tadic case, perceptions of the re­
sulting international verdicts are likely to fall along predictable eth-
tribunal's woes, AssoCIATED PRESs, June 10, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4870020 (discussing 
new trial against one Croat and three Muslims). 
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nic or religious lines. In relatively few instances are convictions or 
acquittals likely to generate unified societal consensus. 
Nor are skeptics of these proceedings likely to be placated by 
these tribunals' procedures or the circumstances of their establish­
ment. Both tribunals adhere to a novel, untested synthesis of pro­
cedural and evidentiary rules borrowed from both common law and 
civil law traditions. The interpretation of these rules divides the 
very judges charged with their application.291 And the Security 
Council origins of these tribunals con�inue to prompt suspicions, 
and not merely among the local governments involved in mass 
atrocities, that the international criminal process remains the crea­
ture of, and subject to the political agendas of, the superpowers. 
There are doubts that these tribunals are enforcing universal values, 
evenhandedly applied. The view that both tribunals, created in the 
wake of preventable massacres in both regions, are intended merely 
to "salvage some scrap of dignity from what remains of Western 
prestige,"292 stems from suspicion that these efforts are driven by, 
and are certainly not above, politics.293 Under these circumstances 
it would be surprising if resulting verdicts drew universal praise or 
inspired societal consensus, especially among those who perceive 
themselves as targets of these prosecutions, such as the Serbs or the 
Hutu. 
Both proponents and critics of ad hoc international tribunals 
have it too easy. So far proponents have been content to enumer­
ate objectives for these tribunals largely without acknowledging the 
tensions among their lofty goals. They have been content to stress 
the need for international criminal prosecutions only where most 
practical; that is, where both the U.N. seems inclined to act and 
alternatives to ad hoc international tribunals seem even more diffi­
cult. Proponents have generally assumed that when international 
tribunals become available, they need to take precedence over al­
ternatives, including prosecutions in national courts. They have 
mistakenly relied on a model of closure that seeks to replicate the 
strengths of domestic criminal processes while correcting the flaws 
of Nuremberg, and have not tried to provide a coherent account of 
how international prosecutions are supposed to work in unison with 
291. See, e.g., supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text. 
292. Simpson, supra note 23, at 24. 
293. See, e.g., Cotic, supra note 78; Forsythe, supra note 40; Hayden, Reply, supra note 40; 
Rubin, supra note 40. Even the effort to internationalize the Balkan tribunal's bench has 
drawn complaints about some of the nations involved in the judging. See, e.g., Chaney, supra 
note 22, at 82 (noting the irony of a Chinese judge rendering verdicts on human rights viola­
tions); supra note 131 (noting absence of Muslims on bench). 
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other fora, including simultaneous attempts at national prosecu­
tions or truth commissions. In response, critics have needed only to 
point to how many of Nuremberg's flaws are shared by these tribu­
nals and how little agreement truly exists concerning values that are 
solemnly touted, but routinely ignored, under international human­
itarian law. In short, tribunal advocates have been permitted to 
postulate mythical criminal processes and opponents have needed 
only to recycle revisionist critiques of the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
trials. 
It is time to get off the merry-go-round. Both the proponents 
and critics of international criminal prosecutions need to address 
seriously the possibility that from Nuremberg to The Hague and 
Arusha, war crimes prosecutions do not produce closure but, at 
least when effectively conducted, lead to civil dissensus. This im­
plies that both proponents and opponents of international criminal 
prosecutions need to address difficult questions, including whether 
international judges should give priority to the goal of preserving 
collective memory or whether at least some of the goals we now 
seek to pursue through international ad hoc tribunals are better ac­
complished through, for example, national prosecutions, truth com­
missions, civil suits, or other processes. A frank appraisal of what 
we can realistically expect international criminal prosecutions to 
achieve also appears necessary to respond effectively to complaints 
about financial and other costs. Tactic's trial cost the international 
community some twenty million dollars.294 Without knowing 
whether we ought to be comparing this effort to the astronomical 
costs of a full-scale military occupation of Bosnia or to the rela­
tively modest costs of organizing a truth commission, it is difficult to 
say whether such expenditures were worthwhile and ought to 
continue. 
At this juncture, the definitive case for the Yugoslav and 
Rwanda tribunals - and for international trials elsewhere - re­
mains to be made. It may be that, over time, neither tribunal will 
successfully promote civil dissensus; if, for example, judgments sti­
fle rather than encourage reasoned debates or if future trials or in­
dictments receive dwindling public notice.295 It may be that 
294. See ScHARF, supra note 3, at 224. 
295. It is not clear that extensive publicity will be accorded to other trials in the Rwanda 
or Yugoslav tribunals. While "[t]hroughout the summer of 1996 • . .  live television coverage 
of the Tadi[c] trial was carried throughout Bosnia," only a limited Serbian audience with 
access to private cable TV transmission had access to it. See id., at 218. While initially the 
Tadic trial drew extensive worldwide media attention, such interest dwindled by its end. See 
id. at xii, 221; see also Akhavan, supra note 38 (manuscript at 67-73) (discussing the denial of 
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alternative approaches, including truth commissions or adjudica­
tions in national courts, might be better at promoting civil dissen­
sus, at least with respect to some issues, especially if the 
internalization of norms is best pursued through forums with demo­
cratic participation and legitimacy and not through authoritarian 
norms imposed from without. Contrary to what is argued here, 
some might contend that civil dissensus reflects a misguided or na­
ive trust in the virtues of discourse and is an inappropriate construct 
except with respect to societies that ar� already committed to dis­
cursive democratic pluralism.296 Or perhaps we may ultimately de­
cide that the models of closure and civil dissensus need not be seen 
as wholly incompatible and that aspects of both can be usefully 
adapted, depending on the circumstances in the societies most di­
rectly affected, to promote all or most of the goals we have in mind. 
It may be that aspects of both visions need to be pursued through a 
multi-pronged strategy, involving legal and nonlegal fora, that as­
signs particular goals to the most suitable entity or set of 
procedures. 
The question of how we justify these or other ad hoc criminal 
tribunals is not purely of academic interest. We have, as yet, no 
consistent vision of when, if ever, it is appropriate to pursue inter­
national criminal trials as opposed to national prosecutions, truth 
commissions, general amnesties, pardons, or other measures.297 
While some have suggested that international criminal trials must 
be pursued once offenses in a region cross a certain threshold of 
gravity,29s the argument seems to be premised, tenuously, on unex-
media access for Yugoslav tribunal trials and concluding that its trials are "primarily an elitist 
exercise"). 
296. Some have argued, for example, that a nation defined on ethnic, as opposed to lib­
eral terms, does not "take part in intellectual debate" but "enters the political arena and 
advances the claim of one nation, its own, against others. It is interested in ethnological, 
historical or philological scholarship only to the extent to which these sciences can substanti­
ate its ideological assertions and further its political aims." Jakob Rosel, Nationalism and 
Ethnicity: Ethnic Nationalism and the Regulation of Ethnic Conflict, in WAR AND ETHNICITY, 
supra note 205, at 145, 152. Others, such as Anne Sa'adah, have argued that even liberal 
states do not always encourage open discussions on all issues. On the contrary, she contends 
that reconciliation efforts in successful democratic transitions involve processes that permit a 
"negotiated memory," including efforts to "forgive and forget" that "often stand in tension 
with values central to the liberal project." SA' ADAH, supra note 105 (manuscript at 1) (draw­
ing from the experiences of postwar Germany and post-Revolutionary War United States); 
see also Cohen, supra note 147, at 47 (arguing that social control can be achieved by eradicat­
ing memory). 
297. See generally Morris, supra note 170; Sheila O'Shea, Interaction Between 
International Criminal Tribunals and National Legal Systems, 28 N.Y.U. J. INTL. L. & PoL. 
367 (1996) (noting variety of state statutes to implement anticipated tribunal orders). 
298. See, e.g., Goldstone, supra note 21, at 492-501 (contrasting the South African truth 
commission with the Yugoslav and Rwanda tribunals). 
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anrined assumptions about the superiority of international fora and 
does not contain reliable criteria for choosing among options. And 
even if we had such criteria, difficult issues of consistency arise 
given the distinct audiences to which we seek to appeal. From a 
victim's perspective, for example, it is not clear why a person who 
tortures civilian prisoners in the Balkans merits an international 
criminal trial while someone who does the same in South Africa 
does not.299 
Proponents of international criminal prosecutions need a justifi­
catory model other than closure. This is especially the case since, 
under the premises of closure, international criminal proceedings 
that fail to meet the preconditions for generating societal consensus 
do not just fail, they undermine the goals that have been used to 
justify the creation of international criminal tribunals. The apostle 
of closure argues that unless the present ad hoc tribunals are given 
the resources to accomplish closure on all fronts - with respect to 
the societies affected, the international community, possible de­
fendants, and victims - they should be shut down, as they only 
undermine the rule of law, along with all the other goals, from de­
terrence to national reconciliation.300 There is, therefore, consider­
able risk that those who live by the model of closure may force ad 
hoc tribunals to perish by it. 
299. Cf. id. (arguing that the "human rights abuses" in South Africa should be the subject 
of Nuremberg-style trials, while the serious crimes within the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
warrant criminal liability). As TadiC's trial suggests, many of the trials at The Hague are 
likely to involve charges of violations of the laws and customs of war and not genocide; many 
are likely to involve offenses that are arguably no worse than many now being revealed to the 
South African Truth Commission. 
300. These concerns appear repeatedly among advocacy pieces on behalf of the tribunals, 
both in academe and in the popular press, and are evident even among the tribunals' judges 
and prosecutors. See Richard J. Goldstone, No Justice in Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1997, at 
A17; Meron, Answering for War Crimes, supra note 3, at 2-3. In the summer of 1997, Chief 
Judge Cassese suggested that the Balkan tribunal's judges should resign en masse in protest 
unless there were attempts to bring Karac!Zic and Mladic to The Hague. See SCHARF, supra 
note 3, at 225. 
